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Abstract 
Regulation, Returns and Systematic Risk: The Case of the UK 
Privatised Utilities 
by Gioia MR Pescetto 
Following the privatisation programme of public utilities implemented by the UK 
government in the 1980s and early 1990s, an interesting debate on the impact of 
regulation on the cost of equity capital has emerged. While the effects of regulatory 
announcements have been studied extensively in the USA, there is very little systematic 
evidence in the UK. This thesis partly redresses this imbalance by analysing the impact 
of regulatory announcements on the ex-post returns of equity capital and systematic risk 
of three utility industries in the UK, namely the electricity, telecommunications and 
water industries. 
The main objective of this thesis is to test the impact of regulatory announcements that 
relate to competition, pricing and the quality of services on the return and risk of equity 
capital. By using an event-study type methodology, the thesis attempts to isolate the 
effects of regulation from technical and market uncertainties. The methodology 
normally used in this type of studies is extended to adjust for the well-documented 
problem in financial time series of volatility clustering and to allow for changes in the 
systematic risk through time. 
Overall, the results in the empirical chapters reveal some important issues. While it is 
clear from the debate in the literature that the cost of capital influences the choice of 
regulatory parameters, this thesis provides evidence to support the view that regulation 
in turn alters the cost of equity capital by affecting the ex-post returns and systematic 
risk of both individual regulated companies and industries. Although the direction and 
size of these effects of regulation are not always easy to predict, there is evidence to 
suggest that they may depend crucially on the structure and competitive posture of the 
industry, as well as technological and market conditions and the parameters of the 
regulatory system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s the UK government pursued a massive programme of privatisation of 
publicly owned enterprises, in particular public utilities, which has been emulated 
throughout the world. Initially, the transfer of ownership did not alter the competitive 
posture of these industries and thus regulatory arrangements had to be set up to 
maintain, and in some cases improve, the quality of service, while protecting consumers 
against monopolistic exploitation. 
Typically, the main regulatory emphasis in relation to public utilities has been on price 
regulation. In the UK, price regulation is implemented through the price-cap system, 
which allows the regulated utility to increase prices by something less than the increase 
in the general price level. A predetermined 'productivity factor', X, is subtracted from 
the price index, RPI, to determine the increase in rates that will be allowed without 
regulatory approval. I f costs increase less than RPI-X, then the shareholders will 
benefit. Thus, the price-cap system, by de-coupling prices charged from profits earned, 
attempts to provide the cost reduction incentives that are absent from the rate-of-return 
regulation, traditionally used in the US. The RPI-X regulation involves a combination 
of judgements about asset values, appropriate rates of return on these assets and 
expected capital and operating expenditures. In this respect, one of the most 
controversial regulatory issues relates to the judgement on the level of risk associated 
with the regulated companies, which is essential in the determination of an acceptable 
and appropriate expected rate of return and cost of capital. The literature recognises 
that the cost of capital is likely to be endogenous to the regulatory process itself, since 
regulation is an on-going dynamic process that affects the characteristics of the 
investor's cash flows. However, the direction of this effect is ambiguous, both 
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theoretically and empirically. Models of the determination of the cost of capital of 
regulated firms, hence, should include regulation explicitly. 
Although the impact of regulation on share prices has been extensively studied in the 
context of the US rate-of-return regulation (Teets, 1992; and Binder, 1985a), the effects 
of regulation on the return of public utilities' stock in the UK is still an under-
researched area (Sawkins, 1996; and Antoniou and Pescetto, 1997). In order to address 
this imbalance, this thesis analyses the impact of regulatory announcements on the 
returns and risk of equity capital for three of the UK utility industries, namely the 
electricity, telecommunications and water industries. The primary objective of this 
thesis is to test the impact of regulatory announcements that relate to competition, 
pricing and the quality of services on the return and risk of equity capital. However, 
unlike most previous studies (Sawkins, 1996) that use the methodology developed by 
Binder (1985b) and Karafiath (1988), this thesis extends that methodology to adjust for 
the well-documented problem in financial time series of volatility clustering and to 
allow for changes in the systematic risk through time. By using an event-study type 
methodology, the thesis attempts to isolate the effects of regulation from technical and 
market uncertainties. This investigation should shed light on whether regulatory 
announcements and decisions, such as the setting of pricing rules, may alter the risk 
perceived by the providers of capital, in particular equity capital. The regulators need to 
understand the nature of the effects that different types of regulation may have on the 
cost of equity capital of regulated companies, since adverse share price reactions to 
regulatory announcements may increase the cost of equity through their impact on the 
companies' systematic risk. 
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More specifically, this thesis contributes to the literature by: 
• Extending the event study methodology to analyse the effects of regulatory 
announcements on the return and systematic risk of regulated utilities. 
• Incorporating time variation in the estimation of systematic risk. 
• Analysing the overall impact of each type of regulatory announcements on the 
return and systematic risk of privatised utilities. 
• Recognising that regulatory announcements may have a different impact across the 
industry, since individual companies may face different problems and are subject to 
different price regulation rules, in the case of the water industry. 
• Attempting to estimate the overall regulatory risk. 
• Providing the first systematic investigation of the above issues for three UK 
privatised utilities with very diverse industry structures and potential for developing 
competition. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the main 
relevant issues in the economics of regulation, with a particular focus on the regulatory 
environment faced by the privatised utilities in the UK. This chapter defines regulation; 
critically reviews the objectives and outcomes of regulation and the two main systems 
of price regulation, namely the rate-of-return and the price-cap systems; analyses the 
specific regulatory system for the privatised utilities in the UK; and, finally, discusses 
the effects of regulation on the rate of return and the cost of capital of regulated firms. 
Chapter 2 classifies unanticipated regulatory announcements by their expected main 
effect and tests their impact on the returns of equity capital of the Regional Electricity 
Companies (RECs) and the power generating companies in England and Wales, both at 
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the level of individual companies and as equally-weighted portfolios of RECs and 
generators. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 use a similar classification of regulatory 
announcements to test their effect on the systematic risk of British Telecom (BT) and 
the water industry in England and Wales, respectively. From a methodological point of 
view, chapter 2 extends the methodology developed by Binder (1985b) and Karafiath 
(1988) to overcome the problem of serial correlation in the volatility of equity returns. 
In addition, the chapter also tests the informational content of individual 
announcements. 
The methodology adopted in chapter 2 is an improvement over the methodology 
normally used in the literature for this type of investigation. Applied to the electricity 
industry, it allows for issues of competition and pricing, and their regulation, to be 
evaluated across the industry and provides evidence in relation to the impact of 
regulation on the return of equity capital. It also shows that regulatory announcements 
have an informational content and thus potential for altering the systematic risk. 
However, the methodology adopted in chapter 2 also suffers from a number of 
drawbacks. In particular, it is not possible to distinguish whether the observed impact 
on returns is due to changes in systematic risk or changes to the unsystematic 
component of returns. In addition, the parameters of the market model are assumed to 
remain constant through time. Therefore, chapter 3 and 4 build on the results of chapter 
2 by utilising methodologies that overcome these problems. Specifically, chapter 3 
allows for time variations in systematic risk and directly tests the impact of 
announcements on the estimated time-varying beta of BT. In chapter 4, an alternative 
methodology to allow for time-variation in systematic risk is adopted and an attempt is 
9 
made to provide an overall estimate of regulatory risk for the water industry of England 
and Wales over the sample period. 
In summary, as it will be further discussed in the concluding chapter, the thesis 
contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of regulation on the cost of capital 
of regulated firms at two main levels. Firstly, it analyses the effect of regulation on 
three industries with very different market structures: and technology. Secondly, it tests 
different ways of extending the event study methodology to overcome some of the well-
documented problems; in the empirical literature. 
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Chapter 1 
Regulation of Public Utilities : An Overview of the Issues 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The literature on the economics of regulation is vast and deals with many and diverse 
topics, ranging from the traditional economic problem of the exploitation of consumers 
by the monopolist, with the associated setting of 'fair' prices and output levels, to 
problems of a more 'political' nature, such as the objectives of the regulator. There is a 
wealth of both theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the whole spectrum of 
economic problems in relation to regulated industries and products. This initial chapter 
reviews some of the main issues in the literature, focusing throughout on the regulatory 
environment faced by the privatised utilities in the UK. In particular, Section 1.1 
defines regulation and presents the main economic reasons for regulating an industry. 
Section 1.2 offers a critical review of the objectives and outcomes of regulation, 
including some of the main theoretical approaches. The two most widely adopted 
regulatory systems, namely the rate of return and the price cap regulation, are reviewed 
in Section 1.3, while Section 1.4 analyses the specific system of regulation applied to 
the privatised utilities in the UK, including its effects on firm's behaviour and 
competition. The chapter then proceeds to review and discuss in Section 1.5 the effects 
of regulation on the rate of return and the cost of equity capital of regulated companies. 
Section 1.6 concludes the chapter. 
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1.1 DEFINITION AND RATIONALE FOR ECONOMIC 
R E G U L A T I O N 
Government intervention in the private sector of developed economies in the form of 
regulation has been widespread for many decades. In the UK, with the privatisation of 
public utilities, regulation has increased recently, especially, but not exclusively, in 
terms of price regulation. However, finding a general definition of regulation is very 
difficult. For example, should government macroeconomic policy measures, such as 
fiscal or monetary measures, be considered regulatory instruments, alongside price 
control, exchange rate restrictions, or minimum wage legislation? The view taken here 
is that such an approach is far too general and that regulation cannot be seen as 
including all governmental activities. In this thesis regulation refers to statute law and 
the associated delegated legislation, which enables government departments and 
agencies to constrain the activities of firms and individuals in the private sector, within 
the framework of the policies pursued by the government (Peacock, 1984). 
The economic rationale for regulating business can be found in the economy's failure, or 
perceived failure, to reach a competitive equilibrium. It is thus generally associated 
with market failure and in particular with the existence of natural monopolies, economic 
rents, insufficient or imperfect control of resources, externalities, asymmetric and costly 
information, imperfect bargaining and/or unequal bargaining power (Breyer, 1982). In 
these cases, orthodox economic theory suggests that the government has an important 
role to play in intervening in the private ownership of firms and property. State 
ownership is one extreme form of intervention in a continuum of governance structures 
that reflect the degree of government intervention in the economy. Regulation is just 
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one of the forms of government intervention, which has acquired a prominent role in the 
post-privatisation era. 
While the issue of privatisation has an accentuated political profile and can be simply 
justified in terms of an ideological preference for private rather than public ownership, 
economists have attempted to compare the consequences on resource allocation of the 
two forms of governance. Theoretical arguments in favour of privatisation tend to be 
based on the belief that, because of government failure and bureaucratic inefficiency, 
state ownership has greater harmful effects on a market economy than regulation, 
although it is well recognised that regulation has costs too. As some forty years ago 
Ronald Coase (1960) wrote in his seminal article referring to market failure: "All 
solutions have costs, and there is no reason to suppose that governmental regulation is 
called for simply because the problem is not handled well by the market or the f irm." I f 
the traditional case in favour of public ownership has rested with considerations of 
allocative efficiency (Rees, 1984), the case for private ownership traditionally rests on 
both the market incentives to improve technical or productive efficiency and the 
penalties imposed by the market for failing to do so. It is the interaction of product and 
capital market pressures that ensures efficiency gains from privatisation: competitive 
product markets penalise persistent under-performance, while competitive capital 
markets penalise managerial 'slack' (Kuehn, 1975; and Singh, 1975). In other words, 
inefficiencies in production are revealed by product markets and capital markets have a 
role in restoring efficiency1. In the presence of market failure, however, government 
1 It should be stressed at this point, however, that the arguments in favour of 
privatisation tend to focus mainly on technical efficiency and often ignore allocative 
efficiency and aspects of economic distribution and stability (Jackson and Price, 1994, 
ch 1). 
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intervention, often in the form of regulation, is needed to restore some of the functions 
normally performed by competitive markets. 
The argument for regulating natural monopolies is well known. Some industries cannot 
efficiently support more than one firm, due to large economies of scale. Under these 
conditions, production costs would increase i f more than one firm were to supply the 
market. However, the producing monopolist, i f unregulated, may cut down production 
in order to raise prices, up to the point where the higher prices no longer compensate for 
the lost revenue from lower production. Therefore, when economies of scale render 
competition 'wasteful', the regulator aims at setting a price near to the incremental cost, 
in order to induce the monopolist to expand output to a socially desirable level. In 
addition, the regulation of a natural monopoly can also be needed to prevent a resource 
transfer from consumers to investors, to prevent the concentration in the monopolist's 
hands of substantial political and social power, and finally to protect consumers from 
unjustified discrimination (Breyer, 1982). 
An important role of regulators is indeed to monitor the distribution of rents and 
distinguish between economic rents that are due to an efficient use of resources and 
rents that are due to the exploitation of a monopolistic position, luck, or circumstances. 
The emphasis placed by the regulator in this case is on a fairer income distribution 
within society, and in particular between producers and consumers. Regulation should 
be designed to discourage the appropriation by the producer of increased economic rents 
that are due to the introduction of more efficient economic processes, or more efficient 
and effective management. The producer should be compelled to transfer at least part 
of these benefits onto the consumer. 
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One of the main problems encountered in the pricing of the product of some regulated 
firms is created by the existence of externalities in either production or consumption, i.e. 
discrepancies between the social and private costs and benefits. Even in markets 
without monopoly power, regulation may still be called for i f the unregulated price of a 
good is not based on the true social cost of producing it. The difference between private 
price and social cost is known as spillover cost, or benefit, and is due to the presence of 
externalities. Spillover benefits, or the presence of positive externalities, are often 
associated with the public provision of services such as education and health, while 
economic regulation is more commonly used to attenuate the effects of spillover costs, 
or negative externalities. Once again, the argument for regulation is based on the 
principle of avoiding economic waste by rectifying economic inefficiencies. The 
textbook example is the instance of pollution, where regulation can be used to 
internalise the costs of pollution into the private choice of optimal output. 
A further cause of market failure is the lack of sufficient information on both production 
and its output to support a well-functioning and competitive product market. 
Information has the distinct characteristics of being a commodity often expensive to 
produce and of quality difficult to monitor. However, once produced, information is 
often easy and cheap to disseminate, or, even worse, it may be very difficult to keep 
information private. I f information has the public good characteristic of non-
excludability, potential producers of information will be discouraged from producing it. 
And even i f excludability were possible, it would not be easy for consumers to monitor 
the quality of information and thus the market for information may fail anyway. The 
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proponents of regulation argue that regulation is needed to assist the producers of 
information and control the quality and type of information provided in order to protect 
the public. In particular, with the development of the economics of information in the 
early 1980s, the control of natural monopolies begun to be analysed as an asymmetric 
information problem, where the firm is better informed about technology and market 
than the regulator (Loeb and Magat, 1979; Baron and Myerson, 1982; and Sappington, 
1982 and 1983). The focus of most of the theoretical literature on regulation under 
asymmetric information is the control of consumer prices. However, as Laffont and 
Tirole (1993) point out, "while this is an important dimension of regulation, many i f not 
most regulatory schemes that have been tried also make use of observed accounting data 
such as costs or profits." (p xviii) A well known theoretical result of the literature that 
takes into account costs data, as well as price data, is that the rents of the regulated firm, 
gained because of its superior information set, can be reduced i f the regulator bears part 
of the costs. This creates an incentive problem, since cost sharing reduces the regulated 
firm's motivation to reduce costs. The literature on this issue concentrates on the design 
of incentive schemes and their sensitivity to changes in market conditions under 
uncertainty2. 
The above theoretical arguments in favour of regulation have been supported by a 
significant body of empirical literature. Although empirical comparisons of state-
owned and private firms raise many methodological concerns, including problems of 
benchmarking and selection bias, several studies have been conducted comparing the 
profitability and efficiency of state versus private ownership firms. There is a general 
2 For a review of the published work of Laffont and Tirole in this area, see Laffont and 
Tirole (1993). 
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agreement among the large majority of these studies that state-owned enterprises tend to 
be less profitable and efficient than privately owned firms (Borcherding, Pommerehne 
and Schneider, 1982; Boardman and Vining, 1989; Vining and Boardman, 1992; 
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter, 1994; Majumdar, 1996; and Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2000). However, there is also some support that, at least in some cases, 
liberalisation without transfer of ownership can generate improvements in productive 
efficiency (Kay and Thompson, 1986) and thus factors other than ownership may also 
be relevant in determining firm's performance (Kole and Mulherin, 1997)3. Supported 
by this wealth of evidence, over the past two decades, governments world-wide have 
embarked on privatisation programmes that have reduced state ownership by about one-
half (Gibbon, 2000). The phenomenon of privatisation has not been confined to Europe, 
though the pace of change in Eastern Europe and Britain in the 1980s and 1990s has 
been somewhat unique. It has been a world-wide phenomenon also involving many 
newly industrialised countries of Africa, South America and South-East Asia. 
1.2 A C R I T I C A L V I E W OF REGULATION 
The growth of regulation in many countries and industries during the recent decades has 
generated concern over the ability of the regulatory regimes to achieve their economic 
objectives and eliminate market inefficiencies. Regulation has been criticised on many 
accounts and authors have argued that, at least in some cases, too little is achieved in 
3 The evidence of non-superiority of private firms should also be noted (Millward, 
1982). 
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terms of improved efficiency as compared to the high costs of regulating. Empirical 
evidence on the costs of regulation has been long available. For example, in the 1970s 
the annual direct costs of regulation in the USA were estimated to range between US$3 
billion and US$6 billion (MacAvoy, 1979), while the annual indirect costs were 
estimated to range between US$60 billion and US$180 billion (Sommers, 1978). In the 
same decade, before the health, safety and environment regulation in the USA, the 
companies subsequently regulated grew faster before than after the regulation was 
imposed, as compared to other similar companies. After regulation, the regulated 
companies grew at an annual average rate of 0.4%, as compared to 2.1% for the 
unregulated companies. They also appear to charge relatively higher prices and produce 
relatively lower output (MacAvoy, 1978). Other critics emphasise the excessive delays 
in the decision process, which characterise the regulatory process. The examples here 
are many, from the ten years that it took for the US Food and Drug Administration in 
the 1970s to decide on the standards regarding the percentage of peanuts in peanut 
butter, to the seven years needed to set the requirements on car brakes standards (Breyer 
and Stewart, 1979). Accusations of unfairness and of lacking legitimacy have also been 
directed to regulation, on the grounds that most regulators are appointed, not elected 
(Freedman, 1975). Critics have questioned the procedures for controlling the great 
power of regulators and argued that regulators may be 'captured' by the industry and end 
up serving the interests of the industry, instead of the public (Stigler, 1971). 
As regulation widened its scope in most industrialised countries, a new strand of 
literature emerged and shifted interest from market inefficiencies to bureaucratic 
inefficiencies. This literature emphasised the political nature of regulation and the 
tendency for regulators to pursue their own goals. I f regulators are individuals 
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accountable to the electorate, either directly or indirectly through the government, 
organised interest groups, such as regulated industries, may be in a better position to 
influence the regulator than consumer groups. This approach implies that regulators, 
instead of achieving efficiency gains and promoting the public interest, could be 
'captured' by the industry and operate primarily for the industry's benefit. Some 
evidence for this hypothesis is again provided by the regulatory experience in the USA. 
Stigler (1962 and 1964) investigated the effect of regulation on both electricity prices 
and costs in securities markets. He found that electricity prices in regulated states were 
no different from prices in unregulated states; in addition, he found no evidence that the 
introduction of the Securities and Exchange Commission saved the purchasers of new 
issues any money, after costs were taken into account. 
The complete capture of the regulatory agency by a pressure group is also likely to arise 
opposition from other groups that are adversely affected. In this case, a balance of 
interests will occur and the ensuing 'equilibrium' will crucially depend on the 
organisation costs faced by the opposing group (Peltzman, 1976). Furthermore, the 
capture of the regulator should not simply be seen in the context of total control of the 
industry over the regulator. There are more subtle forms of capture when the regulated 
parties manage to influence the regulator's views and activities, or manage to insure a 
mediocre performance, or non-performance, of the regulator. Posner (1974) argued that 
there is a life cycle for regulatory institutions. When a new regulatory environment is 
established, the participants are committed to correct market failures and inefficiencies 
and achieve the goals of the welfare economics approach to regulation. However, the 
regulated industry will gradually establish its influence over the regulator and 
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increasingly affect regulatory decisions. Subsequent regulators are also likely to lack 
the enthusiasm and commitment of the original regulator. 
In particular, Stigler (1971) argues that regulation is a good demanded by interest 
groups and supplied by regulators who maximise their political support. Peltzman 
(1976), building on Stigler's framework, shows that regulators redistribute surplus 
(wealth) since their political support is a function of producer and consumer welfare. In 
Peltzman's model, the regulator will never choose a corner solution, thereby 
maximising the wealth of only one group, unless the other group is politically 
powerless. Hence, the regulator will always dampen any shocks hitting profits in the 
industry. For example, the benefits of an increase in demand will not all go to the 
industry, but they will be shared with consumers. 
According to Stigler's model, the politician's objective function is stated as follows: 
where Wj is the wealth of group i, for i=l,2; Mj is positive; and there are no inter-group 
dependencies, so that Mi2=0. This objective function is then maximised subject to the 
following total wealth constraint: 
where Vi > 0, but V ) 2 < 0. That is, the total wealth to be distributed is limited. 
M = M ( W , , W 2 ) (1.1) 
V = W, + W 2 = V(W, ,W 2 ) (1.2) 
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Peltzman extended the above model to price-entry regulation and he derived 
implications for the price-profits outcome and the demand for new regulation. Under 
this framework, the political process is constraint through the setting of a maximum or 
minimum price, together with control entry. The majority generating function is given 
as follows: 
where p is the price of the regulated output; n is the wealth of the producers; M p < 0; 
and M n > 0. The relevant constraint here is given by cost and demand conditions, 
summarised by the following profit function: 
where c are production costs and are a function of the quantity of output. The formal 
problem for a successful regulator is to maximise the following Langrangian 
expression: 
M = M(p,n) (1.3) 
TC = f (p ,c) (1.4) 
L = M(p, n) + X(n - f (p, c)) (1.5) 
with respect to p, ;rand A. This yields: 
= M „ = - X (1.6) 
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Equation (1.6) implies that the marginal political product of an increase in profits by a 
pound, MK, must equal the marginal political product of a price cut, -Mp,that costs a 
pound of profits, since f p is the profit loss per a pound price reduction and must be 
greater than zero. A result of this formulation is that pure 'producer protection' can be 
rational only i f there is no marginal consumer opposition to higher prices, and pure 
'consumer protection' requires no marginal support for higher profits. 
Some interesting implications for the pattern of regulatory choice can be derived from a 
more formal treatment of the interaction between productivity and growth and rational 
political choice. Consider a market already subject to regulation and in a political 
equilibrium. Then consider the effects on this equilibrium of a parametric shift, dx, in 
either the cost or demand function. To obtain the effect of the shift on the p-n 
configuration generated by regulation, we must solve: 
dp/dx 
drc/dx 
dk/dx 
= - [ L , J (1-7) 
where /', j denotesp, nor X. In the case of a cost shift, we obtain: 
dp + fP'MK 
dx - ( A / w - ^ ) - / X r 
(1.8) 
The denominator of equation (1.8) is positive by a necessary condition for a maximum, 
so that the sign of the whole equation depends on the sign of the numerator, which also 
turns out to be positive. Thus, a shift in either demand or costs has an effect on price in 
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the same direction. The most interesting insight provided by equation (1.8) is that a 
price change has two distinct components: a 'political' component and an 'economic' 
component. The first term in the numerator, X f p x , is essentially a 'substitution effect' 
similar to that faced by unregulated firms: under the assumption of profit maximisation, 
a higher marginal cost calls for a higher product price. The second term, fxfpM„n, is a 
'political wealth' effect: the disposable surplus has shrunk, and this forces the regulator 
to reduce his purchases of political support. The regulator wil l , in general, not force the 
entire adjustment onto one group. In particular, consumers will be called on to buffer 
some of the producer losses. The case of a shift in demand is more complex, because the 
demand function enters directly into the M function. 
What emerges from the above is a number of working hypotheses about the nature of 
price and profit adjustments under regulation. Various possibilities can be stated. 
Firstly, regulation will tend to be more heavily weighted toward 'producer protection' in 
depressions and toward 'consumer protection' in expansions. Secondly, the tendency of 
regulators to change prices infrequently ought to be stronger when demand changes 
occur than when cost changes occur. This follows from the opposing wealth and 
substitution effects in the case of a shift in demand, but not in the case of a cost change. 
Here failure to change a price can be interpreted to mean that the opposing effects offset 
each other. Thirdly, studies that show regulation to be ineffective, such as Stigler and 
Friedland (1962) should be re-examined. Fourthly, it is very often difficult to 
distinguish between the political incentives from corresponding profit-maximising 
incentives. Finally, regulation should reduce conventional measures of owner risk. By 
buffering the firm against demand and costs changes, the variability of profits (and 
stock prices) should be lower than otherwise. To the extent that cost and demand 
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changes are economy-wide, regulation should reduce systematic as well as diversifiable 
risk. Peltzman's main conclusion, thus, is that the rational regulator will seek a 
structure of costs and benefits that maximises political returns. This search for political 
advantage wil l in turn lead the regulator to suppress some economic forces that might 
otherwise affect the price structure. Therefore, it cannot be clear a priori what the 
effects of regulation are on either profits, prices or returns. 
There are indeed serious theoretical grounds for doubting some of the basic rationale for 
regulation highlighted in the previous section. Firstly, there is the view that, i f costless 
private bargaining were possible, the allocative problems created by monopoly power 
and externalities would be 'bargained away' in a well-functioning market. According to 
this view, private bargaining could induce the monopolist to produce the competitive 
output in exchange for an appropriate compensation to cover its loss of profits (Gravelle 
and Rees, 1992, p 516). In addition, bargaining could also induce the party who has 
legal control over the level of externality to internalise in its own decision making 
process the effects of the externality onto the other party (Coase, 1960). In reality, 
bargaining is not costless for a number of reasons, spanning from failure to agree on the 
division of the efficiency gains, to difficulties in communication and consensus 
gathering in externality situations with a large number of participants, where the free 
rider problem may also apply. Improving the allocation of property rights is likely to 
ameliorate bargaining, but it is unlikely to solve all bargaining problems. 
The main theoretical arguments in support of regulatory caution are however to be 
found in the theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), price 
discrimination (Pigou, 1962), and the argument that the monopolist is faced with an 
25 
elastic demand for its services. The theory of the second best formalises the inability to 
readily determine the level of prices needed to correct the inefficiencies resulting from 
the difference between monopolistic prices and true economic costs, because it is 
relative prices, and not absolute prices, that direct purchasing decisions. According to 
this theory, thus, a monopolist may indeed raise prices, but an equal degree of 
monopoly throughout the economy could lead relative prices to be roughly similar to 
those of competition. Although this is a very valid argument in theory, it is very 
difficult to apply in practice, given the consideration that needs to be given to the wider 
set of relative prices. 
Finally, there is the argument of price discrimination, based on the view that the 
monopolist will not necessarily lower output i f it can charge different customers two or 
more differential prices. In this case, the argument that regulation reduces economic 
waste weakens; however, distributional concerns arise as consumer surplus is 
transferred onto the producer. Although in most industries it may be difficult for a 
monopolist to apply price discrimination, in the case of many public utilities price 
discrimination is regularly used, given the difficulty of reselling the service received. In 
order to discriminate effectively, a monopolist must also be able to determine the 
demand elasticity of different customers over different price ranges and service 
characteristics. Indeed, the demand for the monopolist's product can be fairly elastic to 
price, as in the case for example of residential telephone services. In these cases, even 
in the absence of regulation, the monopolist needs to consider the effects on demand of 
a change in price. In addition, the threat of entry into the industry adds constraints onto 
the monopolist's price decision. Of course, it must be recognised that these arguments 
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do not apply to situations in which entry barriers faced by new firms into a monopolistic 
industry are high and, as in the case of many utilities, demand is fairly inelastic to price. 
In conclusion, governmental intervention is not costless and distorts the distribution of 
wealth and income. Whether intervention is economically justified or not must be 
determined on a case by case basis. It has often been argued that intervention is 
justified when the beneficiaries can more than compensate the losers out of their gains. 
In other words, i f the benefit to the victims of pollution is larger than the additional 
costs imposed on the consumers of the output of the polluting firm, then intervention 
may be justified. However, this is a rather simplistic way of analysing this complex 
problem. Since this 'compensation' to losers is only hypothetical, the argument should 
become one of distribution, that is maximisation of welfare, not just net economic 
efficiency gain. It could be argued that an ideal regulatory solution should approximate 
a market solution where costless bargaining were feasible. 
1.3 SYSTEMS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION 
Although the privatisation of public utilities has reduced the extent to which prices are 
politically determined in an explicit way, the political hold on the pricing decision of the 
regulated private enterprises has not been eliminated. In a mythical world of full 
information, governments could monitor regulated private firms perfectly and force the 
management to apply the desired model of price determination. However, in reality, 
governments are not fully informed and thus, typically, they can only induce managers to 
comply with the regulator's aims through a system of price regulation. 
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As seen in the previous section, the government's objectives in regulating the price of 
public utility services can be grouped under two main general aims, the first leading to a 
normative theory of price regulation and the second providing the basis for a positive 
theory of price regulation (Bos, 1994). Firstly, governments ought to maximise society's 
welfare. Models based on this assumption provide a benchmark for the critical evaluation 
of the effectiveness of regulation in correcting market failure. Empirically, regulatory 
systems can then be evaluated against this benchmark (Quoilin, 1976; and NEDO, 1976). 
This normative aim of welfare maximisation encompasses the five ex-ante objectives 
firstly suggested by Stephen Littlechild (1983) for the regulatory framework of the 
privatisation of British Telecom, namely: (i) prevent abuse of monopolistic power, while 
enabling the industry to benefit from economies of scale and thus allowing monopolistic 
production; (ii) promote competition; (iii) encourage efficiency and innovation; (iv) lower 
implementation cost; and (v) maximise sales proceeds and consequently enhance the 
privatised company's commercial prospects. 
Secondly, through price regulation, governments will also try to fulfil other political and 
bureaucratic objectives, such as win votes and maximise output. There is no economic 
justification for this set of objectives, however they are real and need to be considered 
when analysing regulatory decisions that have actually been taken. There is little doubt 
that it is not in anyone's interest that privatisation programmes be unpopular, both with the 
management of the regulated firm and with the public at large. This may cause 
governments to compromise when designing the regulatory regime. In a way, the 
government, as well as the regulatory agency, can be 'captured'. Instances of regulatory 
capture and their consequences have been extensively discussed in the literature and need 
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to be considered when modelling regulatory systems (Posner, 1971; Stigler, 1971; and 
Peltzman, 1976). 
In addition to the above objectives, models of price regulation also need to take into 
account the constraints faced by the regulator and the regulated firms, such as market 
characteristics, production technology, profits and managerial objectives. Many of the 
regulated privatised firms sell products and services that have some characteristics of 
public goods and/or externalities. Nevertheless, they are usually sold in a market with a 
demand elastic to price, where there may be some type of segmentation and where they 
may compete with other products, either within the industry or from potential entrants. 
Regulated firms are also constrained by the conditions of their input markets and by the 
state of production technology. Whether price regulation embodies the correct incentives 
for firms to operate on the production possibility frontier and to maximise profits has been 
debated extensively in the literature, both in theory and in practice. It is a wide-spread 
well-supported view that, if the rate-of-return is fixed by the regulator, there is no incentive 
for the regulated firm to increase its productivity. This is why, in the case of the UK 
privatised utilities, the regulator does not control the rate of return directly, but he controls 
the increase in price4. However, this price regulation system still does not solve the 
incentive problem of the rate-of-return regulation completely, since the 'appropriate' level 
of returns for the regulated company plays an important role in informing the setting and 
revision of the price control rules5, as it is discussed later in this chapter. Finally, when 
assuming asymmetry of information, there is the problem of ensuring that the management 
4 For a detailed discussion of the price-cap regulation used in the UK, see Beesley and 
Littlechild (1989). 
5 See Oftel's Consultative Document on "The Regulation of BT's Prices", January 1992, 
pp 12 and 13. 
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fully participates to the implementation of the regulatory framework and does not instead 
follow different goals. Incentive-compatible contracts are used in these cases to bridle the 
management into the rules set by the regulator. In conclusion, a regulatory system is the 
outcome of a bargaining process between government, regulator and industry under a set 
of market and technological constraints. 
1.3.1 The Rate of Return Regulation 
There are two main regulatory regimes that have been extensively applied in practice: the 
rate-of-return regulation and the price-cap regulation6. The rate-of-return regulation 
restricts the regulated company to a maximum level of profits defined as a proportion of its 
capital. The firm is then free to choose output level and price, although the regulator has 
oversight control of inputs and can disallow costs for nonessential inputs. The intuition 
behind this system of regulation is that regulation requires the imposition of a fixed 
constraint on the performance of a regulated firm/industry. However, the environment in 
which regulated firms operate changes all the time and thus the regulator, or the 
government, would have to change the regulatory constraints accordingly. Such a process 
may be tedious and lead to regulatory lags and waste of time and other resources by the 
firm's management. Thus, it seems to be a more economical and flexible procedure for the 
government/regulator to link the regulatory constraint to the rate of return on investment, 
6 For a more detailed discussion and further references on the differences between rate-of-
return and price-cap regulation, see Braeutigam and Panzar (1993). 
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defined as follows 7 : 
_ r n Gross Re venue - Labour Costs - Depreciation - Taxes 
Rate of Re turn = 
Capital Acqui sition Costs - Cumulated Depreciation 
A 'fair ' rate o f return on investment is earned i f gross revenue minus operating expenses is 
sufficient to compensate the f i rm for its investment in physical assets. 
For simplicity, we assume that depreciation is zero, and exclude taxation. Thus, the rate 
base is reduced to the capital acquisition costs, rAk, where rA are the acquisition costs o f 
resources tied up in plant and equipment and k the quantity of capital. The acquisition 
costs, rA, differ f rom the opportunity costs of capital, r. I f the f i rm borrows capital, r is 
equal to the borrowing interest costs; i f the f i rm uses own capital, r is the return that the 
firm could earn by lending capital. Factor prices, rA, r and w, the cost of labour, /, are 
exogenously given. Capital is defined in such a way that the acquisition price, rA, is equal 
to unity. The rate o f return, p, is thus given by: 
P = M : (1-9) 
where xt andp-, are the quantity and price of output /' respectively, for / '=/, 
Using the above notation, the profit o f a firm, on the basis of the opportunity costs o f 
capital instead of the acquisition costs, can be written as follows: 
7 This definition follows Averch-Johnson (1962), p 1054. 
31 
u=Y,l\Pixi-rk~wl (1.10) 
From (1.9) and (1.10) we can re-write the profit formula as follows: 
U={p-r){-k) (1.11) 
Equation (1.11) shows how the rate o f return on investment relates to the profit o f the 
firm and provides a benchmark for the regulator. Thus, any rate-of-return constraint 
becomes a profit constraint and can be used according to the objectives o f the regulated 
f i r m (Baily and Malone, 1970). The regulator could use (1.11) to prevent a profi t 
maximising firm f rom earning excess profits by setting the rate-of-return such that the 
profits are below the unconstrained profit-maximising level. Thus, the relevant 
constraint becomes 
It is clear f rom the above equations that a rate-of-return regulation may distort both the 
capital-labour input ratio and output prices. Therefore, it cannot be known a priori 
whether (p - r) is positive or negative. 
To implement the rate-of-return system, the regulator first selects a base year for which 
he calculates the sum of operating costs, depreciation, taxes and a 'reasonable' profit , 
determined on the basis o f a 'reasonable' rate o f return. This calculated total is the 
U<{p-r){-k) (1.12) 
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firm's revenue requirement. Prices wi l l then be set by the regulator so that the f i rm's 
gross revenue equals its revenue requirement. In order to determine the 'reasonable', or 
' fa i r ' , rate o f return, three methods are most commonly employed: the dividend growth 
model, the capital asset pricing model and, sometimes, simply a historical comparison 
of rates of return in similar firms, or industries8. 
It has been argued that this system of regulation, which was traditionally used for many 
years in the USA, can prevent monopoly abuse and achieve allocative efficiency i f the 
allowed rate o f return is set very close to the cost of borrowing (Train, 1994). Indeed, the 
rate-of-return regulatory system worked reasonably well in the USA, until several 
significant changes occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, such as a sharp increase in the rate o f 
inflation and in the rate and extent o f technological change and competition. This led to a 
failure of the regulatory system to provide adequate capital recovery, incentives for internal 
efficiency, flexible price structure and the system became excessively expensive to 
implement. It became widely recognised that the rate-of-return system tended to provide 
perverse incentives and thus encourage an inefficient use o f resources. Theoretically it has 
been argued that tying profits to capital encourages over-use o f capital (Averch and 
Johnson, 1962). In addition, the definition of the costs of the industry used in calculating 
profits can be controversial, for example in determining which capital expenditures are 
allowable, and cumbersome, since it involves detailed examination o f costs. Finally, since 
any increase in profitability is regulated away and thus redistributed from the company to 
the consumer, there is no incentive to improve efficiency and innovate, nor to increase 
8 The setting of a ' fa i r ' rate-of-return w i l l be discussed in more details in the f inal 
section o f this chapter. 
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output. Empirical evidence has indeed supported the view that rate-of-return regulation 
leads to inefficiencies (Courville, 1974; Spann, 1974; and Peterson, 1975). 
1.3.2 Price Cap Regulation 
Direct control o f prices avoids a number of problems besetting the rate-of-return system 
and it is thought to provide incentives towards efficiency improvements (Crew and 
Kleindorfer, 1992). The price regulation experienced in the British system o f regulation 
for public utilities generally ensures that a weighted average of price increases in any 
one year does not exceed the percentage increase in the Retail Price Index, RPI, less a 
factor X . The X factor can vary f rom time to time, but it is fixed between price reviews. 
The number o f years between price reviews, the regulatory lag, is also fixed. Once the 
price control has been set for a significant period of time, the regulated firm can behave 
like under market discipline and decrease costs to increase profits. In other words, the 
fact that prices are capped, rather than profits, gives the firm an incentive to improve 
productive efficiency and innovate, since the regulated firms is allowed to keep any 
gains f rom cost reduction between price reviews. Thus, there is a strong profit 
incentive. However, just like in a market situation, i f there is not enough competition, 
product quality may fall and an inappropriate output mix may result i f regulation leads 
to a distorted structure o f relative prices. In addition, i f regulators set initial caps too 
low, then the incentives to invest w i l l be reduced by the anticipated low return on 
capital. A n undoubted advantage, however, o f this type o f direct control o f prices is that 
it is easier and cheaper to implement and monitor than the traditional rate-of-return 
regulation experienced in the USA. 
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Given these benefits, i t is not surprising that a price-cap system o f regulation was 
introduced for the privatisation o f British Telecom and other industries in the U K . The 
price-cap system is based on four fundamental characteristics (Acton and Vogelsang, 
1989) 9: 
(i) The regulator sets a maximum price, called the price cap, and the f i rm can then retain 
whatever profits it can make by selling its output at that price. In the setting o f the 
price cap, the regulator considers cost, demand and profit conditions o f the f i rm. 
(i i) In the case of multi-product firms, the regulator may define an aggregate cap for a 
basket o f related goods or services, which takes the form of a weighted average of 
prices or a price index. The regulated firm can then alter the prices o f individual 
products, as long as the index, or weighted average, does not exceed the aggregate 
cap. 
(i i i ) The price cap may be linked to a factor exogenous to the firm, which varies over time, 
such as a price index. 
(iv) A t predetermined intervals of several years, the price cap is reviewed and changed i f 
cost, demand and profit conditions of the regulated firm have changed over the 
regulation period. 
I f the index m denotes monopolistically supplied goods, a profit maximising firm faces a 
const ra intp m <p m *, where the price ceilings,p m *, are set by the regulator and the firm can 
choose any set o f prices p,„ up to the price ceiling. The flexibility of the regulated firm can 
be greatly enhanced i f a joint price ceiling is defined for a basket of services supplied by 
9 More details on the specific U K system of price-cap regulation w i l l be provided in the 
next section o f this chapter. 
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the f i rm, rather than price limits on individual products. The best-known example o f such 
a joint ceiling is the British RPI-X regulation: an average price of some bundle o f the 
firm's products must not exceed the retail price index minus an exogenously fixed constant 
X. Under this regulation, a profit maximising f i rm is prevented f rom exploiting the 
consumers by the constraint: 
P < R P I - X 
where P is a price index o f the monopolistically supplied outputs o f the f i rm. P is 
usually assumed to be a sub-index o f the retail price index and X the sum of weighted 
output revenue increases minus a sum of weighted input cost increases. The choice o f 
X w i l l reflect different objectives by the regulators. In general, a regulator wi th 
'polit ical ' objectives w i l l determine X as exogenous to the regulated f i rm. On the other 
hand, i f X is endogenous to the firm then the regulator has 'productivity-related' 
objectives. 
As Train (1994) points out, a fixed price cap wi l l induce the firm to choose the cost-
minimising input mix and invest in cost saving technologies. This is because the firm is 
allowed to retain any cost reduction achieved and thus it wi l l drive towards efficiency. Of 
course, during the regulatory period o f fixed price cap, the firm can retain all efficiency 
gains, without sharing them with consumers, as it would have happened in the case o f a 
rate-of-return system. However, when the regulatory period comes to an end, the regulator 
w i l l revise the price cap in the light of any efficiency gains and changed market and 
technological conditions during the period. This periodic review allows the consumers to 
participate in the efficiency gains occurred during the regulatory period. The problem with 
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this system is that, although there is a window of time when the f i rm can exploit efficiency 
gains, eventually these gains wi l l be regulated away and thus, like in the rate-of-return 
regulation, there is a possibility of strategic behaviour by the f i rm, which could prevent the 
achievement of cost reductions (Vogelsang and Finsinger, 1979). Depending on the length 
of the regulatory lag and the price review arrangements, the distinction between rate-of-
return and price cap regulation could blur. 
Nevertheless, given that costs and demand conditions change over time, it is in 
everybody's interest, including the f i rm, that the price cap changes over time too. The 
question is how and when these changes should take place. Some changes are usually 
predetermined by the price formula. For example, the price cap may be tied to a price 
index to reflect changes in input prices. Thus, i f there is a general increase in prices, the 
price cap wi l l raise in line with it and the f i rm is protected from cost changes that are 
beyond its control. This exogenously determined price cap adjustment does not affect the 
cost-minimising behaviour of the regulated f i rm, which still benefits from any 
endogenously determined efficiency gain. However, when the price cap adjustment is due 
for a periodical review, the analysis of the firm's behaviour becomes rather more complex 
and strategic games between the regulator and the regulated f i rm cannot be ruled out. In 
particular, it is possible that the firm wi l l 'waste' resources, especially as the end o f the 
review period approaches, to induce the regulator to set a higher price cap. I f the review 
periods are very short, price-cap regulation can become equivalent to rate-of-return 
regulation. 
Price-cap regulation has also been adopted in the USA, initially for A T & T . However, in 
the USA the price cap system adopted provides for bands o f acceptable rates o f return, 
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which can override the price caps when the rate of return falls outside the acceptable 
boundaries10. This modified price cap system has all the disadvantages o f the high 
transaction costs of the traditional rate of return regime and, in the case o f very high 
returns, the system reverts to the rate-of-return regulation. This is why Thompson (1987 
and 1991) argues for a loose upper band and a tight lower band and adds that this would 
minimise both cost of capital and revenue requirements. 
1.4 PUBLIC U T I L I T I E S REGULATION IN T H E UK 
1.4.1 The Legislative Background 
In addition to the characteristics outlined above, there are also legal and administrative 
differences between the ways in which the U K and US governments approach the issue 
of regulation. In the U K , regulation is administrative-based and the relevant Act and 
licence, to which the regulated firm is subjected and which spell out the obligations, 
powers and responsibilities of both regulator and regulated firm, ensure enforcement. In 
addition, during the period investigated by this thesis, regulatory decisions were also 
subject to appeal to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and to judicial review. In 
the US, instead, the courts are heavily involved in setting the regulatory policy and the 
principles of regulation are set out in legislation and subject to appeal to the courts. 
This court-based approach has been mainly adopted to deal wi th the problem of the 
1 0 Some of the changes to the original price cap scheme in the USA have been justified 
on the basis o f different technology and market conditions, as well as ensuring 
continuation in the regulatory function, i.e. continuation in the 'administered contract' 
(Goldberg, 1976). 
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regulated industry establishing its influence over the regulatory decision. However, this 
system has created another problem: organised special interest groups and big regulated 
companies often have more and better resources available, such as more financial 
resources, better lawyers, scientists, information, than consumer groups. Thus this court 
system may eventually go against the interests of the groups that it is designed to 
protect. This is why, in the U K , the role o f courts has been minimised (Carey et al., 
1994). 
From a legal prospective, U K Government's regulation is in the form of primary 
legislation and is imposed by Act o f Parliament, which may be either Public or 
Private". Acts o f Parliament may legislate and impose regulations directly, or empower 
others to regulate. Because o f the concentration o f primary legislation within 
Parliament, many Acts merely set out the broad policy o f the law and the vehicle for 
detailed regulation is subordinate or delegated legislation. The most common among 
several forms of delegated legislation is the statutory instrument, which since 1946 has 
exercised subordinate legislative powers either by an Order in Council, or at the 
instance of a Minister o f the Crown. Another form o f subordinate legislation is the by-
law, issued by a local authority or a statutory undertaking. In contrast to primary 
legislation, delegated legislation is subject to judicial review. The usual form o f U K 
regulation is considerable primary legislation, accompanied by detailed and extensive 
regulation by subordinate legislation, effected by central or local government, or public 
" Public Acts may be General, i f they affect the entire U K , or Local, i f they refer to a 
localised matter. Private Acts relate to affairs o f individual persons and corporations. 
To become an Act, a B i l l requires a simple majority vote by both the House o f 
Commons and the House o f Lords. However, the Lords cannot reject a B i l l passed by 
the Commons and certified by the Speaker to be a 'money B i l l ' , and can only delay a 
Public B i l l for a maximum period o f one year. 
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corporations, and devolution o f administration from central government to local 
government and to public corporations (Peacock, 1984). 
In addition, the U K industry may be subject to European Union (EU) legislation. EU 
laws are binding for all member states, firms and individuals and, in the case of conflict 
between EU laws and national laws, the former prevails. There are four main E U 
institutions involved in the legislative process: the European Council, which consists o f 
one minister for each member state; the European Commission, whose members are 
appointed for four-year terms by agreement o f the governments o f the member states; 
the European Parliament; and the European Court o f Justice, which consists o f one 
judge from each member state. Secondary legislation is issued by the European Council 
and the Commission, and may take several forms. I t may be in the form of: (i) 
regulations, which apply in their entirety to all member states and are directly 
applicable, i.e. they do not need implementation by means o f national legislation; (i i) 
directives, which are binding but allow choice o f implementation's methods by the 
national authorities; ( i i i ) decisions, which are rulings applicable and binding to 
individual cases; and (iv) recommendations, or opinions, which are not binding. 
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1.4.2 RPI-X Regulation 
The history o f public utilities regulation in the U K is much shorter than its USA 
counterpart. Most o f today's regulatory agencies and procedures were established 
during the 1980s, as part o f the programme of subsequent conservative governments to 
privatise the major public utilities. Telecommunications were the first to be privatised, 
soon followed by airports, gas, electricity and water . The original privatisation Acts 
were subsequently augmented by the Competition and Services Act o f 1992, under 
which regulators are compelled to promote and secure competition, while maintaining 
appropriate quality standards, and the Competition Act o f 1998, which facilitates the 
sharing o f networks and the use o f a common carriage. European Union competition 
law comes to strengthen U K legislation. The statutory duties of U K regulators include 
protecting the interests o f consumers with respect to prices and quality o f services, the 
interests o f producers by ensuring that they are able to finance the provision o f these 
services, employees and third parties where environmental concerns may arise. 
As already mentioned, the main instrument o f regulation in the U K is the price-cap 
system, first proposed by Littlechild (1983) and implemented to the regulation o f the 
newly privatised British Telecom. It has become known as RPI-X regulation and it is 
based on a system of price control, according to which the increase in the weighted average 
price of a basket o f services must not be greater than the increase in the Retail Price Index 
1 2 Telecommunications Act, 1982; Airports Act, 1986; Gas Act, 1986; Electricity Act, 
1989; Water Act, 1989; and Water Industry Act 1991. 
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(RPI) reduced by an agreed percentage, known as the X factor. This X factor is supposed 
to reflect the expected productivity gains and ensures that the benefits from productivity 
gains are passed on to the consumer. In particular, when setting the price cap, regulators 
assess the expected efficiency levels over the period in which a specific price cap wi l l 
apply. These expected efficiency levels are then used to forecast cost trends and thus the 
likely rate o f return at different service prices. The chosen price cap w i l l be the one that 
allows the company to earn a 'fair' rate o f return over the period before the next review, 
usually four to five years. Of course, the RPI-X constraint is only one o f many conditions 
imposed by the regulated company's licence, initially set by die government as part o f the 
privatisation process. But unlike other conditions, the magnitude of the X factor has 
limited duration, being periodically reviewed by the regulator as part o f the continuing 
regulatory process. 
There is no formal conditions imposed on the review process, i.e. there is no formal 
constraint on the magnitude o f X in subsequent review periods. However, the regulator is 
limited by a number o f circumstances. Firstly, the other conditions in the licence need to 
be taken into account. These conditions can be changed, but only with the agreement o f 
the licensee. In case o f disagreement, during the period of investigation o f this thesis, the 
regulator could refer the case to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, but it was a 
cumbersome and unpopular procedure and the regulator might have feared failure in 
securing the M M C support. Secondly, since different levels o f X determine how profits 
are split between the consumers and the shareholders of the regulated company, the 
expectations o f these two interest groups must also be considered. Many of these 
expectations are formed at the time of privatisation and thus the regulator may not have 
had any control on their formation. Finally, financial markets have better information on 
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the company's performance at the time of the review of factor X than at the time of 
privatisation. When X is reviewed, the company's shares have usually been traded for a 
number o f years and financial indicators such as the (3 coefficient, the dividend yield, the 
price-earning ratio are known. Therefore, investors wi l l react to any regulatory change and 
discount in share prices the expected effects on the company's performance. The regulator 
cannot ignore the financial market reaction. In conclusion, there are certainly more 
constraints on the regulator's actions at the time of the review, than on the government 
when setting X for the first time. 
The advantages o f the price cap system over a rate-of-retum regulation have been 
highlighted earlier. Here, it is worth mentioning some specifically important aspects for 
the U K privatised utilities. As discussed above, in the case o f companies with monopoly 
power, such as regulated utilities, economic theory predicts that there is a tendency to 
inefficiency and rate-of-return regulation tends to exhacerbate this tendency1 3. On the 
contrary, price-cap regulation is expected to encourage improvements in efficiency 
because, once the RPI-X formula has been set, it is not expected to change for a stated 
number o f years and the company can retain any profits generated over this period, even i f 
these profits are higher than expected. In other words, the regulated company can shares in 
any social gains from efficiency with increased profits, at least for a number of years. 
However, i f a price cap is chosen incorrectly, inefficiencies can still result. In particular, i f 
the price is set well above average costs, a dead-weight loss occurs relative to the second 
best solution; i f price is set below average cost, the company may not be able to survive. 
1 3 The first formal analysis o f the potential inefficiencies caused by a rate-of-return 
regulation appeared in Averch and Johnson (1962). Braeutigam and Panzar (1989) discuss 
inefficiencies caused by profit-based regulation in both competitive and non-competitive 
markets. 
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In the case o f a multi-product company, such as BT, this problem is augmented by having 
to choose a price-cap index and the weights in the index 1 4. Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, whether or not rate-of-return and price-cap regulations have different effects on 
efficiency depends crucially from the time period over which fixed price controls operate. 
I f price rules were to be revised very often, there would be no real difference between the 
two types o f regulation. However, i f a price-cap is fixed for relatively long periods, then 
the incentives to increase productivity are believed to be greater under price than profit 
regulation 1 5. While in the rate-of-return regulation the f i rm recovers its costs ex-post, 
the price-cap is fixed on an ex-ante estimate o f the regulated firm's efficiency gains. As 
long as the regulated f i r m can keep the rate o f increase o f prices charged to customers in 
line wi th the RPI-X formula, its earned rate of return should be o f no interest to the 
regulator. That is, by untying the setting o f prices charged f rom profits earned during 
each regulatory period, there should be an incentive for cost reductions, since any cost 
reduction not accounted for in the setting o f the price-cap w i l l benefit shareholders 
through an increase in profits. 
The so-called 'productivity factor', X , is the key element in this incentive mechanism, 
since it is subtracted f rom the retail price index to determine the increase in rates that 
w i l l be allowed without regulatory approval. I f cost reductions exceed the productivity 
factor, then profits w i l l increase without an increase in real prices charged to customers. 
In a way, the productivity factor determines the rule for sharing cost reductions between 
I 4 For issues related to multiproduct firms facing price-cap regulation, see Sappington and 
Sibley (1992) and Armstrong and Vickers (1991). 
1 5Although from a public-policy perspective price-cap regulation is today widely 
preferred, from an economic theory point o f view whether or not price-cap regulation is 
more welfare enhancing than rate-of-return regulation remains an open question 
(Braeutigam and Panzar, 1993). 
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customers and shareholders. Thus, factor X reflects more than the mere return on 
capital, because it is set as part o f the negotiations o f the whole regulatory framework, 
including for example the coverage of the regulated basket o f services, non-commercial 
obligations and restrictions on competition. It is interesting to note that, unlike their US 
colleagues, U K regulators do not have an obligation to disclose the exact basis for the 
setting o f X 1 6 : as long as their actions are deemed legitimate in terms o f the Act, the 
decisions o f regulators are not questioned. This implies that in the U K system there is 
greater scope for bargaining and X is only one o f the variables on which this bargaining 
occurs. The additional bargaining power of the regulator in the price cap system is a 
main distinguishing feature and efficiency gains f rom regulation w i l l be greater the 
more effectively the regulator is able to use this power (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
The aggregate weighted RPI-X formula also allows the regulated multi-product 
company greater f lexibi l i ty to adjust the structure o f prices within the basket o f services, 
while placing no constraint on prices outside the basket. This characteristic was thought 
to be particularly desirable for British Telecom for which lack o f accurate knowledge o f 
costs and demand conditions meant that 'optimal prices' for individual services could 
not be immediately determined at the time of privatisation (Beesley and Litflechild, 
1989). The consequence o f initial prices being out o f line wi th costs was attenuated by 
British Telecom's ability to determine their price structure across services in and outside 
the regulated basket. 
1 6 The exact details o f the calculation o f X are not in the public domain, but for some 
information on the calculation procedure see Beesley and Littlechild (1989), M M C 
(1990), C A A (1991), Cave (1991) and Ofwat (1991). 
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The U K price-cap system is however also open to criticisms. Hillman and Breautigam 
(1990), for example, argue that, since the choice of productivity factor determines the 
share o f cost reductions to be passed on to the consumer, its choice is a political one, 
and also one that can affect the ability to realise the maximum cost reductions. It is 
certainly acknowledged that the determination of the correct productivity factor is very 
diff icul t and f u l l o f uncertainties (Kiss, 1991; and Kwoka, 1991), since it should not be 
merely based on past data, but reflect future trends in productivity. Past regulatory 
experience confirms this diff icul ty: for example, the factor for British Telecom was 
changed from 3% to 4.5% after only three years o f implementation o f the regulatory 
system. Some of the literature suggests that the factor should be adjusted frequently in 
order to accomplish a fair sharing o f productivity gains (Hillman and Breautigam, 1990) 
and the criteria for revising X should be clear to avoid higher cost o f capital and 
encourage investment. The problem is that, with frequent readjustments o f the 
productivity factor based on cost reductions, the price-cap system becomes very similar 
to the rate-of-return system and thus looses its efficiency incentive. However, the 
consequences o f leaving the cap at an undesirable level for a long time period could be 
quite damaging. Thompson (1992) demonstrated that there is a single value o f the 
productivity factor that is consistent with f i rm value maximisation and revenue growth 
minimisation. I f a higher value than this is chosen, it may induce perverse behaviour on 
the part o f the f i rm . Greater flexibil i ty to set the structure o f prices can also be seen as a 
disadvantage, since i t allows cross-subsidisation, which leads to allocative inefficiency 
and can be used anti-competitively. Finally, it has been argued that placing emphasis on 
the level o f prices may lead to a lower quality o f services (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
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An important consideration for UK regulators is the theoretical view that, while rate-of-
return regulation can be applied equally well to all industry structures, price cap 
regulation can be successful only when applied to monopolistic industries. That is, 
price cap regulation should be limited to those industries where competition is absent 
(Spulber, 1989; and Price, 1994), otherwise a firm could combine predatory pricing in 
the competitive sector with consumer's exploitation in the monopolistic sector, while 
adhering to the aggregate price cap. This is potentially a problem in the case of British 
Telecom since its basket of regulated services includes competitive as well as monopoly 
services. In practice, economic regulation in the UK is in many cases more complex 
than a simple RPI-X formula. British Telecom, for example, has more specific 
constraints regarding the rate of increase of residential line rentals and private circuits. 
The regulator also puts informal pressure on licensees: OFTEL, for example, indicated 
in the past that the re-balancing of trunk and local calls had gone far enough and that 
further action by British Telecom would be followed by explicit controls via a 
modification in the licence agreement. Given that the Competition and Services Act 
(1992) states that regulators are compelled to promote and secure competition, it could 
be concluded that UK regulators have an obligation to protect the consumer only 
temporarily, while encouraging competition to develop. One way of doing so would be 
to subject sections of the market that differ by degree of competition to different price 
caps, without discouraging potential entrants with too heavy restrictions. Certainly the 
basket needs to be reconsidered and, i f necessary, redefined to reflect market conditions. 
In reality, UK regulators have not been overly concerned with relative price re-
balancing. This is another major difference between the UK and the US systems: while 
in the USA regulated companies have to justify any proposed price changes, in the UK 
regulated companies can rebalance the relative prices of their services. The burden of 
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proof to show that the re-balancing should not occur is on the regulator. Whether this 
flexibility is desirable or not depends on the balance between the need for prices to 
reflect fast changing technological and market conditions and the opportunity for anti-
competitive behaviour. 
While price regulation of the telecommunications and water industries is based on the 
tariff basket described above, price regulation of the electricity and gas industry is based 
on a revenue yield approach. According to this price-cap system, price changes must be 
such that the forecasted average revenue per unit of output in the next year does not 
increase by more than RPI-X. To implement this system, the regulated companies 
themselves provide an estimate of output and the formula contains an additional 
correction factor to recoup any deviation between prediction and outcome. Although 
the comparison between this two price cap systems is still open to controversies and 
their effectiveness depends on other aspects of privatisation, it has been argued that in 
general the revenue yield approach allows more strategic behaviour by the company 
(Cheong, 1989). It also decreases the company's risk by smoothing out the average 
unitary revenue and giving it more control over total revenue, since the company 
provides the forecasts. Finally, since the price formula is more complex and based on 
company's estimates, this system is also less transparent. 
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1.4.3 RPI-X Regulation and the Promotion of Competition 
While the promotion of competition was not traditionally a relevant issue in the US rate-
of-return regulation17, the protection of potential entrants from anti-competitive pricing 
policies of incumbent firms was important in the regulation of UK privatised utilities 
from the very beginning. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, an important aim of the UK 
privatisation programme is to develop competition in industries that have traditionally 
been state monopolies, while maintaining appropriate quality standards. The extent to 
which this is possible varies from industry to industry, depending on the technical and 
market conditions of the various UK privatised utilities. The very limited scope for 
developing competition in the water and airport services industries is reflected by the 
small place that competition plays in the Airports and Water Acts. On the contrary, in 
the telecommunications, electricity and gas industries the regulator has a role to play in 
the licensing of entrants and in developing the right conditions to encourage competition 
for the market (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; and Spulber, 1989). 
Regulation can influence the competitive posture of an industry by affecting its structure 
and conduct. Structural regulation includes measures aimed at breaking up monopolies, 
controlling merger activity and the scope of business and removing legal barriers to 
entry. On the other hand, conduct regulation relates to competition policy measures, 
such as pricing behaviour and other forms of dominant behaviour. Price regulation thus 
1 7 On the contrary, it has been argued that one of the main purposes of US regulation 
traditionally was to protect incumbent firms against potential competitors (Stigler, 1971; 
and Jarrell, 1978). 
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has a role to play in determining the conduct of the industry. In particular, when a 
weighted average price cap is applied to a basket of commodities, the regulator needs to 
focus his attention on: (i) the structure of relative prices charged by the regulated multi-
product firm; and (ii) the use of pricing strategies, such as price discrimination, non-
linear pricing, predatory pricing, cross-subsidisation and network access pricing 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch 3; and Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). When 
searching for an optimal pricing structure, the aim of promoting social welfare can 
conflict with the aim of promoting competition. In particular, when the regulated firm 
has an informational advantage over the regulator, the firm is in a better position to 
decide on a welfare maximising structure of prices; however, it is unlikely to do so, 
since the firm's aim is different from the regulator's aim. These conflicts lead towards a 
situation in which the firm has discretion over the pricing structure, but the regulator 
imposes restrictions on the exercise of this discretion (Vickers, 1997). 
Any restriction on pricing behaviour must be based on some kind of benchmark. The 
definition of a benchmark is a very difficult task in the presence of given technological 
conditions and conflicting objectives. While the efficient allocation of resources calls 
for price to equal marginal cost, in the presence of economies of scale this rule leads to 
a price below average cost and thus creates the additional problem of cost recovery. In 
any case, distributional and political concerns complicate this simple rule. I f the 
regulator is perfectly informed and has the ability to make lump-sum transfers, a 
solution to this problem is for the regulated multi-product firm to charge a price equal to 
marginal cost for each product and for the regulator to make transfers to the firm to 
cover the cost differential. I f such transfers are not possible, then optimal regulation 
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would call for Ramsey pricing. The benchmark of Ramsey pricing is the theoretical 
answer to many of the problems outlined above (Ramsey, 1927). Ramsey prices are 
based on the price/cost mark-up on products, (p, - mc$ / p h for each product i, where p is 
the unitary price, mc the marginal cost and (p-mc) the 'tax' charge on each product. An 
optimal set of Ramsey prices does not usually imply equal mark-ups on all products; 
that is, mcj=mcj does not imply p,=Pj. Therefore, Ramsey pricing generally entails a 
form of price discrimination. Although a brief definition of such a complex concept 
inevitably leads to over-simplification, it could be said that, i f a set of optimal Ramsey 
prices applies, a small proportional change in the 'tax' on products, (p-mc), would cause 
the same proportional change in the compensated demand for each product. In other 
words, small increases in taxes, ignoring income effects, lead to equi-proportionate 
reductions in quantities (Mirrless, 1976). Furthermore, the Ramsey principle can also 
apply to non-linear pricing, such as two-part tariffs (Wilson, 1993), and can be adapted 
to accommodate distributional concerns (Hancock and Waddams Price, 1995). 
In practice, however, Ramsey pricing is rarely implemented and the pricing of services 
often fails to reflect costs. For example, the charge for being connected to the telephone 
network in the UK does not depend on where the user is located, although the cost of 
providing the service is higher in a rural than in an urban area. Similarly, although the 
consumption of gas and electricity is higher, and also less elastic, in winter than in 
summer, charges do not vary across seasons. The charge for sending a letter does not 
vary with the distance it travels, or with the remoteness of the destination. This 
departure from efficient pricing may be explained by a number of reasons. First, the 
implementation of Ramsey prices is a very complex matter, to the extent that, as 
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reported in Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp 200-202), Ramsey pricing was not even 
attempted by Boiteux, one of the pioneers of this theory, when he was in charge of 
Electricite de France. To apply Ramsey prices, the regulator needs to know accurately 
consumer demand as well as the firm's cost functions. It then needs to price 
discriminate according to geographical locations, calendar factors, sections of the 
market, and so on. Second, efficiency is not the only concern, but political objectives of 
fairness and acceptability are also important. Thus, for example, the regulator does not 
want to be seen as penalising people leaving in rural areas. Third, Ramsey pricing is not 
always compatible with the objective of promoting competition. I f the competitive 
structure takes the form of a dominant firm and price-taking followers, in theory 
Ramsey pricing can be extended to accommodate this competitive model (Vickers, 
1997). In practice, however, the competitive structure is often more complex and any 
pricing system imposed by the regulator will be sub-optimal, due to firms' monopoly on 
information. 
However, the theory of Ramsey pricing stresses the importance of information in the 
setting of prices. Thus, it emphasises how difficult the job of the regulator is, being 
simultaneously the promoter of competition and less informed than the regulated firm. 
Because of superior information, in most cases, it would be desirable to leave some 
pricing discretion to the regulated firm, so that decentralised information can be 
incorporated into the decision making process. However, there is always the risk that 
freedom will be abused in an anti-competitive manner. Thus, the crucial question 
becomes how to constrain pricing discretion so that competition can be allowed to 
develop. One proposed answer to this question is to impose a single global price cap on 
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the firm's product range (Laffont and Tirole, 1996). This would impose a cap over an 
index of the firm's prices, but leave the firm free to choose the pricing structure within 
that index. I f this price constraint is linear and the weights are set correctly, this global 
price cap is compatible with Ramsey pricing. It can, however, give raise to cross-
subsidisation among products and predatory pricing behaviour. 
It has been suggested that the imposition of floors and ceilings on the prices of 
individual products, as well as set of products, may solve the problem of cross-
subsidisation (Baumol and Sidak, 1994, chs 5 and 6; and Baumol 1996). The 
theoretical literature describes incremental cost floors and stand-alone cost ceilings on 
prices of the type that would normally ensue in a contestable market situation, since 
their calculation does not need information on demand conditions and are thus simpler 
to derive. Even simpler is the derivation of bans on price discrimination, which merely 
impose cross-restrictions on prices. The issue here is to avoid price discrimination by 
the profit maximising firm. Whereas, as described above, price discrimination is 
desirable in the context of an optimal pricing policy by the regulator, the effects on 
welfare of a price discriminating regulated monopoly are ambiguous (Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers, 1994, section 3.3.2; and Varian, 1989). In general, in most cases of 
monopoly, it is certainly not desirable, unless it causes output to raise, although under 
certain conditions it may open up new markets, for example for consumers prepared to 
pay high prices. In the case of regulated monopolies, price discrimination is desirable in 
the case of linear price caps with fixed weights proportional to demand, but undesirable 
in the case of average revenue regulation. However, under the constraint that 
consumers should continue to be able to buy at the uniform price, price discrimination 
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may have benefits. For example, discounts to certain types of consumers may be 
offered as on optional scheme, without affecting the price faced by other consumers. 
The tension between the promotion of competition and an optimal pricing structure has 
been particularly acute in the context of network access pricing in industries where 
rivals have to buy key inputs from dominant firms, such as access to cable or pipe 
networks. Even when the ownership of these networks is separate from competitive 
activities, such as in electricity lines and railway tracks, the pricing of access to the 
network is a complex issue. When a vertically integrated dominant firm is providing 
the network, it is very difficult to strike the correct balance between allowing access on 
reasonable terms and setting a price that discourages inefficient operators. There are 
two main theoretical approaches to these problem: the efficient component pricing rule 
(Baumol and Sidak, 1994, ch 7) and the Ramsey pricing based rule (Laffont and Tirole, 
1994 and 1996). The efficient component pricing rule says that the access price should 
reflect the direct plus the indirect costs of access, where the direct cost is simply the 
incremental cost of access and the indirect cost is the opportunity cost, in the form of 
lost profits, of supplying the network to rival firms. The alternative proposed by 
Laffont and Tirole is that the access price should be equal to the incremental cost of 
access plus a Ramsey term, which takes into account cross-price elasticity as well as 
own-price elasticity of demand. Although this latter approach is more general, since it 
takes into account fixed cost recovery as well as product differentiation, it is also more 
difficult to implement, given the required information on demand functions18. In the 
case of access leading to the supply of several products, the above analysis of Ramsey 
1 8 For a synthesis and critical comparison of these two approaches, see Armstrong, 
Doyle and Vickers (1996). 
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pricing would suggest that different access tariffs should be charged for different uses, 
according to the demand elasticities of the relevant products (Armstrong, Doyle and 
Vickers, 1996). This result is also supported by the efficient component pricing rule, 
according to which access used to supply a product that complements existing products 
should be cheaper than access used to supply a substitute product, since the opportunity 
cost of the latter is higher. In addition, i f the regulator wishes to provide incentives to 
innovation, access sought to supply new innovative products should be even cheaper. 
The importance of incentives in the regulatory process is particularly emphasised by the 
literature that addresses the consequences of the existence of informational asymmetries 
between regulator and regulated firms. I f the regulator is not as well informed as the 
firm about industry conditions, even under 'optimal' regulation firms will be able to 
gain undesirable excess rents from their monopoly on information. To weaken 
individual firm's informational monopoly, the regulatory system should provide 
incentives towards competitive behaviour between firms located in different regions. 
This type of regulation-induced competition is known as yardstick competition and can 
be implemented by making the rewards to one firm dependent on its performance in 
relation to that of other firms in the industry (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, section 1.7). For 
example, the regional structure of the electricity and water industries in England and 
Wales is suitable to yardstick competition between firms in different regional areas. 
Theoretically, models of yardstick competition are part of the literature that formalises 
the treatment of situations where a principal needs to monitor several agents and does so 
by using comparative methods of performance (Holmstrom, 1982; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 
1983; and Mookherjee, 1984). It has been shown that yardstick competition can be used 
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by the regulator to obtain the first-best level of welfare, since firms can compete away 
the informational asymmetry completely (Demski and Sappington, 1984; and Shleifer, 
1985). 
1.5 P R I C E REGULATION, R A T E OF RETURN AND COST OF 
CAPITAL 
In the previous sections, the main focus of analysis was on the workings and failures of 
product markets and how their efficiencies and inefficiencies could justify a mixture of 
privatisation and regulation. However, as mentioned earlier, it is the interaction of 
product and capital market pressures that ensures efficiency gains from privatisation. 
Competitive pressure in product markets can lead to efficiency gains by penalising 
persistent under-performance, though managers are often left with some discretion. 
Overspending, overstaffing and some degree of managerial 'slack' do not necessarily 
result in higher output prices, but they can be hidden by lowering profits. Product 
markets cannot observe and thus penalise this kind of managerial behaviour, which does 
not directly harm customers but cuts into shareholder's returns. On the contrary, 
efficient capital markets will detect managerial 'slack' by exposing managers to clear 
'market' rules. How well capital markets monitor managers is a matter of intense 
debate in the literature and can depend on the form of governance, such as concentrate 
versus diffuse ownership (Stiglitz, 1985). In principle, the government, as a single 
agency, has more power to monitor managers than disperse share ownership; however, 
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managers in state enterprises often work towards badly defined objectives. On the 
contrary, it is argued that in a privatised firm managerial discretion is constrained by the 
threat of take-over. I f capital markets receive the information that the firm is under-
performing, this information will be embodied into its share price and the firm will 
became a target for a take-over, which is most likely to result in the replacement of the 
existing management team. While the theoretical argument is convincing, the empirical 
evidence on the effectiveness of the market for corporate control to discipline 
managerial discretionary behaviour is somewhat inconclusive, with a plethora of studies 
finding no evidence of improved performance after a take-over (Singh, 1971 and 1975; 
Meeks, 1977; Firth, 1979 and 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1982; and Hughes, 1989), and 
others challenging this finding (Halpern, 1973; Mandelker, 1974; and Asquith, 1983). 
In addition to being an instrument of managerial control, capital markets set the price of 
funding on the bases of the regulated firm's performance and risk. The accurate ex-ante 
determination by the regulator of a 'fair' rate of return for regulated firms is obviously 
very important in the case of the rate-of-return regulation. However, even in the context 
of the RPI-X regulation, rate of return considerations are implicit in the setting and re-
setting of factor X (Littlechild, 1986), since allocative efficiency requires that the cost of 
capital be equal to the rate of return and the regulator must ensure that regulated firms 
are financially viable. In effect, i f the price rules were to be revised very often, there 
would be little real difference between rate-of-return and price-cap regulation. At 
privatisation, the regulator needs to anticipate capital market expectations and forecast 
the cost of capital that the regulated firm will face to set the parameters for price 
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regulation19. Once privatised, the regulated firm faces capital markets to raise funds for 
its operations and the regulator must consider the effects of any subsequent regulatory 
decision on the firm's cost of capital. It has been long recognised that the cost of capital 
may well be endogenous to the regulatory process itself (Marshall, Yawitz and 
Greenberg, 1981) and that any model of determination of the cost of capital of a 
regulated firm should include regulation explicitly. The pioneering work of Brennan 
and Schwartz (1982), who analyse the dynamic effects of regulation on firm value and 
risk, shows that it is not accurate to determine the risk, and thus the cost of capital, of a 
regulated firm, without incorporating a model of regulatory action. 
The above considerations make the empirical observation of the rate of return and the 
cost of capital even more complex than it may appear at first sight. Firstly, standard 
models of cost-of-capital determination, from simple discount-cash-flow models to the 
more complex Capital Asset Pricing Model, do not include regulation explicitly. 
Although the Arbitrage Pricing Theory has the potential for including regulation as one 
of the factors, it would be difficult to subsume the complex and dynamic process of 
regulation in a single factor. Secondly, it is the firm's regulated business only that is of 
interest to the regulator, not the firm as a whole. However, the cost of capital of the 
firm's regulated business only cannot be observed directly, since any market data refers 
to the firm in its entirety, and it can only be inferred from financial data. Finally, stock 
market data are useful in determining the firm's cost of equity capital, but the regulator 
must consider the aggregate cost of capital coming from whatever source. These three 
considerations make the use of observed measures of systematic risk, such as the beta 
1 9 For an analysis of the initial setting of X and K factors in price-cap regulation, see 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), section 6.3. 
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coefficient, somewhat inaccurate in assessing the cost of capital of regulated firms 
(Meyers, 1972; and Breen and Lerner, 1972). 
In the context of the rate-of-return regulation, the determination of a 'fair' level of rates of 
return is usually based on revenue requirements, defined as total expenses plus a fair 
rate of return on invested capital. The fair rate of return on invested capital can in turn 
be defined as: 
Fair Rate of Return * Rate Base = (Embedded Cost of Debt x Book Value of 
Debt) + (Fair Rate of Return on Equity x Book Value of Equity) 
Al l components of the above formula can be measured, apart from the rate of return on 
equity. It is therefore fundamentally important for regulators to determine the 'fair' rate 
of return required by equity markets. This is problematic even in the absence of 
regulation, since there is no general agreement in the theory of finance as to the most 
appropriate model to use for the determination of the ex-ante required rate of return on 
equity. In addition, in the case of regulated firms, the evaluation of a required market rate 
of return is further complicated by the regulatory process, since the regulator's allowed rate 
of return is closely, and circularly, related to the required market rate of return (Dubin and 
Navarro, 1982). Under price-cap regulation, the regulator does not explicitly set an 
allowed rate of return. However, as said, the setting of regulatory parameters is based on 
the regulator's view as to the present and future profitability of the firm in relation to 
investor's expectations. Since in the rate of return regulation the determination of the 
allowed rate of return is based on the regulator's view of the rate required by investors, in 
both regulatory systems the regulator considers investor's expectations in setting 
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regulatory rules. However, once set, the allowed rate of return is likely to influence 
investors' expectations, and thus affect the determination of the future market 'fair' rate of 
return on equity. In other words, there is circularity in the determination, by the market 
and by the regulator, of the rate of return. 
In addition to the above, the process of regulation can affect the cost of capital by affecting 
the perceived risk of the firm through several effects. By altering the effects of market 
changes on the industry, it can alter future cash flows, and thus it can alter profitability and 
risk. Traditionally, the literature has identified two main opposite effects of regulation on 
the firm's cash flows. Firstly, during inflationary periods, regulation has a tendency to slow 
down the price adjustment and thus regulated firms are likely to show a reduced level of 
financial performance and increased risk (Joskow and MacAvoy, 1975; Spann, 1976; and 
Keran, 1976). Secondly, a regulatory regime tends to buffer the effects of changes in 
external economic conditions and thus it is likely to reduce firm's risk (Peltzman, 1976; 
and Shaffer, 1984). Whichever the direction of the effect of regulation on firm's risk, there 
is little doubt that, as shown by Brennan and Schwartz (1982), regulation is a dynamic on-
going process that affects the characteristics of cash flows to investors. In particular, 
Binder and Norton (1999) have shown that regulation can affect the systematic risk of a 
firm by altering: (i) the covariability of the returns on equity of the regulated firm with the 
market; (ii) firm's or industry's specific factors; and (iii) the buffering effects of 
regulation20. 
Binder and Norton's model wil l be discussed more extensively in Chapter 3. 
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Under an efficient-markets/rational-expectations hypothesis, investors base their evaluation 
of a company on all available relevant information; that is, information which affects 
future cash flows. To illustrate the effects of regulation on the share price of the regulated 
firm, we can express the price of a share in company / at time t, Pih as equal to the 
discounted value of the future cash flows: 
CF i,l+k (1.13) 
where CF,,,+i is the cash flow that, at time t, investors are expecting a share in company / to 
generate at time t+k, and rx is the discount rate, equal to the opportunity cost of the cash 
flow, given its perceived level of risk. 
A regulatory change may affect expression (1.13) in two ways: by changing future cash 
flows and/or by changing the perceived risk of company i. Assuming that both cash flows 
and risk change, the difference between the pre- and post-regulation share price is equal to: 
k=\ 
CF* l+k CF,, +k (1.14) 
where P*ib CF*iil+k and are the price, the expected cash flow and the opportunity cost of 
the cash flow after the regulatory change, respectively. The size and direction of the 
potential effects of regulation on share prices described in equation (1.14) above cannot be 
determined a priori. They are empirical questions that will be investigated in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
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1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The review of the main issues in the economics of regulation conducted in this chapter 
highlights the importance of empirically investigating the consequences of regulatory 
action for the regulated firm. From a theoretical point of view, the traditional approach to 
regulation assumes that regulators have only one objective and are fully informed, while 
firms produce a single good, maximise profits and are equally well informed. More 
recently, however, the literature has incorporated into the theoretical models of regulation 
many of the imperfection of real life, such as, to mention just a few, the case of multiple 
objectives, multi-product firms and potential prices cross-subsidisation, rationed markets, 
price discrimination and asymmetric information (Bos, 1994). Similarly, the practice of 
the regulation of economic activity has changed dramatically in the last century, 
transforming the relationship between government and business, as well as their role in the 
economic progress. It is fair to say that: "The economics of regulation would be a 
relatively simple matter if regulators were omniscent, benevolent, and able to precommit 
future policy, but in practice there are problems arising from asymmetric information, 
policy credibility, and the danger of 'capture'" (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994, p 
6-7). 
This uncertainty about the form that regulation should take and its effects on regulated 
firms permeates all aspects of the literature, including the relationship between regulation 
and the cost of capital. Section 1.5 above, in particular, shows that, irrespective of the 
regulatory system, there is a two-way feedback effect between the regulator's decisions 
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and the cost of capital1. In the rate of return regulation, this occurs through the setting of 
the allowed rate of return; in the case of price cap regulation, it is embedded in the setting 
of the X factor. The theory however is inconclusive about the direction of the effects of 
regulation, with arguments supporting both increasing and decreasing returns and1 risk. 
Thus, the issue remains largely empirical. The remaining chapters of this thesis contribute 
to the investigation of this relationship between regulation, rate of return and systematic 
risk. 
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Chapter 2 
The Effects of Regulatory Announcements on the Return 
and Conditional Volatility of the Equity Capital of the 
Power Generators and the RECs 
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2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Following the privatisation of public utilities by the UK Government and the introduction 
of regulatory bodies to control their activities, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest that 
such regulation had an impact on the utilities' cost of equity capital. While in the USA 
there was a body of empirical literature quantifying the effects of regulation on the return 
of public utilities' stock, these aspects had not as yet been investigated in any rigorous way 
in the UK. However, the results of such investigation would obviously be of great interest 
to regulatory bodies and firms in regulated industries, as well as to consumers and 
investors. 
Existing studies on the impact of unanticipated regulatory announcements on share prices 
relate mainly to the US rate-of-return regulation. These studies tend to consider infrequent 
or one-off regulatory events and the main aim of the analysis is to quantify the regulatory 
effects over some time period, usually several days (Teets, 1992) or a month (Binder, 
1985a). The present chapter analyses instead the impact of unanticipated regulatory 
announcements on the cost of equity capital of the Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) 
and the power generating companies in England and Wales, which are subject to price-cap 
regulation administered by Offer, a regulatory agency. This is achieved by studying the 
impact of regulatory announcements on the return on equity of these regulated companies. 
In this type of studies, the literature usually applies the methodology of Karafiath (1988) 
and Binder (1985b) and uses an extended market model, with dummy variables that 
capture the effects of announcements on and around the announcement date. In this 
chapter, this methodology is extended to capture the heterosckedasticity of financial time 
series. Announcements are classified into three groups: announcements which affect the 
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industry's competitive posture, its pricing policy and its supply of services. Each of these 
three groups is further split into two groups, depending on whether the announcements are 
expected to increase or decrease competition, price and service supply, respectively. The 
effects of announcements are tested on an equally weighted portfolio of generators and of 
RECs, as well as on the individual RECs. Finally, the informational content of individual 
regulatory announcements is also investigated. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 outlines the privatisation 
and regulatory framework of the electricity industry of England and Wales in the light of 
the main economic characteristics of electricity generation and supply. Section 2.2 
analyses the event study methodology adopted in this chapter to investigate the effects of 
regulatory announcements on the returns and conditional volatility of returns of the equity 
capital of both the Regional Electricity Companies and the electricity generating 
companies of England and Wales. This section also contains the formulation of the 
hypotheses tested for groups of regulatory announcements and individual announcements. 
The data and the selection process for the announcements is described in Section 2.3. The 
empirical results for both group and individual announcements are presented in Section 
2.4, while the conclusions are in Section 2.5. 
2.1 PRIV1TISATION AND REGULATION OF THE E L E C T R I C I T Y 
INDUSTRY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 
There are four main stages of production in the supply of electricity: generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply to final customers. With respect to generation, there 
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is a choice of energy inputs, but all involve some environmental costs; that is, there are 
considerable spillover effects in the generation of electricity. Furthermore, electricity 
generation is capital intensive and most investment costs are sunk. Essentially, electricity 
is a product that is, in the main, non-storable, with fluctuating difficult-to-predict demand 
and constrained supply. Demand fluctuates by time of the day and time of the year and 
heavily depends on weather conditions. Supply is constrained in the short-run by the 
capacity limit of power stations and can be affected by unpredictable outages. In spite of 
these difficulties, demand and supply must be matched continuously throughout the system 
and total capacity needs to exceed expected demand by a safe margin to allow for 
uncertainties. Thus, at any one time, some power stations may not be producing 
electricity, but nevertheless supplying a valuable electricity call option. Evidence on 
electricity generation indicates that, depending on the energy input used, there are 
increasing returns at relatively low levels of production, but mainly constant returns 
otherwise21. 
The transportation of electricity is costly and the rate of power loss is an increasing 
function, approximately quadratic, of the net power flow along transmission lines. Thus, 
the choice of geographical location and size of plants in relation to local demand is 
important for the overall efficiency of the system and generation is closely related to 
transmission. Transmission too is capital intensive and has sunk costs. In addition, 
transmission has the characteristics of a natural monopoly, since duplication of lines would 
normally be inefficient and a system-wide network desirable. There is no physical trade 
between one supplier and one user. A number of generators supply power at different 
nodes in the system and a greater number of users withdraw power at other nodes. 
2 1 For example, the rninimum efficiency scale for fossil fuel generation is estimated to be 
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Equilibrium between demand and supply must be continuously maintained by co-
ordinating very closely generation and transmission. This is why these two activities have 
typically been vertically integrated and it has been argued in the empirical literature that 
economies of scope between them could be large enough to give them joint natural 
monopoly cost conditions, even i f generation per se is not a natural monopoly (Kaserman 
and Mayo, 1991; and Kerkvliet, 1991). Thus, in separating generation and transmission, 
there could be a trade-off between the gains of greater competition in generation and the 
losses of economies of scope between generation and transmission. In general, the optimal 
price at any one node depends not only on the marginal cost of generating electricity, but 
also on the effects across the system of incremental supply and/or demand at that node, and 
in particular the effects on the system's losses and transmission constraint22. 
Like transmission, distribution is also characterised by capital intensity, sunk costs and 
natural monopoly cost conditions within any given area. Traditionally, the supply of 
electricity to retail customers has been carried out by the same companies providing the 
distribution, with the exception of large industrial customers who could be supplied 
directly by the transmission company. However, although a replication of wires would 
obviously be inefficient, there is no reason why a number of suppliers could not compete 
in retailing, using a common distribution network. 
The structure of the electricity industry in England and Wales before privatisation was 
established by the Electricity Act of 1957. According to this Act, it consisted of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), responsible for generation and bulk 
around 400 megawatts capacity (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). 
2 2 On the theory of the spatial pricing of electricity, see Bohn, Caramanis and Schweppe, 
1984; and Hogan, 1992. 
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transmission of electricity and in control of most of the industry's investment, and twelve 
Area Boards, which distributed and supplied electricity from the CEGB's bulk supply 
points within their designated areas. In addition, the Electricity Council had policy-making 
functions and comprised of three representatives of the CEGB, the chairmen of the Area 
Boards and six independent members appointed by the Minister23. 
As a state owned industry, the electricity industry experienced similar problems to the ones 
faced by other British nationalised utilities, mainly due to lack of competition in both 
product and capital markets, and the political nature of the decision-making process. In 
particular, the industry's monopoly in the product market mainly translated in a lack of 
choice for consumers. The absence of a market for corporate control meant that there were 
no incentives to improve efficiency, since there was no takeover threat, with the ultimate 
'owners' of the business being members of the public without property rights over their 
'ownership'. Priority was often given to political objectives over commercial and public 
service objectives; for example, in the 1970s the industry was asked to keep prices low in 
an attempt to contain the general level of consumer price inflation by a Labour 
Government, and in the 1980s it was asked to increase prices by a Conservative 
Government in order to reduce public borrowing. In addition, the electricity industry was 
used to support the nationalised British coal industry by putting pressure on the industry to 
produce a higher proportion of electricity by burning coal than it would have freely chosen 
(Robinson and Marshall, 1985; and Robinson, 1985). 
For a history of the British electricity industry up to the late 60s, see Keif-Cohen 
(1969), Ch 4, and for the later period including privatisation, see Thomas (1997). 
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Figure 2.1 
Chronology of the Privatisation of the Electricity Industry 
May 1987 The Conservative Party manifesto specifies the commitment to privatise 
the electricity industry 
Feb 1988 Publication of the White Papers entitled 'Privatising Electricity' and 
'Privatisation of the Scottish Electricity Industry' 
May 1988 The Public Utility Transfer and Water Charges Act empowers electricity 
boards and the Electricity Council to transfer property 
Dec 1988 Second reading of the Electricity Bill in the House of Common 
Apr 1989 Second reading of the Electricity Bill in the House of Lords 
Jul 1989 The Electricity Act 1989 is enacted 
Sep 1989 Appointment of the Director General of Electricity Supply 
Nov 1989 Nuclear generation is withdrawn from the privatisation programme and 
Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear are created 
Mar 1990 The assets of the Central Electricity Generating Board and Area Boards 
are transferred to successor companies and the Licences come into effect 
Dec 1990 The twelve Regional Electricity Companies and National Grid are sold 
Mar 1991 National Power and PowerGen (60% of shares) are sold 
Jun 1991 Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric are sold 
The commitment to privatise the electricity supply was made in the 1987 Conservative 
Party election manifesto and was based on the usual claim that the process of privatisation 
would result in an increase in efficiency and consumer welfare. It was in many ways the 
most difficult privatisation attempted. The asset value of the British electricity industry at 
privatisation was estimated to be about four time as large as the total asset base of all the 
industries privatised in the first two Thatcher terms (Holmes, Chesshire and Thomas, 
1987). In addition, this was a complex industry with a number of firms operating at 
different stages of production, very different from the previous experiences of the 
privatisation of the telecommunications and gas industries. There was no clear agenda for 
the electricity privatisation in the 1987 manifesto and no vision of the final desired 
structure of the industry. There was a commitment to promote nuclear power generation 
without any suggestion as to the safety of this in a privatised industry. 
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The actual privatisation of the electricity industry was legislated in 1989. Figure 2.1 
describes the chronology of this privatisation. The structure of the newly privatised 
electricity industry in England and Wales involved the separation of generation from 
transmission24. The privatisation scheme of the electricity industry adopted by the then 
Government involved privatising the twelve Area Boards as twelve Regional Electricity 
Companies (RECs), without any restructuring. The CEGB on the other hand was split 
both 'horizontally' and 'vertically' before it was privatised. The generation assets were 
passed to three new companies: National Power, PowerGen, and Nuclear Electric. The 
first two received all the CEGB's fossil-fuel stations and were privatised, while the last 
one received all the nuclear power stations and remained within the public sector. 
Initially the percentage share of generating capacity for the three companies was as 
follows: National Power (52%), PowerGen (33%) and Nuclear Electric (15%). The 
transmission assets of the CEGB were transferred to a forth new company, the National 
Grid Company (NGC). Thus, the vertical separation of generation and transmission that 
characterised the state-owned industry was replaced by vertical integration of 
transmission and distribution. The NGC became responsible for many of the co-
ordinating activities of the CEGB. 
The RECs were required to keep separate accounts for their distribution and supply 
business. Thus, distribution and supply were separated in an accounting sense, but not in 
terms of either ownership or control. RECs must, however, make their distribution 
systems available to other suppliers on equivalent regulated terms to those upon which 
they provide services to their own supply business. Thus, the RECs have become 
monopolies in distribution, but not in supply. 
2 4 For details on the structure of the industry at privatisation, see HMSO (1988). 
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The 1989 Electricity Act set out the regulatory framework of the electricity supply 
industry, which among other things established the post of a Director General of 
Electricity Supply (DGES) and a new Office of Electricity Regulation (OFFER). Under 
this framework, to operate in the industry a firm requires one or more of four types of 
licence: generation, transmission, public electricity supply and second-tier supply. The 
general duties of the DGES, and also of the Secretary of State for Energy, are to: (i) 
secure that all reasonable demands for electricity are satisfied; (ii) secure that all 
licence-holders are able to finance and perform their licensed activities; and (iii) 
promote competition in generation and supply of electricity. In addition to the above, 
the DGES is also responsible for monitoring compliance with license conditions, 
including price controls, and ensuring enforcement. 
Apart from the above structural changes made at the time of privatisation, the privatised 
electricity market differs from the nationalised industry in three fundamental respects: 
(i) entry is now permitted to both the generation and supply business whereas 
previously it was prohibited by the state; 
(ii) the electricity companies have private shareholders, instead of being owned by 
government; 
(iii) regulation is by an independent body with a duty to promote competition, instead 
of being conducted mainly behind closed doors, with unclear rules, by politicians, 
civil servants and industry managers. 
The general approach to regulation of the industry can be summarised as comprising of 
two main objectives. First, price-cap regulation is intended to prevent abuse or market 
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power in the naturally monopolistic parts of the industry, namely transmission and 
distribution. Second, other regulatory aspects are designed to promote competition in 
the other parts of the industry, namely, generation and supply. Under this regime, the 
revenues of the distribution businesses of the RECs and most of the revenues of the 
National Grid are subject to an RPI-X price cap. As from 31 March 1998, the 
monopoly franchises have shrunk with more competition being introduced in electricity 
supply. To encourage more competition, initially certain restrictions were imposed on 
the retail competition. Specifically, in the period up to 1998, caps were imposed on the 
shares of the various regional retail markets that could be captured by the two major 
generating companies, National Power and PowerGen. 
Unlike distribution and retail supply, the regulation for generation and wholesale supply 
of electricity is not of the price-cap variety. Instead, it takes the form of the imposition 
of obligations on companies wishing to participate in the wholesale market. The 
mechanism for this is the Pooling and Settlements Agreement, to which all the main 
players must belong. The pooling agreement requires the generators to submit day-
ahead bids to supply power to the system from each of their sets, and on the basis of this 
and its information on demand, NGC seeks to dispatch generating sets so as to minimise 
total supply costs. The offer price of the marginal generating set operating in any half-
hour is called the system marginal price. Under the pooling agreement, generators 
supplying power to the system are paid a price per unit equal to the system marginal 
price plus a 'capacity' element. This, in turn, is intended to remunerate capacity held 
for system-security reasons. Certain procedures have been imposed by regulation in 
estimating the capacity element of the price. Following privatisation the behaviour of 
wholesale (pool) prices has been the subject of much public attention. Post-
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privatisation pool prices have shown substantial volatility. As a result of concerns about 
pool pricing, the Director General reviewed pool pricing in 1991. The review 
concluded that the generators where manipulating prices to some extent and 
recommended changes in some of the procedures set out in the Pooling Agreement. 
The introduction of competition has been the distinctive feature of the privatisation of 
electricity. An effective competitive market in generation has been a fundamental aim 
of electricity privatisation from the beginning. While the market is not yet fully 
competitive, competition in generation has increased over the years. For example, at the 
time of privatisation, National Power and PowerGen together had 78% of the output and 
capacity in England and Wales. Their output share in 1995 was below 60%, with new 
entry continuing to take place. However, their share of total capacity has fallen only 
half as fast, to 69%. Shares of capacity are also important in assessing competition. 
While originally ownership of NGC by the RECs was allowed for transitional purposes, 
subsequently the RECs have been encouraged to sell their entire holdings in the NGC. 
This was intended to encourage competition between the NGC and the RECs (for 
example, in metering and settlements and provision of connections) and in effect led to 
total separation of transmission from generation and supply, something very central to 
the electricity privatisation. The separation of REC's distribution networks from their 
activities in generation and supply and other business was promoted and encouraged. In 
order to allow competition to develop in the supply of electricity, the captive market of the 
RECs has been gradually reduced up to April 1998, since when most consumers can 
choose their supplier. 
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There can be little doubt that competitive pressures and RPI-X price caps have reduced 
operating costs significantly. However, prices in all stages of the electricity chain have 
not fallen as much as costs. While some aspects of pricing have fallen, this decrease 
was mainly due to a decline in primary fuel prices; only some of the price reduction was 
due to the actions taken by the Director General. 
2.2 R E G U L A T O R Y E F F E C T S , METHODOLOGY AND 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the aims of governments when regulating private 
industries and the intended effects of such regulation are well known and widely 
discussed in both the academic (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976; 
Kahn, 1988) and popular press. However, the direction of the actual effects of 
regulation on the value of regulated firms, and thus their cost of capital, is unclear and 
depends on specific regulatory policies and how they allocate risk between the parties 
involved. As discussed in the previous chapter, Peltzman (1976) identifies economic as 
well as political influences in the regulatory process and examines how regulatory 
action wil l be affected by the desire to ensure that its effects are distributed among 
consumers and producers, rather than directed towards only one group. This analysis 
shows that ultimately regulators will tend to maximise political returns, suppressing 
some economic considerations. The final outcome of the regulatory process and its 
effect on either profits, prices, or returns will thus be uncertain. In the absence of 
precise theoretical predictions, the impact of regulation remains an empirical question. 
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Given the complexity of establishing the regulator's objectives, when conducting an 
empirical investigation, assumptions regarding the main aim of regulation need to be 
formulated. Predictions on specific effects can then be made under each of these 
assumptions, although in reality they need not be mutually exclusive. Throughout this 
thesis, three competing, but not mutually exclusive, assumptions on the regulator's 
objectives are considered. According to the first assumption, regulation is seen as 
protecting the consumer from monopoly power and externalities, and thus it should 
cause a reallocation of returns from shareholders to consumers. Under this first 
assumption of consumer protection, regulation would be expected to have a negative 
effect on the value of the regulated company, increase its level of risk as perceived by 
investors and thus increase its cost of equity capital. 
According to the second assumption, regulation may assist incumbent firms to maintain 
their monopoly power. For example, the regulator by keeping prices low may be seen 
as effectively creating barriers to new entrants. This producer-protection assumption, 
also known as regulatory capture, implies that such regulation has a positive effect on 
share prices and the associated perceived risk and thus decreases the cost of equity 
capital. Under the third assumption, regulators are seen as optimising their own utility 
at the expense of both consumers and producers and regulatory announcements are then 
not dictated by economic and social needs but by the need of the regulator to be seen as 
useful and active. No predictions on the effect of regulation on share prices can be 
made in this case. 
Irrespective as to which of the above hypothesis underlies the actions of the regulators, 
it is generally accepted that regulation has an impact on the rate of return on equity of 
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public utilities, as explained in more detail in the previous chapter, section 1.5. Two 
ways in which the regulatory process can affect the rate of return are by : i) setting 
pricing rules that affect the profit level and its sensitivity to variations in revenue and 
cost; and ii) altering the risk faced by the providers of equity and debt finance. The 
direction of these effects on equity prices is however unclear and will depend on 
specific regulatory policies and how they allocate risk between consumers and 
shareholders. It is important to the regulators to understand the nature of the effects that 
different types of regulation can have on the return on equity, since this in turn has 
obvious implications for the cost of capital of regulated companies. Adverse price 
reactions to regulatory announcements are likely to increase the cost of equity capital. 
While the cost of debt is usually linked to current interest rates, and there is evidence 
that 'blue chip' company debt typically earned, in the period investigated in this thesis, 
a rate of return between one-half and one per cent higher of that of government debts, 
the return on equity changes with investors' expectations and can be rather volatile for 
an actively traded security. 
As also analysed in section 1.5, the cost of equity capital is a very important variable for 
regulators because it determines the appropriate level of the rate of return (see Dubin 
and Navaro,1982). Although in the UK the regulator does not control the rate of return 
directly, an appropriate level of return for the regulated company is considered when 
price control rules are revised (see Braeutigam and Panzar, 1993). The chosen price cap 
is the one that allows the company to earn a 'fair' market rate of return on equity, based 
on investors' expectations. In an efficient capital market, rational investors react to 
news expected to alter the risk/returns relationship of a company's equity capital. 
Therefore, regulatory announcements perceived by investors to affect future cash flows 
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and/or risk lead to changes in the required rate of return on equity capital and thus share 
prices. 
2.2.1 Event Study Methodology 
A regulation process can be described as a chain of events. Whenever these events have 
informational content, they will be expected to have an impact on financial markets. The 
empirical investigations of this impact can be grouped under the name of event studies. 
Up to the 1980s, event studies had traditionally used anticipated accounting data, 
especially earnings, to test the impact of announcements on share prices (Beaver, 1968; 
and Ball and Brown, 1968). In these studies, events are certain and often the informational 
content of announcements is widely forecast. However, forecasts may be inaccurate, 
especially earnings forecasts, and thus price reactions may still occur following 
announcements. 
The use of financial data to measure the effects of regulation is relatively recent (Schwert, 
1981; and Dowdell, Govindaraj and Jain, 1992). It is a well accepted view, acknowledged 
even by the regulators, that stock price data lead to more powerful tests than accounting 
data for at least four reasons: 
(i) stock price data are more accurate than accounting data; 
(ii) they provide a greater number of observations; 
(iii) they relate to future earnings, while accounting data relate only to current earnings and 
thus the regulation must be effective before accounting data are used for testing; and 
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(iv) in well-specified market models, the market-wide movements are discounted to isolate 
the effects of individual regulatory announcements on the returns of a specific 
company. 
The empirical model used in event studies, in its general form, is stated as follows: 
rt=xtB+e, (2.1) 
where, r t is the return of the security in period /; x t is a vector of independent variables 
not related to the event of interest, such as the return earned on an index portfolio in 
period t; B is a vector of parameters, such as the security beta, measuring the co-
movement between the security return and the independent variables; and et is a zero-
mean disturbance with different variance in event and non-event periods. 
Equation (2.1) is the return generating process for the non-event time period. Returns 
are typically assumed to follow a stationary stochastic process. The return generating 
process shifts following an event when market participants revise their value of the 
security. Thus, the return generating process in event periods becomes: 
r, =x,B + FT + e, (2.2) 
where, F is a row vector of regulatory announcements thought to influence the impact of 
the event on the return process; and T is a vector of parameters measuring the influence 
of F on the impact of the event. 
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The above model (2.2) is typically estimated for securities having common 
characteristics, for example subject to the same regulatory regime. Hypotheses to be 
tested are usually centred on V. Announcements in F are set to unity during the event 
period and zero otherwise, and T measures the impact of the event. In estimating and 
drawing inferences on T, a number of issues need particular attention25. Firstly, the 
return interval is typically one day, since events occurring in a specific day are expected 
to have an immediate effect on asset prices in an efficient market. Ideally, it would be 
desirable to have intra-daily data and analyse the effect at the exact time when the 
announcement is made. However, this data frequency is only suitable for short event 
periods and the precise time in the day of announcement is in many cases not known. A 
researcher needs to be aware that the choice of data frequency affects the parameter 
estimates. The second issue relates to the choice of event window. Although the 
informational impact of the announcement is expected to be instantaneous, it is a 
widespread practice to test for the impact in a window around the announcement date 
(Ball and Brown, 1968). This is done because, although the date of the announcement 
is normally known, the informational content of the announcement may have been 
anticipated by the market, or there may be a delayed reaction to it. The accurate 
determination of the event date is of fundamental importance. This may be particularly 
difficult when an event comprises of a number of unfolding announcements and when 
there is potential for information leeks. In some cases, several announcements may fall 
in the same day, or within a few days. In these cases, a trade-off needs to be struck 
between focusing on the most important announcements and loosing some information, 
2 5 For a more extensive review of this issue and event studies in general, see Thompson 
(1995). 
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and including more announcements but be unable to infer the true nature of market 
reaction. 
Another issue to be considered is the possibility that an announcement may not only 
shift the level of share prices, but also affect the risk. The change in risk could be 
permanent or transitory and the literature discusses both. Permanent changes can be 
identified by comparing the measure of risk before and after the event. For example, 
studies have been conducted to identify shifts in risk around mergers (Mandelker, 1974; 
and Dodd and Ruback, 1977) and share repurchases (Dann, Masulis and Mayers, 1991; 
Hertzel and Jain, 1991; and Bartov, 1991). Transitory risk changes during the event 
window have been documented by Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) for dividend 
announcements and Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) for major corporate events. 
Finally, the effects of an event may need to be analysed across a group of firms, for 
example an industry. A popular recent approach to this problem is to combine firms 
into a portfolio and examine the impact of the event on portfolio returns (Sefcik and 
Thompson, 1986). 
2.2.2 Methodology and Hypothesis Formulation 
In regulatory event studies that use stock price data, the event date is generally 
unanticipated and it is characterised by an unpredictable information set. Binder (1985b) 
uses regulatory announcements from the Wall Street Journal and finds that there is little 
US industry share price reaction to each event. Schumann (1988) finds that regulations of 
New York takeover bids causes negative effects on shareholder wealth and Teets (1992) 
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shows that the regulation of US electrical utilities causes the average share price response 
to unexpected earnings announcements to be less than for non regulated companies. This 
means that such regulatory announcements are likely to cause security prices to change 
(Schwert, 1981). 
In this thesis, in order to model the market reaction to unanticipated regulatory 
announcements, the market model is extended to incorporate dummy variables. Such 
model measures the reaction to each announcement investigated after discounting 
general market movements. This methodology has been first developed by Binder 
(1985a and 1985b) and Karafiath (1988), who tested the effects of statutory regulation 
in the USA. Later, Ederington and Lee (1993) use the same model to examine the 
impact of economic announcements on market volatility. This latter study dispenses 
with any exogenous market variable and simply estimates a dummy variable regression. 
Traditionally, the event study methodology involves a two-stage estimation procedure. In 
the first stage, the market model is estimated for the period before the event. In the second 
stage, returns are forecasted using the pre-event estimated parameters to calculate 
abnormal return (or forecast errors) and their respective t-statistics. Since the publication 
of the pioneering studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969), this procedure 
has been used extensively, especially in corporate finance, to measure, for example, the 
price effects of financing decisions or the wealth effects of mergers. This methodology is 
based on the assumption that the residuals are independent and identically distributed. The 
assumption of independence of residuals means that, when analysing aggregate abnormal 
returns, it is assumed that the abnormal returns on individual securities are uncorrelated. 
Thus, the variance of the aggregated sample cumulative abnormal returns can be calculated 
82 
assuming that the covariances are zero. This is normally a reasonable assumption i f the 
event windows relating to the individual securities do not overlap in time. However, i f 
some of the event windows do overlap, in other words i f there is a problem of clustering, 
the covariances between abnormal returns may well be different from zero26. Equally, the 
assumption that residuals are identically distributed is problematic if, as Binder (1985b) 
indicates, the abnormal returns and/or the residual variance are expected to differ across 
firms27. 
In this thesis, each event tested is a regulatory announcement expected to affect most of the 
firms in the industry. In other words, each event takes place at the same time for all firms 
in the industry and thus the assumption of residual independence is likely to be violated. 
One way to overcome this problem is to analyse abnormal returns without aggregation, 
where the null hypothesis that the event has no impact is tested by using security-by-
security data. This can be performed by using a multivariate regression model, that is by 
simultaneously estimating a market model for each firm, augmented by including a 
dummy variable taking the value of one during the event period and zero otherwise. In this 
way, the dummy variable's coefficient measures the abnormal return during the event 
period28. 
More specifically, the extended market model for each company /' is formulated as follows: 
R„=ai+filRml+ D , ,+*„ (2.3) 
2 6 See Bernard (1987) for a treatment of the problems relating to clustering. 
2 7 See also Fama (1976), pp 129-39. 
2 8 Karafiath (1988) shows the equivalence of the two-stage procedure and the extended 
market model. 
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where, R, is the continuously compounded return on equity capital at time /, defined to be 
the natural logarithm of its gross return; Rm, is the continuously compounded return on the 
market index; Djt is an announcement dummy variable that equals one on the day(s) of 
announcement j and zero otherwise; a, /? and # are coefficients to be estimated; and e, is 
the error term. The above model measures the impact of an event by quantifying the 
abnormal returns caused by the event. The parameters # measure the abnormal 
performance during the announcement period; that is, they measure the deviation of a 
company's actual return during the announcement period from the expected normal return 
predicted by the market model. 
This methodology not only allows the abnormal returns, as measured by to differ 
across firms, but it also allows the residuals and their variances to differ across firms. In 
addition, the contemporaneous covariances of residuals are not assumed to be zero, 
although the noncontemporaneous covariances are assumed to be zero. In other words, the 
multivariate regression model expressed in equation (2.3) already incorporates 
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous dependence of residuals across equations. 
An additional advantage of the multivariate regression model methodology is the 
existence of robust statistical tests to test joint-hypotheses. Binder (1985b) identifies 
two main joint-hypotheses of interest in event studies: 
(i) Al l the abnormal returns for all announcements and all firms equal zero: 
H i : Yij = 0 Vi.j 
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(ii) The abnormal returns for a specific announcement equal zero for all firms: 
H 2 : n = 0 Vi 
There are a number of statistics that can test these joint hypotheses, such as the 
likelihood ratio test, but the distribution of these statistics is only known asymptotically 
and Binder (1985b) shows that they tend to be biased when a limited number of 
observations are sampled. The Wald statistic is also widely used, but Laitinen (1978) 
finds that it tends to be biased against the null hypothesis in small samples. This 
problem can be overcome by using an F-distributed statistic developed by Rao (1973), 
which has been shown to be accurate with as little as 60 observations29. 
Although the testing of the joint hypotheses discussed above is of great interest in some 
investigations, this thesis aims at conducting a more disaggregated analysis of the 
impact of different types of regulatory announcements and also of the effects on 
individual firms in the industry. This should provide useful insights to policy makers 
about the effects of implementing their regulatory policy. When the impact of group 
announcements is tested in section 2.4.1, an equally-weighted portfolio of stocks of the 
electricity companies is created and the estimation sample includes four years of daily 
returns. In this case the size of the sample is large enough to accept that the asymptotic 
significance test used are robust. When individual announcements are regressed against 
individual companies, the estimation period is broken down to individual years, given 
the complexity of estimating the adopted GARCH methodology. In this case, the 
relatively small number of observations makes the significance of the asymptotic test 
2 9 For a critical comparison between statistics available to test joint hypotheses in the 
multivariate regression model, see Binder (1985b). 
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weaker. However, looking at individual announcements firm by firm does provide 
greater insight into the aggregate effect of the group announcement results, as discussed 
later in this chapter. 
It is commonly accepted that the volatility of asset returns tends to be serially correlated. 
In other words, large return changes tend to be followed by even lager return changes in 
either direction. To capture this serial correlation in volatility, Engle (1982) proposed the 
class of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models. Bollerslev 
(1986) extended the ARCH model to a Generalised ARCH (GARCH) with the following 
conditional variance function: 
h,=a0 + Xaiel, + Zfiihl-l (2.4) 
;=1 /=! 
where is a moving average component and /?//*,_/ is an autoregresssive component. 
To capture the serial correlation in the volatility of return in the extended market model in 
equation (2.3) the following model is, thus, estimated: 
K = a, + P, K„ + 2 > , Dj + eu 
K = a 0 + a \ £l-\ + «2 V i 
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where Rit is the return on equity capital of company /' at time t. The above model (2.5) is 
the extended market model with the conditional variance modelled as a GARCH (1,1) 
30 
process . 
2.2.2.1 Hypothesis Formulation for Groups of Announcements 
The model at (2.5) is used to investigate the impact of regulatory announcements on the 
return on the equity capital of the privatised electricity industry in England and Wales, at 
the level of both distribution and generation. Regulatory announcements are grouped by 
their expected impact on competition, prices and quality of service in the electricity 
industry. In addition, they are also grouped according to whether they relate to generation 
or distribution. Thus, the following groups of announcements are considered31: 
• Distribution Price Negative (DPN): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected to have a negative impact on electricity retail prices. 
• Distribution Price Positive (DPP): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected not to have a negative impact on electricity retail prices. 
• Distribution Competition Positive (DCP): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected to increase competition in electricity distribution and supply to final 
customers. 
3 0 The finance literature has demonstrated that the GARCH (1,1) specification is the 
most appropriate for a wide variety of markets (Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992). 
3 1 Initially, announcements expected to have a negative impact on competition {DCN) 
and quality of service (DSN) in distribution and announcements expected not to have a 
negative impact on price in generation (GPP) were also considered. However, once the 
list of announcements was cleaned of clashes with other events, no announcements 
belonging to these groups were left. 
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• Distribution Service Positive (DSP): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected to improve the quality of service in electricity supply. 
• Generation Price Negative (GPN): announcements relating to generation and expected 
to have a negative impact on electricity wholesale (pool) prices. 
• Generation Competition Negative (GCN): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected not to increase competition in electricity generation. 
• Generation Competition Positive (GCP): announcements relating to distribution and 
expected to increase competition in electricity generation. 
The effects of these announcement groups are estimated for both the RECs and the 
generators. The investigation is carried out on equally-weighted portfolios of RECs and 
generators, as well as on individual RECs. With respect to their effects on the portfolio of 
RECs, the following hypotheses are tested: 
(i) Announcements expected to lead to a fall in the retail price of electricity supply 
(DPN) are also expected to decrease profits and thus have a negative impact on the 
return on equity. In terms of model 2.5: 
Ho : yi = 0 
H, : Yi <0 
(ii) Announcements expected not to lead to a fall in the retail price of electricity supply 
(DPP) are also expected to have potential for an increase in profits, since the 
regulated firm has more discretion on price setting, and thus have a positive impact 
on the return on equity: 
H 0 : Y 2 = 0 
H, : y 2 > 0 
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(iii) Announcements expected to increase competition in electricity distribution and 
supply to final customers (DCP) are also expected to lead to a decline in profits and 
thus have a negative impact on the return on equity: 
H 0 : 72 = 0 
H, : y 2 < 0 
(iv) Announcements expected to improve the quality of service in electricity distribution 
(DSP) are also expected to lead to a decline in profits and thus have a negative 
impact on the return on equity: 
Ho : Y2 = 0 
Hi : y 2 < 0 
(v) Announcements expected to lead to a fall in the electricity wholesale (pool) price 
(GPN) are expected to increase the profits of the RECs and thus have a positive 
impact on their return on equity: 
Ho : y, = 0 
H, : Yi > 0 
(vi) Announcements expected not to lead to an increase in competition in electricity 
generation (GCN) are also expected to have the potential for a decline in the profits 
of the RECs as their suppliers keep their monopoly power, and thus have a negative 
impact on their return on equity: 
Ho : Y3 = 0 
H, : Y3 < 0 
(vii) Announcements expected to increase competition in electricity generation (GCP) are 
also expected to lead to a increase in the RECs' profits and thus have a positive 
impact on their return on equity: 
Ho : Y2 = 0 
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H, : y 2 > 0 
With respect to the effects of the above groups of announcements on generators' rate of 
return on equity, the assumption made in formulating some of the following hypotheses 
is that whatever affects price and competition in distribution could eventually affect the 
electricity generating companies for two main reasons. Firstly, it wil l affect the 
wholesale demand of electricity. Secondly, the divide between generation and 
distribution is expected to become weaker with time, with generators being increasingly 
allowed to supply electricity direct to customers and large customers allowed to generate 
their own electricity. Thus, the following hypothesis are formulated: 
(i) Announcements expected to lead to a fall in the retail price of electricity supply 
(DPN) are also expected to have a potential for decreasing the profits of the 
generators and thus may have a negative impact on the generators' return on equity. 
In terms of model 2.5: 
H 0 : Y I = 0 
H I : yi <0 
(ii) Announcements expected not to lead to a fall in the retail price of electricity supply 
(DPP) are also expected to have potential for increasing generators' profits and thus 
have a positive impact on their return on equity: 
H 0 : y 2 = 0 
Hi : Y2 > 0 
(iii) Announcements expected to increase competition in electricity distribution and 
supply to final customers (DCP) are also expected to have potential for leading to a 
decline in the profits of generators and thus have a negative impact on their return on 
equity: 
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H 0 : y 2 = 0 
H i : Y2 < 0 
(iv) Announcements expected to lead to a fall in the electricity wholesale (pool) price 
(GPN) are expected to decrease the profits of the generators and thus have a negative 
impact on their return on equity: 
H 0 : Y . = 0 
H , : Y . < 0 
(v) Announcements expected not to lead to an increase in competition in electricity 
generation (GCN) are also expected to have the potential for an increase in the 
profits of the generators, and thus have a positive impact on their return on equity: 
H 0 : Y3 = 0 
H, : Y 3 > 0 
(vi) Announcements expected to increase competition in electricity generation (GCP) are 
also expected to lead to a decline in the generators' profits and thus have a negative 
impact on their return on equity: 
Ho: Y2 = 0 
H, : 72 < 0 
The above hypotheses are formulated on the assumption that the main concern of the 
electricity regulators is to protect the consumer and there is no regulatory capture. Each of 
the above hypotheses are tested concurrently using the model in equation (2.5). 
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2.2.2.2 Hypothesis Formulation for Individual Announcements 
The information derived from estimating equation (2.5) is essential for drawing policy 
conclusions on the effect of different types of regulatory announcements on the cost of 
equity capital. However, when analysing the announcements in groups, we loose sight of 
the contribution of each individual announcement to the overall group effect. For example, 
i f an announcement group is found not to have a significant impact on equity returns, this 
may be due to investors believing that type of announcements not to have an affect on the 
regulated company's performance. On the other hand, it could also be the consequence of 
an averaging out effect within the group, with individual announcements causing a 
significant market reaction, but in different directions. In this latter case, we cannot predict 
the direction of the effect of that specific type of announcement, but it would be incorrect 
to believe that investors are indifferent to those announcements being made. Thus, the 
impact of individual regulatory announcements is further analysed in an attempt to gain 
more detailed insight on the nature of the market reaction to regulatory information. Given 
the large number of individual dummies in each announcement group, the model (2.5) is 
estimated by year, as well as by type of announcements, on the returns of each individual 
REC. 
2.2.2.3 Volatility Around Announcements 
When announcements are unanticipated, as it is the case with the type of regulatory 
announcements investigated in this thesis, the share price is likely to become more volatile 
around an event date with informational content (Ross, 1989). However, an announcement 
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should produce only a short-lived increase in volatility i f markets are efficient. In fact, 
once the impact of the announcement has been fully incorporated in share prices, volatility 
should return to normal levels32. Indeed, one of the conclusions of the regulatory model of 
Peltzman (1976) is that regulation, by affecting a regulated company's cash flow, will also 
affect the variance of returns. Thus, regulatory announcements are expected to impact on 
the volatility of returns at two levels: the informational level and through the firm's cash 
flow. 
In order to test for the impact of different individual announcements on the volatility of 
returns, we test the effect on the conditional volatility of the RECs share returns. To this 
end, the announcement dummies are introduced in the GARCH conditional variance 
equation in model (2.5) and deleted from the mean equation. More specifically, the 
following model is estimated: 
K = « 0 + «i 4 - « + a 2 K<-\+ £ ypj 
(2.6) 
Whether an announcements is considered by the market to be good or bad news, the 
coefficients yj should be statistically significant and positive i f volatility has been 
increased by the news. 
3 2 See Ederington and Lee (1993) for a detailed analysis of the impact of news releases 
on volatility. 
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2.3 ANNOUNCEMENT S E L E C T I O N AND DATA 
In regulatory event studies that use stock price data, the event date is generally 
unanticipated and is characterised by an unpredictable information set (Binder, 1985b; 
Schumann, 1988; and Teets, 1992). Since the timing of the announcements cannot always 
be accurately determined, in this thesis a three-day window is used to capture movements 
in returns and volatility of returns which may occur around, but not necessarily on, the day 
chosen as the event date. A three-day window also allows any effect occurring because of 
market anticipation or delayed reaction to be detected. However, the window cannot be 
too large i f contamination from other unknown events which may occur during the period 
covered by a larger window must be avoided. 
Whatever type of data is used, studies of regulatory announcements have to confront the 
fact that typically many regulatory events do not involve a single well-defined 
announcement, but are more likely to involve a series of smaller announcements, or policy 
decisions. Due to the 'lobbying' nature of negotiations between regulators and industry, 
some information about future announcements is likely to be known ahead of time. As a 
result, investors' expectations will change before the public announcement is finally made 
and the expected implications of such a regulatory announcement will be incorporated into 
the share price at the time of the expectational change (Brown and Warner, 1980; and 
1985). In addition, each regulatory announcement may cause the release of new 
information which affect the market expectations of future regulatory changes. 
The announcements considered in this thesis include official announcements by regulatory 
bodies, such as OFFER in this chapter, as well as news announcements made by the 
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government, representatives of regulatory bodies and regulated companies, and any press 
announcement related to the relevant regulatory environment. Such news items are 
included because they may provide information to market participants in anticipation of 
forthcoming official regulatory announcements. I f only official regulatory announcements 
had been considered, the time of the actual change in investors' expectations may well 
have been missed. Consequently, the announcements considered include any 'news' 
believed to have an informational content in relation to the regulatory structure of the 
electricity industry. The periods preceding and following each announcement have been 
checked for the presence of other events, such as quarterly earning announcements and 
announcements believed to be contaminated by other events have been excluded from the 
sample. 
After considering all these issues, the effects of 69 announcements have been tested over 
the period from January 1991, just after the privatisation of the RECs33, to December 1994. 
Appendix 2.2 lists all the announcements considered in chronological order and coded by 
groups of announcements. There are 38 announcements that refer to the distribution of 
electricity and 31 to generation. As a proxy for the market return, the difference of the 
natural logarithms of the FT All Share Index was calculated. In addition, equally weighted 
portfolios of the twelve RECs and the two generators were constructed. All share prices 
and the index were obtained from Datastream. 
The RECs are listed in Appendix 2.1. 
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2.4 E M P I R I C A L RESULTS 
2.4.1 Results of Group Announcements 
The results of the announcement group analysis show that regulatory announcements 
relating to the retail price of electricity supply are the only type of announcements to 
have a significant impact on the equally weighted portfolio of RECs. The results 
presented in Table 2.1 are obtained from estimating equation 2.5 over the period from 
January 1991 to December 1994. These results show that only the coefficients yi and y2 
are statistically significant and have the expected sign, while all other y coefficients are 
insignificant. In other words, the return on equity capital of the RECs, taken as a group, 
is affected negatively by announcements expected to lead to a decrease in the retail 
price of electricity and positively by announcements that give an indication of no further 
cuts in electricity prices. For announcement groups relating to competition in 
distribution and price and competition in generation (DCP, DSP, GPN, GCP and GCN) 
the null hypothesis is accepted. This is an interesting result, since it indicates that 
investors do not appear to react on average to announcements relating to the competitive 
posture of either electricity distribution (DCP) or generation (GCP and GCN). They 
also do not appear to be concerned with announcements aimed at containing the 
wholesale price of electricity (GPN). 
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Table 2.1 
The effect of competition, pricing and service announcements on the return on 
equity capital of an equally weighted portfolio of REC's 
R, = a * pRml + YyPPN + y7DPP + y3DCP + y4 DSP + y5GPN + ybGCP + y7GCN + e, 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT A 0,0006 2.05* 
BETA P 0.6842 5.07* 
DPN Yi -0.9377 -4.10* 
DPP Y2 0.7886 2.56* 
DCP n 0.2286 0.78 
DSP Y4 -0.0267 -0.83 
GPN 75 0.1377 0.46 
GCP 76 -0.0034 -0.61 
GCN Y7 0.0008 0.93 
Notes: 
* Denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2.2 
The effect of competition, pricing and service announcements on the return on 
equity capital of an equally weighted portfolio of generators. 
R, = a 4 pRml + y.DPN + y2DPP + y.DCP + y4DSP + y5GPN + yhGCP + ynGCN + e, 
ht - a0 + a, c f , + ax ht_v 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
C O N S T A N T A 0.0007 0.43 
B E T A P 0.8897 8.91* 
DPN Yi 04515 1.52 
DPP Y2 1.1948 8.39* 
DGP P- -0:6589 -0.93 
DSP 74 -0.0025 -0.66 
GPN 75 -0.3531 -3.37* 
G C P 76 0.6278 2.82* 
G;CN 77 0,3451 0.91 
Notes: 
* Denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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The explanation of why announcements relating to competition do not appear to have an 
unambiguous group impact on the returns of the RECs may lie in the way in which the 
industry was privatised and the technical characteristics of electricity transmission and 
distribution. Most of the individual announcements in the DCP group relate to 
measures that were to a large extent decided at privatisation. The 1988 White Paper 
(Department of Energy, 1988) had already suggested that large industrial customers 
may be able to choose their electricity supplier. In 1989, it became clear that 
competition in the supply of electricity will be extended to all consumers in three stages. 
Specifically, it was decided that consumers with a maximum demand of more than 1 
MW, equivalent to about 30% of all electricity generated, would be able to choose their 
supplier immediately. From 1994, consumers with a maximum demand of more than 
100 kW, and from 1998 all consumers, irrespective of their level of consumption, would 
be able to choose their supplier. It is thus not surprising that investors do not appear to 
react when announcements relating to this expected opening up of competition in 
electricity supply are actually made. In an efficient capital market these expected 
announcements should be already discounted in the share price. 
With respect to competition in generation and its effect on the RECs, the argument is 
more complex. Irrespective of government and regulator's aims to develop 
competition, physical laws determine the way in which electricity flows from 
generating power stations to consumers, through the distributional grid. These physical 
laws are such that it is impossible to determine in which power station the electricity 
supplied to a particular consumer was generated. In practical terms, all generators must 
sell their electricity to the Pool for distribution through the national grid. Therefore, in 
order to buy electricity directly from a generator, a consumer must sign a contract with 
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the supplier. The consumption of electricity is then monitored half-hourly to determine 
how much the supplier must buy from the Pool and how much the NGC and the local 
REC should be paid for their services of transmitting and distributing electricity34. On 
the basis of these technical constraints, competition in electricity generation can be 
developed in two main ways. Firstly, the government could insure that generation is 
spread across enough generators, so that no single generator would have enough 
monopolistic power in the market. Secondly, generators could be induced to sell a good 
proportion of their output through contracts, and in this way be exposed to the threat of 
entry i f the contract price is not in line with the competitive price. Many argue that the 
structure of generation at privatisation was not adequately competitive, although 
contracts and entry threats did restrict generators' market power. However, it has also 
been argued that the expected complete liberalisation of electricity supply after 1998 
would have weaken the development of competition in generation and the threat of 
entry (Green and Newbery, 1997). Given the above stated limits to the development of 
competition in generation, it is hardly surprising that announcements relating to 
competition in generation (GCP and GCN) and wholesale price (GPN) made in the first 
four years of electricity privatisation do not appear to have a collective effect on the 
3 4 In practice, most contracts between generators and RECs take the form of 'contracts 
for differences' (CfD). These contracts are written as financial options, with a strike 
price: i f the Pool Input Price (PIP) exceeds the strike price, then the buyer can exercise 
the option to buy electricity at the lower strike price (call option); i f the PIP falls below 
the strike price, then the generator receives the higher strike price (put option). These 
contracts are equivalent to fixing a price for electricity. They are called CfD because 
the generator receives the PIP and the difference between a specified strike price and the 
PIP for each unit contracted. Arbitrage takes place between the spot and contract 
markets, with buyers and sellers switching between them in search of the most 
favourable terms. Thus, contract prices must be kept close to expected spot prices. 
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returns of the RECs. Investors were indeed entitled to believe that these types of 
announcements were unlikely to lead to more competition and lower wholesale prices. 
However, the results are quite different when the effects of the same announcement 
groups are tested on the return on the equity capital of the equally weighted portfolio of 
generators (Table 2.2). In this case, generators' returns appear to be affected by 
announcements relating to the relaxation of control rules on retail price (DPP), the 
tightening of wholesale price's control (GPN) and the increase in competition in 
generation (GCP) and all coefficients have the expected sign. The significant effects of 
GPN and GCP announcements are particularly interesting and could be interpreted as a 
personal achievement of Professor Littlechild, the DGES. At privatisation, the 
regulatory regime that was put in place seemed to be based on the assumption that there 
was enough competition in generation not to require much regulation. The regulator 
had indeed very little power to intervene in the electricity generation market, which in 
reality was far from competitive. The only threat available to the regulator to affect 
both the structure of the industry and the working of the Pool was the referral to the 
MMC. Professor Littlechild used this threat extensively and effectively, particularly in 
1993. Voluntary structural changes to electricity generation occurred in this period and 
no doubt this affected investors' expectations about the returns of the generators. 
2.4.2 Results of Individual Announcements 
In order to gain more insights into the potential effects of regulatory announcements on 
the returns of electricity companies, the effect of individual announcements within the 
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groups on both returns and conditional volatility of returns are also tested for each 
individual REC. Although the observation of an individual announcement's effect 
cannot be generalised to the group and thus carries no clear policy implications in 
relation to a particular type of announcement, nevertheless it can shed further light in 
interpreting the group results. Given the number of RECs and announcements within 
each group, Equation 2.5 is estimated by year and announcement group. Detailed 
results of these estimations are provided in Appendix 2.3, while Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
summarise the results of the individual announcements found to have a statistically 
significant impact on at least one company. 
As expected, a good proportion of announcements within insignificant groups have a 
significant impact on the returns of individual RECs. Notably, some of the 
announcements expected to promote competition in distribution (DCP) have a positive 
impact on the returns of some RECs, result that appears to run contrary to the 
formulated hypothesis. Closer investigation, however, reveals the difficulty in 
interpreting the reaction to announcements without a detailed knowledge of their 
informational content. For example, DCP2, which announces that the regulator has 
decided to ignore calls for delaying market liberalisation, causes an increase in the 
returns of five RECs. This can be explained by the implication of this announcement, 
made explicit by announcement DC3 that also has a positive impact on some RECs, that 
this regulator's decision frees the RECs to sign five-year contracts with the generators 
and thus hedge movements in price until 1998, the year of expected ful l liberalisation. 
Investors in some of the RECs have obviously welcomed this news, which reduces the 
risk of pool electricity price fluctuations. Similarly, DCP8, which announces the 
regulator's preference for speeding up liberalisation, has a positive impact on a number 
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of RECs. This can be explained by the fact that the speeding up of liberalisation was 
prompted by changes in the gas market due in 1996, which allowed household 
consumers a choice of gas supplier. Gas companies, which also sell electricity, would 
have had an unfair advantage over the RECs, unless a similar liberalisation was 
introduced in the electricity market. It is therefore good news for investors that the 
regulator is trying to create a levelled playing field in the supply of electricity. 
With respect to the announcements relating to the wholesale price of electricity, only 
GPN1 has a positive impact on the returns of a number of RECs. This announcement, 
made at an early stage of privatisation in February 1991, was the first of a number of 
warnings by the regulator that the price charged by generators was too high and would 
not be tolerated. Not surprisingly, subsequent announcements to this first one had no 
impact since carried no new information. However, the sensitivity of the RECs' returns 
to GPN1 is a sign that wholesale price announcements can affect expectations of 
investors in distribution companies. Among the announcements relating to competition 
in generation, only two announcement, GCP6 and GCP17, had a positive effect on 
several RECs. Both announcements relate to the sale of power stations by generating 
companies and the regulator's view that they should be sold to competitors to increase 
competition in generation. However, both announcements have the opposite effect than 
expected on the returns of some of the RECs. The explanation for this result lies in the 
regulator's expressed view that the RECs should be allowed to buy power stations from 
generators. I f this happens, the RECs may acquire market power by becoming more 
vertically integrated. This is obviously good news for shareholders. 
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As explained earlier, when announcements are unanticipated, as it is the case with the 
type of regulatory announcements investigated in this thesis, the share price is likely to 
become more volatile around an event date with informational content (Ross, 1989). 
Table 2.4 summarises the results from testing the effect of announcements on the 
conditional volatility of the RECs share returns35. The significant group DPN appears 
to have the greater number of announcements with informational content, as measured 
by their significant effect on the conditional volatility of returns. In addition, the 
announcements with informational content are often, but not always, the ones who had 
been found to affect returns. DPP1, DPP5 and GPN1, which affected the returns of 
many RECs, also appear to have a very strong informational content. Thus, overall, it 
can be concluded that, although some of the announcements that affect returns do not 
appear to affect the conditional volatility of returns, the announcements with a 
systematic effect on the returns of most RECs also have a definite impact on the 
conditional volatility of returns across the industry. 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter, after providing an overview of the electricity industry in England and 
Wales, analyses the impact of unanticipated regulatory announcements on the return of 
the equity capital of the Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) and the power 
generating companies in England and Wales. The results of the announcement group 
analysis show that regulatory announcements relating to the retail price of electricity 
supply are the only type of announcements to have a significant impact, as a group, on 
3 5 Detailed results are in Appendix 2.3, Tables A2.3.8-A2.3.11. 
106 
the equally weighted portfolio of RECs. This is not surprising when considering that 
most of the announcements relating to competition could have been to some extent 
anticipated at the time of privatisation. In particular, the return on equity capital of the 
RECs, taken as a group, is affected negatively by announcements expected to lead to a 
decrease in the retail price of electricity and positively by announcements that give an 
indication of no further cuts in electricity prices. These results are in line with the 
formulated hypotheses. 
Results are however quite different when the effects of the same announcement groups 
are tested on the return on the equity capital of the equally weighted portfolio of 
generators. Generators' returns appear to be affected by announcements relating to the 
relaxation of control rules on retail price, the tightening of wholesale price's control and 
the increase in competition in generation. Al l coefficients relating to these significant 
groups have the expected sign. Since generation was privatised as a duopoly, without 
clear indication of how competition should evolve, it is to be expected that 
announcements to promote greater competition in generation would have a significant 
impact. 
When the attention is turned to the impact of individual announcements, it is found that 
a good proportion of announcements within insignificant groups have a significant 
impact on the returns of individual RECs, but their effect does not always have the 
expected sign. Although there appear to be good reasons for the fact that the reaction of 
investors to some of these announcements goes contrary to expectations, these 
anomalies illustrate how difficult it is to classify announcements by type and formulate 
hypothesis about the group effects. There is no doubt that greater competition in any 
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industry should mean lower profits and thus lower investor's returns. However, as seen 
in the previous section, this generalisation does not take into account cases when a 
move towards industry's liberalisation has implications beyond the simple competitive 
posture of incumbent firms. These implications can only be fully considered when 
analysing individual announcements. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
List of Regional Electricity Companies at Privatisation 
Eastern Electricity EEL 
East Midlands Electricity EME 
London Electricity LEL 
Manweb MWB 
Midlands Electricity MEL 
Northern Electric NEL 
Norweb NWB 
Seeboard SBD 
Southern Electric SEL 
South Wales Electricity SWAE 
South Western Electricity SWE 
Yorkshire Electricity VEL 
109 
APPENDIX 2.2 
Regulatory Announcements Relating to the Electricity Industry of England and 
Wales: January 1991 - December 1994 
Announcement Type, 
Number and Date Description of Announcement 
1991 
DSP1 Jan 20 OFFER will soon publish a document setting out the 'standards of 
performance' for the RECs, guaranteeing standards of services for 
customers. 
GCP1 Jan 22 National Power and PowerGen are not allowed to compete for large 
industrial customers to ensure that independent generators and 
other entrants to the supplier market can compete. 
DPN1 Jan 29 The number of business customers elegible for cheaper electricity 
wil l increase. 
DPN2 Feb 18 DGES warns that the present price-cap formula may allow 
electricity price to increase too much. 
DPN3 Feb 20 DGES warns RECs that he will not allow prices to rise as much as 
anticipated. 
GPN1 Feb 25 Energy Secretary says that electricity generating companies will 
have to justify their proposals of price increases to regulators. 
GCP2 Apr 15 Energy Secretary says that competition in electricity generation 
will develop in spite of the recent increase in gas prices. 
DPN4 Jun 19 DGES expressed concerns on the profits of electricity companies 
after East Midland Electricity reported better than expected annual 
results. 
DSP 2 Aug 8 OFFER rules that electricity suppliers should not press late paying 
business customers for cash deposits. Customers should be given 
more choice of payment methods. 
GCP3 Sep 17 Pool Executive Committee to discuss four options over how much 
companies generating their own electricity on site should pay the 
pool, or spot market. 
GPN2 Oct 3 OFFER threatens to refer the generators to the MMC over 
operations in the wholesale market as prices surge against a falling 
seasonal demand. 
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DPN5 Oct 22 
GCP4 Nov 18 
DSP3 Dec 18 
GCP5 Dec 20 
1992 
DPN6 Jan 13 
DPP1 Feb 6 
DPP2 Feb 28 
GCP6 Mar 5 
GCP7 Mar 9 
DCP1 Apr 23 
GCP8 Jun 9 
DPN7 Jun 15 
DPP3 Jun 25 
DPN8 Jul 2 
OFFER warns seven RECs that they may be overcharging 
customers and urges them to compensate customers. The other five 
RECs should consider passing on the benefits of lower inflation to 
customers. 
Major Energy Users' Council calls for the generators to be split up 
to break their hold on the wholesale market and change the rules to 
unable large users to negotiate lower prices. 
OFFER wil l consider altering the price formula to provide 
incentives for the RECs to help customers to save energy. 
DGES says that generators have used their dominant position to 
push up prices and recommends changes to the licence to weaken 
their market power. 
The Coalition for Fair Electricity Regulation (COFFER) plans to 
take OFFER to court over failure to keep prices down. 
RECs reach a favourable price deal with the regulator. 
OFFER likely to be satisfied with Northern Electric's price rise. 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd warns that OFFER wil l be tougher than 
investors anticipate on competition and force generators to offer 
power stations due to close for sale to their competitors. 
Commons energy committee of MPs calls for wide-ranging reform 
to increase competition in generation and OFFER supports this 
view. 
OFFER amends market rules to allow more large customers to 
chose their electricity supplier. 
DGES agrees with Commons energy committee that National 
Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric are too dominant in the 
market. 
OFFER announces that it wil l not allow RECs to make big profits 
at the expenses of customers. OFFER'S deputy director warns that 
the price formula is likely to be tighten when reviewed in 1994 and 
1995. 
DTI approves South Wales electricity price cut. 
OFFER is likely to force the NGC, owned by the RECs, to cut its 
charges to electricity customers. 
I l l 
DPN9 Jul 7 
DSP4 Jul 23 
GPN3 Jul 27 
DPN10 Aug 13 
DPN11 Oct 8 
GPN4 Dec 18 
1993 
DCP2 Feb 4 
DCP3 Feb 12 
GPN5 Feb 22 
GCP9 Mar 9 
DPN12 Mar 16 
DCP4 Apr 1 
GPN6 May 5 
GPN7 May 24 
GPN8 Jun 9 
OFFER proposes new pricing formula that will result in a 
substantial cut in the NGC's charges. 
OFFER reports that customers in London get a better service and 
proposes measures to improve customer's service nationally. 
DGES asks the generators to explain why pool prices have 
increased sharply since May. 
COFFER plans to take DGES to court for failing to keep prices 
down. 
OFFER launches review of price controls. 
DGES accuses generators of using dominant market position to 
push electricity prices up and suggests that electricity generation 
could be regulated in future. 
OFFER opposes plans to delay electricity market liberalisation to 
protect the use of coal in electricity generation, rather than 
switching to cheaper gas. 
Government opts not to delay the liberalisation of the electricity 
market. Generators are free to sign five-year contracts with the 
RECs, but DGES has yet to decide whether generators' prices are 
unfair. 
DGES wants to study generators' coal contracts, following 
allegations that coal price cuts have not been passed on to 
customers. I f found 'guilty', generators could either be subjected 
to regulation or referred to the MMC. 
OFFER suggests that generators should sale eleven power stations 
due to close. 
OFFER plans shake-up of supply price control. 
OFFER allows generators to make unlimited sales direct to 
customers. 
OFFER asks generators to account for the significant price rises. 
OFFER warns generators that they will face MMC referral over the 
latest price rises. 
A survey by National Utilities Services warns that large industrial 
groups buying directly from the pool have faced compound price 
rises of 11% 
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DPN13 Jul 8 
DPN14 Jul 9 
Tomorrow OFFER will announce tougher controls on electricity 
supply prices. 
New control measures tough, but manageable, according to the 
RECs. 
GPN9 Jul 30 OFFER reports on pool price increases and warns that generators 
face referral to the MMC. 
DPN15 Aug 4 
DPN16 Aug 13 
RECs accept new price controls. 
Following a decision by the power industry to change the way pool 
prices are calculated, the largest customers should see a price 
reduction in the Autumn. 
GCP10 Sep 28 
GCP11 Oct 18 
DCP5 Oct 22 
DCP6 Oct 26 
The Energy Intensive Users Group claims that members' interests 
have not been represented in the August poll and pool prices wil l 
not decrease enough. 
Major Energy User's Council urges OFFER to refer generators to 
the MMC over the operation of the pool. 
Regulator criticises power companies over attempts to tie 
customers to long term contracts and instructs them to include 
escape clauses. 
OFFER pledges to probe RECs profits as he launches a review of 
their distribution accounts. 
GCP12 Nov 15 
GPN10 Nov 18 
DPN17 Nov 23 
GCP13 Dec 14 
GCP14 Dec 15 
GCN1 Dec 20 
Energy Secretary announces that supply licences are no longer 
required for companies generating their own electricity. 
Wholesale electricity prices were 23% higher than last year and 
pressure increases on the regulator to refer generators to the MMC. 
Energy Intensive User's Group asked OFFER to curb prices after 
an academic study suggested that consumers are overcharged. 
DGES to make a statement tomorrow on the generators but 
unlikely to decide whether to refer them to the MMC. 
DGES will not refer generators to the MMC i f agreement on plant 
disposals and prices is reached. 
Big energy users back down from insistence that generators should 
be referred to the MMC. 
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1994 
GCN2 Feb 10 
DCP7 Mar 3 
GCP15 Mar 7 
DPN18 Mar 29 
DPN19 Apr 22 
DCP8 May 17 
GCN3 May 19 
DPP4 Jun 27 
DPN20 Aug 5 
DPP5 Aug 10 
GCP16 Oct 6 
DPP6 Nov 30 
GCP17 Dec 8 
GCN4 Dec 14 
DGES wil l not refer the generators to the MMC after agreement on 
the sale of plants and price-capping has been reached. 
Regulator call for more competition by 1996. 
OFFER seeks industry's view on changing the bidding mechanism 
for the pool and on allowing companies to trade outside the pool. 
Consumers' committees press DGES to tighten price controls on 
RECs. 
DGES's lecture surprises markets with the speed with which the 
regulator envisages clawing back earnings. 
DGES indicates preferences for speeding up liberalisation. 
Minister rules out nuclear sell-off in current parliament. 
Regulator shows signs of compromise with RECs over regulatory 
changes to distribution prices. 
DGES review of electricity price controls, due on Thursday, is 
expected to results in price cuts for 95/96 and tighter controls 
thereafter. 
New price controls likely to disappoint customers and please 
investors: they are less severe than expected. 
DGES favours privatising nuclear power industry to improve 
competition 
DGES confirms and defends expected rise in RECs dividends. 
DGES warns generators on plant disposal and considers regulatory 
changes to allow RECs to buy plants from them. 
Government accepts ruling by OFFER that the case for the 
widespread trading of electricity outside the pool has not been 
made. 
Notes: 
DCP Announcements likely to lead to more competition in electricity distribution 
DPN Announcements likely to lead to lower prices in electricity distribution 
DPP Announcements not likely to lead to lower prices in electricity distribution 
DSP Announcements likely to lead to service improvements in electricity distribution 
GCN Announcements not likely to lead to more competition in electricity generation 
GCP Announcements likely to lead to more competition in electricity generation 
GPN Announcements likely to lead to lower prices in electricity generation 
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APPENDIX 2.3 
Table A2.3.1 
The effect of DISTRIBUTION PRICE-NEG (DPN) announcements on the 
conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
R» = at + + i>, DPNj + s„ 
./ = ' 
K = a0 + « 1 4 - 1 + « 2 V l 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 1.36 
Beta 0.854 65.02* 
DPN1 n -0.0010 -2.14* 
DPN2 72 0.0007 0.14 
DPN3 73 -0.0064 -1.06 
DPN4 74 -0.0005 -2.04* 
DPN5 75 -0.0016 -2.37* 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.58 
Beta P 0.950 230.0* 
DPN1 7i 0.0004 0.52 
DPN2 72 0.0006 0.96 
DPN3 73 -0.0014 -2.22* 
DPN4 74 -0.0025 -4.06* 
DPN5 75 -0.0016 -2.40* 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 1.45 
Beta P 0.945 257.85 
DPN1 7i 0.0004 0.68 
DPN2 72 0.0007 1.03 
DPN3 73 -0.0014 -1.90* 
DPN4 74 -0.0002 -1.12 
DPN 5 75 -0.0016 -0.33 
MANWEB 
Constant a 0.0001 1.26 
Beta P 0.845 102.3* 
DPN1 7i 0.0009 1.05 
115 
DPN2 72 0.0005 0.17 
DPN3 73 -0.0023 -1.86* 
DPN4 74 -0.0007 -2.34* 
DPN5 75 -0.0020 -2.47* 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 0.85 
Beta P 0.911 145.0* 
DPN1 7i 0.0007 0.92 
DPN2 72 0.0004 1.26 
DPN3 7s -0.0019 -2.34* 
DPN4 74 -0.0011 -2.53* 
DPN5 75 -0.0020 -2.14* 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0000 2.25* 
Beta P 0.870 89.3* 
DPN1 7i 0.0006 0.76 
DPN2 72 -0.0010 -0.67 
DPN3 73 0.0002 0.89 
DPN4 74 -0.0001 -1.12 
DPN5 75 -0.0019 -0.96 
NORWEB 
Constant a 0.0002 3.11* 
Beta P 0.955 316.3* 
DPN1 7i 0.0003 0.67 
DPN2 72 -0.0007 -0.36 
DPN3 73 0.0000 0.03 
DPN4 74 -0.0010 -0.09 
DPN5 75 -0.0015 -0.49 
SEEBOARD 
Constant a 0.0001 1.67 
Beta P 0.935 195.08 
DPN1 7i 0.0007 1.48 
DPN2 72 0.0004 0.35 
DPN3 73 -0.0007 -0.53 
DPN4 74 -0.0009 -0.99 
DPN5 75 -0.0006 -0.41 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0001 2.27* 
Beta P 0.930 177.5* 
DPN1 7i 0.0006 1.04 
DPN2 72 0.0002 0.28 
DPN3 73 -0.0010 -1.20 
DPN4 74 -0.0007 -1.09 
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DPN5 75 -0.0017 -0.83 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 2.05* 
Beta P 0.931 258.6* 
DPN1 n -0.0045 -13.08* 
DPN2 72 0.0005 0.69 
DPN3 73 -0.0011 -1.45 
DPN4 74 -0.0015 -1.06 
DPN5 75 -0.0011 -1.61 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 1.59 
Beta P 0.779 41.56* 
DPN1 7i -0.0014 -2.34* 
DPN2 72 -0.0005 -0.33 
DPN3 73 -0.0007 -0.95 
DPN4 74 -0.0015 -1.52 
DPN5 75 -0.0015 -0.62 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0003 4.91* 
Beta P 0.714 35.17* 
DPN1 7i 0.0002 0.32 
DPN2 72 0.0004 0.50 
DPN3 73 -0.0007 -1.06 
DPN4 74 -0.0014 -2.34* 
DPN5 75 -0.0007 -1.17 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 1.43 
Beta P 0.692 53.42* 
DPN6 76 0.0012 0.91 
DPN7 77 -0.0011 -3.10* 
DPN8 78 -0.0012 -2.22* 
DPN9 79 0.0005 0.38 
DPN10 7io 0.0007 0.24 
DPN11 7u -0.0002 -0.08 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0002 1.45 
Beta P 0.690 36.34* 
DPN6 76 -0.0015 -4.10* 
DPN7 77 -0.0017 -4.25* 
DPN8 78 -0.0007 -1.20 
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DPN9 79 0.0017 2.50* 
DPN10 Yio 0.0015 1.27 
DPN11 Yu -0.0003 -0.25 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0002 1.51 
Beta P 0.692 46.43* 
DPN6 76 -0.0018 -3.76* 
DPN7 7? -0.0009 -4.34* 
DPN8 78 -0.0005 -0.58 
DPN9 79 0.0008 0.92 
DPN10 7w 0.0005 0.31 
DPN11 7u 0.00026 0.26 
MANWEB 
Constant a 0.0001 1.13 
Beta P 0.705 71.60* 
DPN6 76 0.0015 1.69* 
DPN7 77 -0.0010 -3.87* 
DPN8 78 -0.0008 -1.06 
DPN9 79 0.0013 1.51 
DPN10 7io -0.0002 -0.07 
DPN11 7ii 0.0001 0.09 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.68 
Beta P 0.880 149.0* 
DPN6 76 -0.0009 -1.47 
DPN7 77 -0.0007 -2.98* 
DPN8 78 0.0000 0.11 
DPN9 79 0.0002 0.32 
DPN10 7io 0.0009 0.98 
DPN11 7n 0.0006 0.55 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0002 2.86* 
Beta P 0.690 99.6* 
DPN6 76 0.0012 2.92* 
DPN7 77 -0.0012 -3.11* 
DPN8 78 -0.0007 -1.36 
DPN9 79 0.0011 1.01 
DPN10 7io 0.0009 0.78 
DPN11 7n -0.0000 -0.01 
NORWEB 
Constant a 0.0001 1.43 
Beta P 0.700 72.25* 
DPN6 76 -0.0006 -1.29 
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DPN7 77 -0.0017 -4.15* 
DPN8 Y8 -0.0006 -0.92 
DPN9 79 0.0011 1.23 
DPN10 7io 0.0011 1.14 
DPN11 7ii -0.0003 -0.29 
SEEBOARD 
Constant a 0.0002 2.54* 
Beta P 0.866 136.70 
DPN6 76 -0.0004 -0.51 
DPN7 77 -0.0013 -3.16* 
DPN8 78 -0.0012 -1.77* 
DPN9 79 0.0000 0.00 
DPN10 7io 0.0001 0.14 
DPN11 7n -0.0005 -0.52 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0001 1.82* 
Beta P 0.880 166.0* 
DPN6 76 -0.0011 -3.40* 
DPN7 77 -0.0007 -2.78* 
DPN8 78 -0.0009 -2.35* 
DPN9 79 0.0011 0.73 
DPN10 7io 0.0009 0.92 
DPN11 7n -0.0000 -0.01 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a -0.0001 -1.68 
Beta P 0.867 163.8* 
DPN6 76 0.0002 0.35 
DPN7 77 -0.0001 -1.10 
DPN8 78 -0.0005 -1.09 
DPN9 79 0.0009 0.25 
DPN10 7io 0.0011 0.92 
DPN11 7ii 0.0007 0.51 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0002 2.28* 
Beta P 0.901 162.6* 
DPN6 76 -0.0021 -3.34* 
DPN7 77 -0.0006 -3.10* 
DPN8 78 -0.0006 -0.74 
DPN9 79 0.0012 1.06 
DPN10 7io 0.0002 0.11 
DPN11 7n 0.0000 0.00 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0001 2.29* 
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Beta P 0.581 20.31* 
DPN6 Y6 -0.0023 -1.33 
DPN7 77 -0.0011 -1.52 
DPN8 78 -0.0007 -1.11 
DPN9 79 0.0013 2.91* 
DPN10 7io 0.0006 0.67 
DPN11 7n -0.0003 -0.27 
1993 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.16 
Beta P 0.622 14.77* 
DPN12 7n -0.0004 -0.90 
DPN13 713 0.0003 0.36 
DPN14 714 -0.0001 -0.16 
DPN15 715 -0.0004 -0.14 
DPN16 716 0.0009 0.70 
DPN17 7n -0.0004 -0.83 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a -0.0000 -0.43 
Beta P 0.667 19.21* 
DPN12 7n -0.0001 -0.34 
DPN13 713 0.0003 0.57 
DPN14 714 -0.0000 -0.00 
DPN15 715 -0.0005 -0.64 
DPN16 716 0.0005 0.21 
DPN17 7n -0.0005 -1.08 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.13 
Beta P 0.622 17.59* 
DPN12 712 0.0002 0.27 
DPN13 713 0.0011 1.42 
DPN14 714 0.0005 0.63 
DPN15 715 -0.0007 -0.62 
DPN16 716 0.0008 0.72 
DPN17 7n -0.0006 -1.09 
MANWEB 
Constant a 0.0000 0.16 
Beta P 0.609 15.72* 
DPN12 712 0.0002 0.35 
DPN13 713 0.0010 0.96 
DPN14 714 -0.0003 -0.24 
DPN15 715 -0.0005 -0.41 
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DPN16 716 0.0011 0.39 
DPN17 Yn -0.0004 -0.69 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.17 
Beta P 0.611 16.73* 
DPN12 Y12 0.0000 0.20 
DPN13 Yn 0.0006 0.96 
DPN14 Y\4 0.0007 1.10 
DPN15 Y15 -0.0003 -0.08 
DPN16 Yl6 0.0013 0.99 
DPN17 Yn -0.0004 -1.06 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0000 0.18 
Beta P 0.548 10.36* 
DPN12 Y12 0.0002 0.46 
DPN13 Yl3 0.0010 0.84 
DPN14 Y14 -0.0004 -0.38 
DPN15 YI5 -0.0000 -0.01 
DPN16 Yl6 0.0008 0.85 
DPN17 Yl7 -0.0002 -0.38 
NORWEB 
Constant a 0.0000 0.18 
Beta P 0.577 11.21* 
DPN12 Yn 0.0007 1.11 
DPN13 Yn 0.0007 0.68 
DPN14 Y14 0.0002 0.23 
DPN15 Yis 0.0003 0.19 
DPN16 Yl6 0.0003 0.15 
DPN17 Yn -0.0007 -1.98* 
SEEBOARD 
Constant a 0.0000 0.19 
Beta P 0.577 15.99* 
DPN12 Yn 0.0001 0.34 
DPN13 Yis 0.0009 1.72* 
DPN14 YI4 0.0005 0.97 
DPN15 Y'5 -0.0004 -0.29 
DPN16 YI6 0.0005 0.21 
DPN17 Yn -0.0003 -0.76 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0006 0.80 
Beta P 0.604 16.15* 
DPN12 Yn -0.0057 -1.04 
DPN13 Yl3 0.0053 0.60 
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DPN 14 714 -0.0037 -0.30 
DPN 15 715 -0.0066 -0.33 
DPN 16 716 0.0061 0.39 
DPN 17 717 -0.0072 -1.39 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0006 0.87 
Beta P 0.544 10.16 
DPN 12 717 0.0032 0.34 
DPN 13 713 0.0052 0.59 
DPN 14 714 -0.0017 -0.19 
DPN 15 715 -0.0009 -0.08 
DPN 16 716 0.0141 0.34 
DPN 17 7n -0.0058 -0.59 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.71 
Beta P 0.540 9.54* 
DPN 12 712 0.0002 0.35 
DPN 13 713 0.0007 0.80 
DPN 14 714 0.0000 0.80 
DPN 15 715 -0.0005 -0.58 
DPN 16 716 0.0008 1.24 
DPN 17 717 0.0001 0.22 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0000 0.74 
Beta P 0.540 10.51 
DPN 12 712 0.0000 0.18 
DPN 13 713 0.0006 0.89 
DPN 14 714 0.0002 0.24 
DPN 15 715 -0.0004 -0.36 
DPN 16 716 0.0002 0.00 
DPN 17 7n -0.0002 -0.41 
1994 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0117 12.76 
Beta P 0.639 18.05 
DPN 18 718 0.0156 1.55 
DPN 19 719 -0.0173 -1.32 
DPN20 720 0.0008 0.03 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0012 16.67 
Beta P 0.714 27.71 
DPN 18 718 0.0015 2.89* 
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DPN 19 Yl9 -0.0019 -3.02* 
DPN20 720 -0.0017 -0.84 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0196 10.26* 
Beta P 0.705 38.88* 
DPN 18 718 0.0229 3.05* 
DPN 19 719 -0.0124 -1.43 
DPN20 720 -0.0031 -0.14 
MANWEB 
Constant a 0.0111 11.89* 
Beta P 0.548 15.12* 
DPN 18 718 0.0122 1.44 
DPN 19 719 -0.0159 -1.69* 
DPN20 720 -0.0046 -0.20 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0115 11.10* 
Beta P 0.612 16.79* 
DPN 18 718 0.0164 2.02* 
DPN 19 719 -0.0170 -2.32* 
DPN20 720 -0.0030 -0.09 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0117 10.86* 
Beta P 0.665 32.72* 
DPN 18 718 0.0209 2.07* 
DPN 19 719 -0.0187 -0.97 
DPN20 720 -0.0043 -0.03 
NORWEB 
Constant a 0.0117 11.76* 
Beta P 0.593 13.17* 
DPN 18 718 0.0220 3.06* 
DPN 19 719 -0.0146 -1.29 
DPN20 720 0.0013 0.03 
SEEBOARD 
Constant a 0.0119 9.90* 
Beta P 0.608 13.62* 
DPN 18 718 0.0157 1.34 
DPN 19 719 -0.0171 -2.26* 
DPN20 720 -0.0077 -0.54 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
Constant a 0.0132 14.99* 
Beta P 0.302 21.05* 
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DPN18 yI8 0.0122 1.72* 
DPN19 y19 -0.0195 -2.05* 
DPN20 Y20 -0.0004 -0.01 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0128 14.40* 
Beta p 0.296 3.06* 
DPN18 yl8 0.0074 0.90 
DPN19 y,9 -0.0146 -1.15 
DPN20 y20 0.0015 0.13 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0122 14.98* 
Beta p 0.305 3.56* 
DPN18 yl8 0.0152 2.45* 
DPN19 yI9 -0.0214 -2.44* 
DPN20 y20 -0.0078 -0.40 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
Constant a 0.0106 11.47* 
Beta p 0.731 38.57* 
DPN18 y,8 0.0211 3.01* 
DPN19 yl9 -0.0236 -1.47 
DPN20 y20 -0.0022 -0.07 
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Table A2.3.2 
The effect of DISTRIBUTION PRICE-POS (DPP) announcements 
on the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
Rll=al+filRml + irJDPPi+sil 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 n 0.0011 2.09* 
DPP2 72 00.0001 0.03 
DPP3 73 -0.0001 -0.12 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 7i 0.0053 2.34* 
DPP2 72 0.0000 0.02 
DPP3 73 0.0001 0.04 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 7i 0.0112 3.11* 
DPP2 72 0.0005 0.56 
DPP3 73 0.0006 0.64 
MANWEB 
DPP1 7i 0.0010 1.89* 
DPP2 72 0.0003 0.68 
DPP3 73 -0.0000 -0.01 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 7i 0.0075 2.36* 
DPP2 72 -0.0003 -0.19 
DPP3 73 -0.0002 -0.13 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP1 7i 0.0055 2.13* 
DPP2 72 0.0034 4.34* 
DPP3 73 0.0004 1.14 
NORWEB 
DPP1 7i 0.0089 2.76* 
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DPP2 y2 0.0008 0.77 
DPP3 y3 -0.0001 -0.41 
SEEBOARD 
DPP1 y, 0.0111 3.11* 
DPP2 y2 0.0000 0.07 
DPP3 y3 -0.0003 -0.08 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP1 y, 0.0089 2.76* 
DPP2 y2 0.0011 0.08 
DPP3 yi -0.0009 -0.28 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 y, 0.0086 2.78* 
DPP2 y2 0.0005 0.15 
DPP3 y3 0.0105 2.89* 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 y, 0.0045 1.78* 
DPP2 y2 0.0006 0.97 
DPP3 y3 0.0031 0.19 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 y, 0.0001 1.65* 
DPP2 y2 0.0007 0.13 
DPP3 y3 0.0048 1.13 
1994 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 y4 -0.0052 -0.92 
DPP5 y5 -0.0193 -6.97* 
DPP6 y6 0.0060 0.73 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 y4 0.0028 0.25 
DPP5 y5 0.0118 2.21* 
DPP6 y6 0.0072 0.47 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 y4 0.0139 1.86* 
DPP5 y5 0.0191 5.97* 
DPP6 y6 0.0130 0.47 
MANWEB 
DPP4 y4 -0.0004 -0.07 
DPP 5 y5 0.0078 1.40 
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DPP6 y6 0.0072 0.79 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 y4 0.0091 1.55 
DPP 5 y5 0.0162 2.56* 
DPP6 ye 0.0109 1.29 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP4 y4 0.0025 0.43 
DPP5 Y5 0.0056 0.53 
DPP6 ye 0.0131 1.12 
NORWEB 
DPP4 Y4 0.0083 1.44 
DPP5 y5 0.0093 1.72* 
DPP6 Y6 0.0082 0.74 
SEEBOARD 
DPP4 y4 0.0016 0.22 
DPP5 YS 0.0119 1.74* 
DPP6 Y6 0.0121 1.18 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP4 y4 -0.0011 -0.14 
DPP5 Y5 0.0199 5.59* 
DPP6 ye 0.0049 0.47 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 Y4 0.0105 0.87 
DPP5 Ys 0.0112 2.59* 
DPP6 y6 0.0048 0.45 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 y4 0.0120 0.77 
DPP5 YS 0.0170 4.14* 
DPP6 Y6 0.0084 0.86 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP4 Y4 0.0153 1.50 
DPP5 Y5 0.0116 2.08* 
DPP6 ye 0.0066 0.61 
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Table A2.3.3 
The effect of DISTRIBUTION COMP-POS (DCP) announcements 
on the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
Rll=a,+piRM + Y1yJDCPJ+ell 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 y, 0.0011 0.64 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 y, 0.0009 1.01 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 y, 0.0003 0.95 
MANWEB 
DCP1 y, 0.0002 1.04 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 y, 0.0007 1.20 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP1 y, 0.0004 1.03 
NORWEB 
DCP1 y, 0.0002 0.92 
SEEBOARD 
DCP1 y, 0.0003 1.45 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP1 yi 0.0006 1.07 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y DCP1 y, 0.0005 1.15 
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SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 y, 0.0008 0.89 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP1 n 0.0004 1.46 
1993 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 Y2 0.0011 2.64* 
DCP3 n 0.0009 1.56 
DCP4 Y4 -0.0002 -0.39 
DCP5 y5 -0.0002 -0.14 
DCP6 y6 0.0004 0.28 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 y2 0.0010 1.51 
DCP3 y3 0.0009 1.76* 
DCP4 Y4 -0.0002 -0.40 
DCP5 Ys -0.0002 -0.08 
DCP6 Y6 0.0004 0.11 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 Y2 0.0013 1.85* 
DCP3 YS 0.0008 2.01* 
DCP4 Y4 -0.0000 -0.02 
DCP5 YS -0.0004 -0.24 
DCP6 Ye 0.0006 0.29 
MANWEB 
DCP2 y2 0.0092 1.74* 
DCP3 Yi 0.0063 1.06 
DCP4 Y4 0.0012 0.26 
DCP5 y5 -0.0012 -0.08 
DCP6 Y6 -0.0006 -0.06 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 Y2 0.0019 4.92* 
DCP3 Yi 0.0009 1.38 
DCP4 Y4 -0.0000 -0.14 
DCP5 YS -0.0005 -0.41 
DCP6 Ye 0.0005 0.24 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP2 Y2 0.0015 1.96* 
DCP3 y3 0.0006 1.26 
DCP4 Y4 0.0001 0.26 
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DCP5 75 -0.0002 -0.10 
DCP6 76 0.0006 0.37 
NORWEB 
DCP2 72 0.0003 0.22 
DCP3 73 0.0014 2.16* 
DCP4 74 0.0007 1.21 
DCP5 75 -0.0004 -0.39 
DCP6 76 0.0007 0.42 
SEEBOARD 
DCP2 72 0.0008 1.50 
DCP3 73 0.0008 1.46 
DCP4 74 -0.0000 -0.00 
DCP5 75 -0.0004 -0.34 
DCP6 76 0.0005 0.04 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP2 72 0.0009 1.17 
DCP3 73 0.0015 3.32* 
DCP4 74 -0.0005 -1.02 
DCP5 75 -0.0003 -0.04 
DCP6 76 0.0012 2.12* 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 72 0.0004 1.25 
DCP3 73 0.0007 0.64 
DCP4 74 0.0003 0.47 
DCP5 75 -0.0002 -0.17 
DCP6 76 0.0006 0.28 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 72 0.0005 1.09 
DCP3 73 0.0010 0.87 
DCP4 74 0.0002 0.41 
DCP5 75 -0.0004 -0.46 
DCP6 76 0.0004 0.30 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP2 72 0.0006 1.52 
DCP3 73 0.0002 0.00 
DCP4 74 0.0000 0.28 
DCP5 75 -0.0005 -0.23 
DCP6 76 0.0001 0.23 
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1994 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 y7 
DCP8 y8 
-0.0000 
0.0026 
-0.20 
0.12 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 
DCP8 
77 
78 
0.0076 
0.0315 
0.78 
3.82* 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 y7 0.0055 
DCP8 y8 0.0134 
0.44 
1.58 
MANWEB 
DCP7 
DCP8 
7? 
78 
0.0060 
0.0323 
0.38 
6.13* 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 
DCP8 
77 
78 
0.0042 
0.0278 
0.25 
5.19* 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP7 y7 0.0047 
DCP8 y8 0.0236 
0.24 
7.76* 
NORWEB 
DCP7 
DCP8 
SEEBOARD 
DCP7 
DCP8 
77 
78 
77 
78 
-0.0002 
0.0177 
0.0050 
0.0352 
-0.01 
2.75* 
0.09 
2.83* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DCP7 y7 0.0034 
DCP8 y8 0.0112 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 y7 -0.0031 
DCP8 y8 0.0261 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 y7 0.0067 
DCP8 y8 0.0218 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DCP7 y7 0.0012 
DCP8 y8 -0.0166 
0.12 
1.29 
-0.18 
3.79* 
0.66 
3.82* 
0.08 
-5.47* 
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Table A2.3.4 
The effect of DISTRIBUTION SERVICE-POS (DSP) 
announcements on the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
7=1 
h„ = a0 + a, + a2 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 n 0.0006 1.06 
DSP2 72 0.0001 0.08 
DSP3 73 -0.0003 -0.33 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 7i 0.0006 0.82 
DSP2 72 0.0004 0.48 
DSP3 73 -0.0003 -0.35 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 7i 0.0010 0.79 
DSP2 72 0.0001 0.04 
DSP3 73 -0.0013 -1.64* 
MANWEB 
DSP1 7i 0.0009 1.05 
DSP2 72 -0.0004 -0.42 
DSP3 73 -0.0001 -0.09 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 7i 0.0007 1.24 
DSP2 72 -0.0002 -0.24 
DSP3 73 -0.0003 -0.26 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DSP1 7i 0.0005 1.31 
DSP2 72 0.0004 0.63 
DSP3 73 -0.0010 -1.25 
NORWEB 
DSP1 7i 0.0004 1.01 
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DSP2 Y2 0.0005 0.71 
DSP3 Y3 -0.0003 -0.33 
SEEBOARD 
DSP1 YI 0.0001 3.28* 
DSP2 Y2 0.0004 0.53 
DSP3 Yi 0.0002 0.08 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DSP1 YI 0.0009 1.22 
DSP2 Y2 -0.0006 -0.47 
DSP3 Yi -0.0002 -0.14 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 YI 0.0015 2.16* 
DSP2 Y2 0.0002 0.29 
DSP3 Ys -0.0014 -2.56* 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 YI 0.0019 3.16* 
DSP2 Y2 0.0005 0.90 
DSP3 y3 -0.0007 -1.40 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP1 YI 0.0003 0.75 
DSP2 Y2 -0.0004 -0.46 
DSP3 y3 -0.0006 -0.93 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 y4 0.0003 1.16 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 Y4 0.0002 0.61 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 Y4 0.0007 0.09 
MANWEB 
DSP4 Y4 0.0006 0.55 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 Y4 0.0004 0.24 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DSP4 Y4 0.0011 1.34 
133 
NORWEB 
DSP4 y4 0.0009 1.23 
SEEBQARD 
DSP4 y, 0.0012 1.48 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DSP4 y4 0.0007 1.52 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 Y4 0.0013 1.19 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 Y4 0-0006 1.24 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DSP4 y4 0.0005 1.58 
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Table A2.3.5 
The effect of GENERATION PRICE-NEG (GPN) announcements on 
the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
Rh = a,. + M , „ + 2 > 7 GPN, + e. 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 y, 0.0005 2.11* 
GPN2 Y2 0.0002 1.18 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 y, 0.0011 1.72* 
GPN2 Y2 0.0003 0.42 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 YI 0.0004 1.32 
GPN2 Y2 -0.0006 -1.23 
MANWEB 
GPN1 YI 0.0012 1.03 
GPN2 Y2 -0.0005 -0.63 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 YI 0.0006 2.47* 
GPN2 y2 0.0007 0.41 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN1 YI 0.0010 3.11* 
GPN2 Y2 0.0003 0.92 
NORWEB 
GPN1 y, 0.0002 2.39* 
GPN2 Y2 -0.0006 -0.37 
SEEBOARD 
GPN1 Yi 0.0004 4.67* 
GPN2 Y2 0.0000 0.06 
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SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN1 y, 0.0008 3.36* 
GPN2 y2 0.0002 1.42 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 y, 0.0009 3.13* 
GPN2 y2 -0.0005 -1.25 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 y, 0.0017 2.97* 
GPN2 y2 -0.0005 -0.83 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 y, 0.0012 2.74* 
GPN2 y2 -0.0000 -0.06 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 y3 0.0002 1.41 
GPN4 y4 0.0004 1.04 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 y3 0.0009 1.42 
GPN4 y4 0.0003 0.42 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 y3 0.0005 0.98 
GPN4 y4 -0.0001 -0.14 
MANWEB 
GPN3 y3 0.0002 1.21 
GPN4 y4 -0.0006 -0.83 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 y3 0.0005 1.34 
GPN4 y4 0.0002 0.37 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN3 y3 0.0007 1.14 
GPN4 y4 0.0003 0.92 
NORWEB 
GPN3 y3 0.0004 1.52 
GPN4 Y4 -0.0002 -0.76 
SEEBOARD 
GPN3 Y3 0.0007 1.27 
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GPN4 y4 0.0001 0.67 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN3 Y3 0.0005 1.41 
GPN4 f4 0.0003 0.90 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 Ys 0.0013 1.18 
GPN4 y4 -0.0001 -1.25 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 Y3 0.0007 0.99 
GPN4 Y4 -0.0003 -0.69 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN3 Yi 0.0012 1.71* 
GPN4 Y4 0.0003 1.14 
1993 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN5 Y5 -0.0005 -1.11 
GPN6 Y6 0.0001 1.29 
GPN7 y7 0.0008 1.19 
GPN8 YS 0.0002 0.31 
GPN9 Y9 0.0000 0.85 
GPN10 YIO 0.0007 1.10 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN5 Y5 0.0001 0.91 
GPN6 Y6 0.0005 0.78 
GPN7 Y7 0.0006 1.24 
GPN8 y8 0.0003 0.81 
GPN9 Y9 -0.0001 -0.75 
GPN10 YIO 0.0003 1.23 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN5 YS -0.0002 -0.29 
GPN6 ye 0.0003 1.18 
GPN7 Y7 0.0007 1.43 
GPN8 YS 0.0004 0.78 
GPN9 Y9 0.0002 1.35 
GPN10 Yio 0.00011 0.97 
MANWEB 
GPN5 YS 0.0000 0.61 
GPN6 ye 0.0003 1.46 
GPN7 Y? 0.0002 0.81 
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GPN8 y8 0.0005 1.03 
GPN9 y9 -0.0002 -0.65 
GPN10 y,0 0.0016 1.19 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN5 y5 -0.0019 -1.22 
GPN6 y6 0.0004 0.69 
GPN7 y7 0.0010 1.60 
GPN8 y8 0.0007 0.91 
GPN9 y9 0.0001 1.27 
GPN10 yw 0.0015 1.33 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN5 y5 -0.0009 -1.08 
GPN6 y6 0.0028 1.10 
GPN7 y7 0.0019 1.46 
GPN8 y8 0.0010 0.45 
GPN9 y9 0.0001 1.50 
GPN10 y,0 0.0022 0.49 
NORWEB 
GPN5 y5 -0.0010 -1.19 
GPN6 y6 0.0006 0.53 
GPN7 0.0003 1.31 
GPN8 y8 0.0007 1.51 
GPN9 y9 0.0001 0.09 
GPN10 y,0 0.0000 1.16 
SEEBOARD 
GPN5 y5 0.0001 1.31 
GPN6 y6 0.0003 0.85 
GPN7 ^ 7 0.0007 0.19 
GPN8 ya 0.0002 1.35 
GPN9 y9 -0.0002 -0.91 
GPN10 y,0 0.0004 1.14 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN5 y5 -0.0004 -1.18 
GPN6 y6 0.0002 0.99 
GPN7 y7 0.0001 1.39 
GPN8 ^ 0.0010 0.83 
GPN9 y9 0.0001 1.05 
GPN10 YIO 0.0017 1.60 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN5 y5 -0.0015 -1.01 
GPN6 y6 0.0007 1.44 
GPN7 y7 0.0000 0.17 
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GPN8 y8 0.0004 0.88 
GPN9 Y9 0.0012 0.77 
GPN1.0 Yio 0.0009 1.16 
SOUTH WESTERN ELECTRICITY 
GPN5 YS 0.0014 0,91 
GPN6 ^ 0.0004 1.29 
GPN7 ^ 7 0.0007 1.47 
GPN8 YS 0.0000 0.13 
GPN9 Y9 0.0003 0.87 
GPN10 x/o 0.0008 1.41 
YORKSHIRE ELECTRICITY 
GPN5 Yi 0.0013 1.53 
GPN6 ft 0.0006 1.46 
GPN7 y7 0.0012 1.16 
GPN8 ^ 0.0001 1.00 
GPN9 j/p 0.0003 0.93 
GPN10 YIO 0.0010 1.50 
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Table A2.3.6 
The effect of GENERATION COMPETITION-POS (GCP) 
announcements on the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
K=a, + piRml + tylGCPl+eil 
7=1 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 YI 0.0001 0.11 
GCP2 Y2 0.0002 0.18 
GCP3 YS -0.0004 -0.08 
GCP4 Y4 -0.0004 -0.15 
GCP5 Ys -0.0005 -0.72 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 YI 0.0053 0.02 
GCP2 Y2 0.0001 0.02 
GCP3 Yi -0.0003 -0.15 
GCP4 Y4 -0.0002 -0.05 
GCP5 YS -0.0010 -0.76 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 YI 0.0003 0.11 
GCP2 Y2 -0.0002 -0.28 
GCP3 Y3 -0.0005 -0.15 
GCP4 Y4 -0.0019 -0.38 
GCP5 YS -0.0009 -0.91 
MANWEB 
GCP1 YI 0.0015 0.02 
GCP2 Y2 -0.0005 -0.43 
GCP3 Ys 0.0001 0.03 
GCP4 Y4 -0.0000 -0.02 
GCP5 YS -0.0001 -0.09 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 YI -0.0001 -0.13 
GCP2 Y2 0.0005 0.23 
GCP3 Yi -0.0003 -0.03 
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GCP4 74 -0.0016 -0.70 
GCP5 75 -0.0002 -0.24 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP1 7i -0.0002 -0.21 
GCP2 72 0.0001 0.02 
GCP3 7s -0.0004 -0.11 
GCP4 74 -0.0008 -0.69 
GCP5 75 -0.0007 -0.74 
NORWEB 
GCP1 7i -0.0003 -0.35 
GCP2 72 -0.0001 -0.17 
GCP3 73 0.0001 0.04 
GCP4 74 -0.0007 -0.63 
GCP5 75 -0.0002 -0.25 
SEEBOARD 
GCP1 7i -0.0002 -0.27 
GCP2 72 0.0000 0.01 
GCP3 73 -0.0003 -0.06 
GCP4 74 -0.0017 -1.62 
GCP5 75 -0.0011 -1.83 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP1 7i 0.0004 0.18 
GCP2 72 0.0007 0.82 
GCP3 73 -0.0001 -0.05 
GCP4 74 -0.0012 -1.30 
GCP5 75 -0.0002 -0.13 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 7i 0.0002 0.06 
GCP2 72 -0.0009 -0.25 
GCP3 73 -0.0000 -0.00 
GCP4 74 -0.0014 -1.46 
GCP5 75 -0.0004 -0.14 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 7i 0.0070 0.27 
GCP2 72 -0.0001 -0.01 
GCP3 73 -0.0001 -0.08 
GCP4 74 -0.0011 -1.33 
GCP5 75 -0.0013 -1.31 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 7i 0.0002 0.34 
GCP2 72 -0.0000 -000 
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GCP3 y3 -0.0002 -0.04 
GCP4 y4 -0.0012 -1.39 
GCP5 y5 -0.0007 -0.74 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0004 0.33 
GCP7 y? 0.0000 0.14 
GCP8 y8 -0.0010 -0.18 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0009 2.11* 
GCP7 y7 0.0008 0.92 
GCP8 y8 -0.0006 -1.09 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0003 0.87 
GCP7 y7 0.0009 0.35 
GCP8 y8 -0.0002 -0.91 
MANWEB 
GCP6 y6 0.0013 1.11 
GCP7 y7 0.0000 0.81 
GCP8 y8 -0.0004 -1.06 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0006 2.66* 
GCP7 y7 0.0003 0.08 
GCP8 y8 -0.0011 -0.92 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP6 y6 0.0010 1.21 
GCP7 y7 0.0001 0.56 
GCP8 y8 -0.0000 -0.07 
NORWEB 
GCP6 y6 0.0004 1.41 
GCP7 y7 0.0008 1.18 
GCP8 y8 -0.0016 -0.18 
SEEBOARD 
GCP6 y6 0.0007 1.18 
GCP7 y7 0.0003 0.47 
GCP8 y8 -0.0012 -0.98 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP6 ye 0.0002 2.17* 
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GCP7 y7 0.0000 0.31 
GCP8 y8 -0.0009 -0.78 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0011 1.17 
GCP7 y7 0.0005 0.88 
GCP8 y8 -0.0018 -0.96 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 Y6 0.0008 1.77* 
GCP7 y7 0.0004 0.78 
GCP8 y8 -0.0014 -0.59 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP6 y6 0.0006 1.47 
GCP7 y7 0.0001 0.87 
GCP8 y8 -0.0015 -0.34 
1993 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 y9 0.0005 0.73 
GCP10 yw 0.0003 0.97 
GCP11 yn -0.0006 -0.42 
GCP12 y,2 -0.0011 -0.57 
GCP13 y,3 0.0006 1.02 
GCP14 yl4 -0.0010 -0.41 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 y9 0.0010 0.66 
GCP10 y,0 0.0001 0.08 
GCP11 yn -0.0014 -1.48 
GCP12 yI2 -0.0006 -0.79 
GCP13 y,3 0.0012 1.52 
GCP14 y14 -0.0007 -0.94 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 y9 0.0001 0.09 
GCP10 y,0 -0.0002 -0.53 
GCP11 y,, -0.0005 -0.88 
GCP12 y,2 -0.008 -0.14 
GCP13 y,3 0.0017 1.27 
GCP14 y14 0.0014 1.30 
MANWEB 
GCP9 y9 0.0001 1.07 
GCP10 y,0 0.0003 0.42 
GCP11 yu -0.0013 -0.96 
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GCP12 
GCP13 
GCP14 
Yn 
Yl3 
Yl4 
-0.0004 
-0.0000 
-0.0008 
-0.47 
-0.68 
-0.87 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 Y9 0.0015 1.12 
GCP10 Yio 0.0005 0.08 
GCP11 Yn -0.0011 -0.64 
GCP12 Yn -0.0001 -0.59 
GCP13 YI3 0.0004 1.42 
GCP14 YI4 -0.0007 -0.45 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP9 Y9 0.0008 1.17 
GCP10 Yw 0.0004 0.37 
GCP11 Yn -0.0005 -0.59 
GCP12 Y12 -0.0009 -1.06 
GCP13 Yl3 -0.0003 -1.34 
GCP14 Yl4 -0.0011 -0.94 
NORWEB 
GCP9 Y9 0.0019 1.43 
GCP10 Yw 0.0002 0.65 
GCP11 Yn -0.0007 -0.72 
GCP12 Y12 -0.0008 -1.06 
GCP13 Yl3 0.0020 1.32 
GCP14 Yl4 -0.0001 -0.67 
SEEBOARD 
GCP9 Y9 0.0006 0.80 
GCP10 Yio 0.0002 0.59 
GCP11 Yn -0.0004 -1.43 
GCP12 Yn -0.0015 -0.79 
GCP13 YI3 -0.0007 -1.32 
GCP14 Yu 0.0012 1.50 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP9 Y9 0.0009 1.18 
GCP10 Yio 0.0000 0.53 
GCP11 YII 0.0001 0.08 
GCP12 Yn -0.0006 -0.27 
GCP13 Yl3 0.0008 1.32 
GCP14 Yl4 -0.0007 -0.75 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 Y9 0.0006 1.42 
GCP10 Yio 0.0002 0.09 
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GCP11 YU -0.0012 -0.61 
GCP12 y12 -0.0008 -0.39 
GCP13 yI3 0.0004 1.27 
GCP14 y14 -0.0007 -0.93 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 y9 0.0008 0.58 
GCP10 yl0 0.0002 1.01 
GCP11 yu -0.0000 -0.05 
GCP12 yl2 -0.0005 -0.27 
GCP13 Yi3 0.0010 1.31 
GCP14 y14 0.0004 0.86 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP9 y9 0.0003 0.07 
GCP10 y,0 0.0006 0.63 
GCP11 yu -0.0012 -1.04 
GCP12 y12 -0.0002 -0.35 
GCP13 yI3 -0.0007 -1.43 
GCP14 yl4 -0.0018 -1.30 
1994 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 yl5 0.0011 0.44 
GCP16 y,6 -0.0006 -0.87 
GCP17 yl7 0.0004 1.89* 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 y15 0.0004 1.06 
GCP16 Yi6 0.0000 0.03 
GCP17 yl7 0.0007 1.48 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 yI5 0.0002 0.06 
GCP16 y,6 0.0004 0.18 
GCP17 y,7 0.0012 2.06* 
MANWEB 
GCP15 yis 0.0009 1.07 
GCP16 y,6 0.0004 0.08 
GCP17 y,7 -0.0007 -0.74 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 y15 0.0003 0.58 
GCP16 y16 0.0005 0.09 
GCP17 y,7 0.0006 1.56 
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NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP15 Yi5 
GCP16 yi6 
GCP17 Yn 
NORWEB 
GCP15 Yis 
GCP16 Yi6 
GCP17 Y>7 
SEEBOARD 
GCP15 Yis 
GCP16 m 
GCP17 Yn 
0.0006 
-0.0006 
0.0005 
0.0008 
-0.0001 
0.0016 
0.0003 
-0.0002 
0.0005 
0.79 
0.27 
1.21 
0.83 
-0.30 
1.18 
0.67 
-0.06 
2.10* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCP15 YIS 0.0006 
GCP16 Yi6 0.0002 
GCP17 Yn 0.0017 
1.06 
0.37 
1.53 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 yl5 0.0007 
GCP16 Yi6 -0.0000 
GCP17 Yn 0.0014 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 Y l 5 0.0006 
GCP16 Y l 6 -0.0004 
GCP17 Y l l 0.0014 
0.55 
-0.03 
1.32 
0.93 
-0.64 
0.63 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP15 YIS 0.0012 
GCP16 Y,6 -0.0008 
GCP17 Yn 0.0004 
1.03 
-0.77 
1.74* 
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Table A2.3.7 
The effect of GENERATION COMPETITION-NEG (GCN) 
announcements on the conditional mean of the RECs by year. 
R, = a, + p^,, + ±y GCNj + eu 
./ = ! 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1993 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 y, 0.0003 0.35 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 y} 0.0023 0.92 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 YI 0.0009 1.42 
MAN W E B 
GCN1 Yi 0.0018 1.27 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 Yi -0.0001 -0.21 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCN1 YI -0.0007 -0.98 
NORWEB 
GCN1 YI -0.0000 -0.41 
SEEBOARD 
GCN1 YI -0.0005 -0.59 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCN1 YI 0.0011 1.31 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 YI 0.0004 0.76 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y GCN1 Yi 0.0006 1.57 
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Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN1 yi 0.0013 1.42 
1994 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 Y2 0.0012 1.41 
GCN3 YS 0.0001 0.78 
GCN4 y4 0.0013 1.32 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 y2 0.0002 0.16 
GCN3 Ys -0.0006 -0.51 
GCN4 Y4 0.0003 0.28 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 Y2 0.0004 0.71 
GCN3 YS -0.0001 -0.49 
GCN4 Y4 0.0012 1.06 
MAN WEB 
GCN2 Y2 0.0005 0.92 
GCN3 Y3 -0.0007 -0.44 
GCN4 Y4 0.0004 0.75 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 Y2 0.0003 0.46 
GCN3 Yi -0.0013 -1.08 
GCN4 y4 0.0005 0.94 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCN2 Y2 0.0011 1.49 
GCN3 Ys -0.0008 -0.99 
GCN4 Y4 0.0014 0.68 
NORWEB 
GCN2 Y2 0.0005 0.85 
GCN3 Ys -0.0006 -1.31 
GCN4 Y4 0.0009 0.77 
SEEBOARD 
GCN2 Y2 0.0016 1.83* 
GCN3 Ys 0.0000 0.83 
GCN4 Y4 0.0021 0.19 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GCN2 Y2 0.0008 1.00 
GCN3 Ys -0.0006 -0.76 
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GCN4 y4 0.0019 0.93 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 y2 0.0006 1.35 
GCN3 y3 010003 0.16 
GCN4 y4 0.00014 0.77 
SOUTH WESTERN E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 y2 0.0003 2.09* 
GCN3 y3 0.0000 0.09 
GCN4 y4 0.0004 0.45 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCN2 y2 0.0004 0,75 
GCN3 y3 0.0001 0.71 
GCN4 y4 0.0004 1.17 
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Table A2.3.8 
DISTRIBUTION P R I C E - N E G (DPN) announcements with a statistically 
significant effect on the conditional variance of the returns on the RECs ' equity 
by year. 
R„ = a, + /?,/?„„ + e„ 
hu =a0+a, e],_, + a2 hit_, + t t j DPNj 
7=1 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN3 <j)3 5.3270 2.18* 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN1 <pj 0.2205 2.52* 
DPN3 d>3 0.1808 2.60 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN2 <f>2 0.0007 1.79* 
1992 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN6 <p6 0.0003 4.68* 
DPN7 fa 0.0012 1.82* 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN6 </>6 0.0053 3.15* 
DPN7 <p7 0.0010 2.02 * 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN6 <j>6 0.0018 3.10* 
DPN7 (t>7 0.0756 2.84* 
MANWEB 
DPN6 <f>6 0.2011 4.89* 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN6 <t>6 0.0175 3.24* 
DPN7 fa 1.4503 2.97* 
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NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPN7 07 0.0213 2.33* 
* 
NORWEB 
DPN7 <t>7 0.0257 2.99' 
SEEBOARD 
DPN6 06 0.0187 4.01* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPN6 06 0.3167 4.85v 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN6 06 0.1180 1.98 
DPN7 0r 0.0045 2.90* 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN7 (f>7 0.1965 2.78* 
1993 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN13 0,3 0.0008 2.92* 
DPN14 <f>,4 0.0012 4.48* 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPN13 0/3 0.0070 3.05* 
DPN14 0N 0.0086 3.69* 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN13 0,3 0.0051 2.07* 
DPN14 0,4 0.0063 2.42* 
1994 
MANWEB 
DPN19 0i9 1.0038 3.43* 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN18 0,8 0.0200 17.36* 
DPN19 0,9 0.0097 5.34 
* 
SEEBOARD 
DPN18 0,8 0.0153 7.67* 
DPN19 0,9 0.0487 5.00* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPN19 0,9 0.0165 3.07* 
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SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN18 <f>ls 0.0131 4.95* 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPN18 (t>l8 0.0116 3.62* 
DPN19 (j),9 00077 3.68* 
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Table A2.3.9 
DISTRIBUTION PRICE-POS (DPP) announcements with a statistically 
significant effect on the conditional variance of the returns on the RECs ' equity 
by year. 
R„ = a, + /?,/?„„ + e„ 
h„ =aQ + ax el_t + a2 hi t_x + t</>j DPPj 
./ = ! 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1994 
EAST MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 
DPP5 
9i 0.0062 
0.0060 
3.45* 
5.73* 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 <j>i 0.0090 2.03' 
MANWEB 
DPP1 
DPP5 
6 
MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 (f>! 
DPP5 65 
0.0061 
-0.0056 
0.0061 
0.0050 
2.77* 
-4.22* 
2.33* 
3.09* 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP1 fa 0.0060 
DPP5 d>5 -0.0056 
2.56* 
-3.92* 
NORWEB 
DPP1 
DPP5 
0.0062 
0.0050 
2.10* 
2.64* 
SEEBOARD 
DPP1 
DPP5 
6 0.0070 
-0.0047 
2.16* 
-2.25* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
DPP1 <p, 0.0069 
DPP5 (f>5 -0.0050 
2.19* 
-2.45* 
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SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 <f>, 0.0068 2.10* 
DPP5 <f>5 -0.0049 -2.31* 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 <j), 0.0071 2.14* 
DPP 5 <f>5 -0.0049 -2.25* 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
DPP1 cj>i 
DPP5 </>s 
0.0069 2.07* 
0.0049 2.26* 
L. 
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Table A2.3.10 
GENERATION P R I C E N E G A T I V E (GPN) announcements with a statistically 
significant effect on the conditional variance of the returns on the RECs ' equity 
by year. 
Ru = a,. + p.Rm, + e„ 
K =aQ+a, 4_, + a2 /?,,_, + t<f>j GPNj 
7 = 1 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
E A S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 <j>, 0.4503 4.03* 
E A S T MIDLANDS E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 (/>, -0.0349 -3.76* 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 (j>i 0.0071 5.60* 
NORTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN1 <f>i 0.0014 2.16* 
NORWEB 
GPN1 </>, 0.0045 3.06* 
SEEBOARD 
GPN1 </>, -0.0563 -2.86* 
SOUTHERN E L E C T R I C 
GPN1 </>, 0.0222 3.10* 
SOUTH W A L E S E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 tp, 0.0099 2.59* 
SOUTH W E S T E R N E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 </>i 0.0117 4.80* 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GPN1 0, 0.0113 2.77* 
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Table A2.3.11 
GENERATION COMPETITION POSITIVE (GCP) announcements with a 
statistically significant effect on the conditional variance of the returns on the 
RECs ' equity by year. 
R„ = a, + //,/?„„ + e„ 
K = « o + « , 4 I + « 2 hi,,-\ + t</>j GCPj 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
1991 
LONDON E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP2 <i>2 0.0126 1.69* 
SOUTH WALES 1 E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 <f>, -0.0139 -1.93* 
GCP2 (f>2 0.0125 6.22* 
Y O R K S H I R E E L E C T R I C I T Y 
GCP1 </>, -0.0130 -2.01* 
GCP2 <f>2 0.0121 5.21* 
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Regulatory Announcements on the Systematic 
Risk of British Telecoms A Time-Varying Approach 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis conducted in the previous chapter offers interesting insights into the effects 
of regulation on the rate of return of equity capital. However, it also suffers from a 
number of methodological drawbacks. Firstly, it is impossible to identify whether 
regulation affects the rate of return by impacting on the intercept or on the slope of the 
capital market line. In other words, the effect of regulation on the company's performance 
cannot be distinguished from the effect on the company's systematic risk. Secondly, the 
parameters of the market model are assumed to remain constant over time. The 
assumption of the stability of the beta coefficient has been criticised for a long time, with 
much of the literature agreeing that in reality the beta of firms tends to vary over time with 
changes in the firm's size, product mix and financial leverage (Blume, 1975). In the case 
of newly privatised utilities, the assumption of a stable beta coefficient is even less 
credible, given the uncertainty surrounding the future structure and competitive posture of 
utility industries and their regulatory constraints. Following decades of state monopoly, 
after privatisation, firms in these industries are likely to face a fast changing environment 
at the level of both firms and industry. In addition, there is considerable theoretical and 
empirical evidence to suggest that regulation itself has an impact on the regulated firm's 
systematic risk. However, the theory is inconclusive as to the direction of this impact and 
thus the effect of regulation on firms' systematic risk remains an interesting empirical 
question. 
On the basis of the above observations, this chapter will model the impact of regulation on 
the systematic risk of British Telecom (BT), using a time-varying approach. The 
remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the main economic 
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issues relating to the privatisation of the telecommunications industry in the UK, with 
particular emphasis on the promotion of competition and price controls. Section 3.2 
discusses the theoretical and empirical relationship between regulation and systematic risk 
of regulated firms. Methodological issues relating to unanticipated event studies and the 
methodology adopted in the chapter are discussed in Section 3.3, along with the 
formulation of the tested hypotheses. Section 3.4 describes the announcement selection 
procedure and the data and Section 3.5 presents the empirical results for both group and 
individual regulatory announcements. Concluding remarks are contained in section 3.6. 
3.1 T H E PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION OF T H E BRITISH 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
The first network utility industry to be privatised in Britain was the telecommunications 
industry. This privatisation provided a learning experience for policy decisions about 
appropriate competitive and regulatory frameworks for the future privatisation of other 
utilities. For example, the RPI-X price cap regulation was first applied to British Telecom, 
before its subsequent widespread use in several other utility industries. In addition, the 
privatisation of the British telecommunications industry came at a time of great advancement 
in technology and changes in the use of the telecommunications network by customers. 
Today, customers use the network for more than just basic voice transmission and this 
imposes different demands on the network. The switching and transmission technology is 
now similar to those used in the computing and broadcasting industries and the links with 
these industries are strong. 
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Basically, the telecommunications industry comprises of three main functions: i) the 
operation of the network; ii) the supply of the equipment attached to the network; and iii) the 
supply of services over the network36. A telecommunications network operates by means of 
exchanges and transmissions links, with local exchanges, trunk or long-distance lines and 
international networks being configured hierarchically. The new technology for transmission 
makes use of fibre-optic cables and modem exchanges are electronic and programmable, 
rather than electromagnetic. The use of fibre-optic technology has dramatically reduced the 
cost of long-distance calls and increased the carrying capacity of cables, so that sufficient 
information can be conveyed to give high quality TV signals. In addition, the cost of 
increasing capacity, once the cable has been laid down, is independent of the length of the 
cable. In mobile networks, the final local link is a radio link, able to transmit digital rather 
than analog signals. The types of terminal apparatus that can now be attached to the network 
is expanding and includes answering machines, fax and telex machines, private automatic 
branch exchanges, TV sets and computers. Equally, the variety of services provided over the 
network is also expanding. 
From an economic point of view, the key features of the telecommunications industry are that 
it is a multi-product industry, with a non-storable output subject to time-varying and 
stochastic demand. In addition, the structure of costs tends to change very often with the 
rapidly changing technology. In general, it can be said that the telecommunications industry 
has sunk costs, as well as capacity constraints, externalities, elements of natural monopoly 
and a complex vertically integrated structure. Regulation mainly relates to the last three 
3 6 Although for the purpose of analysis it is useful to distinguish among these three functions, 
in reality it is not always possible to make this distinction. For a more detailed treatment of 
the economics of telecommunications see Brock (1981); Sharkey (1982, ch 9); Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994, ch 7); Cave and Williamson (1996); Grout (1996); and 
Armstrong (1997). 
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attributes. In relation to externalities, there are very important positive network 
externalities37, which arise because it is in the interest of existing customers that new 
customers subscribe for the service. The obvious example in voice telephony is that any 
individual customer benefits from being connected to a larger number of users. The presence 
of network externalities can affect the pricing policy for new subscribers as well as for the 
interconnection of rival networks. In addition, there are social benefits in providing 
telephone services to remote or sparsely populated areas, or specialised services to disabled 
people. This justifies some cross-subsidisation among types and geographical location of 
users. Finally, the main negative externality arises from network congestion due to the 
limited capacity of the network and the variation of demand over time. Although the 
introduction of electronic technology has reduced the problem of congestion and short-run 
variable costs, this still justifies the use of peak-load pricing schemes for some services. 
Aspects of natural monopoly have traditionally thought to be present in the construction and 
operation of the network, although not in the supply of services over the network, or in the 
supply of equipment. This is a controversial issue with a weak theoretical support and mixed 
empirical evidence. Although it may seem obvious at first sight that wires and exchanges 
from several suppliers over the same territory would be a wasteful duplication38, the 
empirical evidence on the existence of natural monopoly characteristics in network 
operations does not always provide support for this view 3 9. Traffic on trunk and international 
3 7 In the case of telecommunications the use of the terminology 'network' externality is 
slightly confusing, since individual users do not strictly speaking benefit from the number 
of other network users, but from the number of customers using the same service, which 
could be provided over several networks. For a definition of network externality, see 
Tirole(1988, section 10.6). 
3 8 However, it must be noted that in New Zealand Clear Communications Inc. is 
duplicating local network in most main cities to compete against New Zealand Telecom. 
3 9 For example, Evans and Heckman (1983) and Hunt and Lynk (1991) found evidence 
that, prior to divestiture, the Bell network in the USA was not a natural monopoly; Shin 
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lines is so heavy that it has been argued that economies of scale have been long exhausted. 
Even local telephony is becoming more competitive (Baumol and Sidak, 1994), with large 
users bypassing the local network to connect directly to the long-distance network and mobile 
telephony becoming more and more widespread. It is however recognised that there are 
substantial costs for a single user to connect to more than one fixed network and/or more than 
one mobile network. This in turns makes it expensive to switch to a different network, once 
the first connection choice has been made. This creates some monopoly power in local 
connections and thus a role for regulation to protect consumers. The presence of monopoly 
power and network externalities also explains why network interconnection is so important 
for competition policy in telecommunications. Entry of new suppliers into the market is only 
possible i f there is full network interconnection, so that customers of one network can make 
and receive calls from customers of another network at reasonable access charges. I f this 
were not possible, then the smaller network would not be able to compete on equal footing 
with the larger network 
Competition in the industry is further impeded by several vertical relationships. The fact that 
local, long-distance and international operations are hierarchically configured means that, 
when making a long-distance call, a customer utilises wires and exchanges of two local 
networks, in addition to trunk exchanges and long-distance lines. For international calls, the 
networks of two or more countries also need to connect, bringing in the need for international 
agreements. Calls from mobile phones usually involve the use of fixed-link networks, which 
then become inputs for mobile network operators. In addition, the operations of suppliers of 
and Ying (1992) reached the same conclusion for the regional networks in the USA; while 
Roeller (1990) found evidence of natural monopoly characteristics in the US Bell network. 
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services over the network and suppliers of apparatus to be connected to the network are 
strongly related to the availability and technical specification of the network. 
3.1.1 The Privatisation of BT and the Promotion of Competition. 
In Britain, British Telecom (BT) enjoyed a statutory monopoly on all aspects of the 
telecommunications network operation and almost all aspects of apparatus supply until 
1981. Back in July 1980, the then Secretary of State for Industry, Sir Keith Joseph, had 
announced to Parliament the government's intention to relax BT's monopoly40. 
However, a second licence as a national network operator was issued to Mercury only in 
1982 and Mercury did not launch its main services until 1986. In November 1983 the 
government announced that no further licences to provide fixed-link services would be 
issued for the next seven years, to allow Mercury to establish itself in the market 
without threat of further entry41. However, entry into other parts of the 
telecommunications market, including apparatus and the value-added network and 
services (VANS), was completely liberalised. BT was privatised in 1984 as a vertically 
integrated network operator and service provider. Soon after BT's privatisation, the 
government awarded the first cable television franchises. However, because of the 
restricted duopoly policy, these networks were not allowed to offer telecommunications 
services. Mercury's competition affected two main areas of service42. Firstly, Mercury 
4 0 For a detailed discussion of the main issues involved in the liberalisation of the British 
telecommunications' network see Beesley (1981); and Beesley and Laidlaw (1993). 
4 1 During the period of restricted entry, however, the government issued two licences to 
cellular radio network operators to sell services to customers through service providers and 
in 1989 four licences were issued for Telepoint, a service using portable telephones. 
4 2 For an economic analysis of the effects of the entry of Mercury into the British 
telecommunications industry see Beesley and Laidlaw (1997). 
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targeted large customers to be connected directly to its network by a microwave link, 
thus bypassing BT's network at the operating end. Secondly, Mercury marketed its 
services to smaller users for long-distance and international calls, while still using BT's 
network at the local level. Although the first marketing strategy was quite successful 
with a number of large customers connecting into Mercury's network, especially in the 
City of London, Mercury was never able to attract a significant share of small users. 
At the end of the seven years of restricted entry, the government issued a consultative 
document on the liberalisation of the telecommunication services, followed in March 
1991 by a White Paper. The recommendation was that the duopoly should end 4 3 and 
that every application to offer telecommunication services in the UK over fixed-link 
networks should be considered on its own merits. This made the UK one of the most 
liberalised telecommunications markets in the world, although BT still dominated fixed-
link network operations, among many other services. Because of BT's market power, a 
regulatory body was constituted, the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL), to 
monitor and enforce operators' licence conditions and advise the government on any 
regulatory matter. OFTEL also plays an advisory role on the issuing of new licences by 
the Department of Trade and Industry. In addition, it was decided that BT and Mercury 
would not be allowed to carry television services over their networks until at least 2001, 
to allow the cable television companies to strengthen their presence in the local fixed 
telecommunications market44. 
4 3 However, the duopoly policy for international network operations was retained until 
1996. 
4 4 BT's competitive advantage was also limited by other measures. For example, BT was 
not allowed to use radio links in its local loops, to encourage entry by local operators, such 
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From 1991 several new operators entered the market. At the level of small residential 
customers, the main competitors included the cable television companies, nationwide 
networks such as Energis and Ionica, regional operators such as Norweb, Scottish 
Telecom and Torch, and specialised business sector operators such as COLT and MFS. 
In addition, in the few months following then end of the duopoly in the international 
networks in 1996, about 50 license applications for international services were 
submitted (OFTEL, 1996a). However, there is little doubt that over the sample period 
of this thesis, up to December 1993, the competition faced by BT was very limited and 
BT remained dominant in fixed network operations. According to OFTEL (1996b), in 
December 1995 BT still supplied 94% of the exchange lines in Britain, with Mercury 
supplying about 1% and the cable operators about 5%. Less than 4% of residential 
customers use indirect access over BT lines for rival long-distance and international 
services. In terms of revenues, BT's market shares for all calls were 92% for local calls, 
81% for national long-distance calls and 70% for international calls. 
Particularly contentious has been the issue of interconnection charges. A l l networks 
require BT to deliver a large proportion of their calls, while a much smaller proportion 
of calls from BT's users are to customers on other networks, including mobile networks. 
Thus, BT has been asking for higher interconnection charges than other networks. In 
addition, BT's retail prices are not always in line with their cost. For example, rural 
users are charged the same prices for services, although it is more expensive to offer 
these services in geographically isolated areas. Equally, connection and quarterly fixed 
rental charges do not cover the fixed costs of providing and running the network, so that 
as Ionica, who were permitted to use this new technology. More recently, BT has been 
licensed to use radio links in its fixed networks in rural areas. 
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usage charges need to be above the marginal cost of using the network. These pricing 
policies could work against BT, i f BT were obliged to set interconnection charges equal 
to the marginal cost of providing interconnection. For example, the new market 
entrants could chose to service only more profitable customers and routes and as a 
consequence BT would loose the more profitable markets, which uses to cross-subsidise 
the loss-making operations. In addition, competitors could afford to be profitable even 
i f they were less efficient than BT. Therefore, interconnection charges must be greater 
that their cost, i f BT has to offer some services at prices below their cost. 
In mobile network operations, the government followed another duopoly policy, with 
Cellnet, in which BT had a controlling interest, and Vodafone being the only operators 
from 1985 to 1991 4 5. Mobile network operators, however, could not sell their services 
directly to the general public, but they had to wholesale their airtime to service 
providers. Although they were allowed to own, or control, service providers, they were 
not allowed by the license conditions to favour 'tied' over independent service 
providers. This allowed competition to develop at the level of end-user services, with a 
great variety of packages being retailed. In 1991, two additional operators were 
licensed, Mercury One-2-One and Orange, with no further licenses issued until at least 
2005. The four operators are now allowed to retail their services directly to the public 
and there is no control over the prices charged for mobile services. 
4 5 For more detailed on mobile telephony in the UK see Cave and Williamson, 1996. 
166 
3.1.2 Price Regulation for BT 
When the privatisation of the main public utilities was first considered by the 
Department of Industry, the original intention was to adopt a modified version of the 
rate-of-return regulation. However, it was finally agreed that a direct control on prices, 
or price-cap, was a better solution for the privatised BT and versions of it have been 
ever since used for the regulation of other privatised utilities in the UK and elsewhere 
(Littlechild, 1983)46. Since 1984, BT's prices have been controlled by RPI-X 
regulation, which limits the price rises allowed for a specified basket of services to a 
given percentage, X, less than the Retail Price Index (RPI). 
The main decision parameters in determining BT's price-cap regulation were the 
composition of the basket, whether to allow unrestricted resale of BT's leased lines and 
the value of factor X in the price formula. Al l three parameters had serious implications 
for BT's prices and profits. The main debate on the first parameter was whether to 
restrict the basket to connection and local call charges, or whether to include inland 
trunk calls4 7. BT's argument was that local connections and local calls were already 
under-priced and there was little scope for further price reductions. Inland trunk calls, 
on the other hand, offered a greater scope for price reductions since they were priced 
considerably above costs, impending new technology gave good prospects for further 
cost reductions and competition was expected soon from Mercury. With respect to the 
unrestricted resale of BT's leased lines, this would allow competitors to use low-priced 
4 6 The main features of the price-cap are analysed in chapter 1. 
4 7 International calls were not really considered for regulation, although they were highly 
profitable, since at the time the USA was the only other country pursuing a policy of 
liberalisation in telecommunications. 
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BT circuits to undercut high-priced BT phone calls and thus push prices down. Finally, 
the importance of the correct setting of factor X is obvious. The final regulatory 
package included inland trunk calls, no resale of leased lines and X equal to 3%, 
although the details of how this figure of three was reached were never published, nor 
have any of the calculations of other subsequent X factors across public utilities been 
revealed. 
The chosen form of price cap was the so called 'tariff basket' type, according to which 
the RPI-X price-cap is applied to a weighted average of prices of specified services, 
rather than having separate indices for each service. This formula was chosen on 
grounds of simplicity and flexibility and gave BT considerable discretion to change 
relative prices within the regulated basket48. Connection and international call charges, 
charges for leasing private lines and for value-added network and data services 
(VANS), and apparatus manufacture and supply were not regulated. There was no cost 
passthrough component, unlike in the formula of other utility industries privatised later. 
Finally, quality was not explicitly regulated, although the brief of the regulator was to 
promote the interests of consumers and producers with respect to price, quality and 
variety of services. Under the 1984 licence, BT's price control was RPI-3% to remain 
fixed for five years. In 1989, this was tightened to RPI-4.5% and, in 1991, it was 
tightened again to RPI-6.25%, with international calls included into the basket. From 
1993, the price-cap was further increased to RPI-7.5% and fixed for four years. In 
addition to this tightening of the price-cap formula, the scope of regulation also 
broadened, to include connection and international charges and a separate price-cap for 
4 8 This discretion however was limited by an undertaking not to increase line rental charges 
by more than RPI+2% and to apply uniform connection and rental charges among 
customers, irrespective of the cost of serving any one user. 
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leased lines, and the regulatory control over the re-balancing of the price structure also 
increased49. During the first decade of regulation, the services subject to price-cap 
regulation have risen from 48% to 70% of BT's turnover. In the same period, national 
calls experienced the largest change in price, with a cumulative price decrease of 64.6% 
for 'peak' calls and 26.8 for 'off-peak' calls. Local call prices also fell by 17.8% (peak) 
and 19.6% (off-peak). On the contrary, residential line rental charges have been 
gradually rising, experiencing a cumulative increase of 4.6%5 0. 
In spite of the regulatory constraints and the above price trends, BT's profits as a 
privatised company prospered, partly because of efficiency gains and the declining costs 
of new technology51, and the question whether they were excessive arose. Interestingly, 
although the rate of return of BT was not regulated, nevertheless the regulator published 
an assessment of the 'appropriate' rate of return concluding that the then earned 18% on 
book value was 'fair' (Director General of Telecommunications, 1996)52. In reality, BT 
kept its prices below the allowed maximum level for two years, although there was 
some re-balancing between the prices of local and long-distance calls. In spite of the 
original hope that regulation would become increasingly lighter as competition 
In 1987, OFTEL's staff even published an analysis of a proposed BT's price structure 
based on Ramsey prices (Culham, 1987); however, this remained a paper exercise. 
5 0 For more details on BT's pricing policy and regulated price reviews, see Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994). 
5 1 It must be noted in this respect that, although BT's return on capital employed increased 
from 9.1% in 1980 to 22.4% in 1991, Beesley and Laidlow (1989) argue that the 
efficiency gains achieved were a modest 2% per annum, well below BT's potential gains. 
During this same period, BT's turnover rose from £3.5 billion to £13 billion, while 
Mercury had a small market share and a turnover of only £702 million by 1991. This 
prompted the duopoly review of the late 1980s. 
5 2 For a debate on this first assessment of BT's price regulation see Beesley, Gist and 
Laidlaw (1987) and Carsberg (1987). 
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developed, price regulation became tighter and more encompassing over time, with 
virtually all aspects of network operation being regulated by the early 1990s. 
3.2 R E G U L A T I O N AND SYSTEMATIC R I S K 
As already discussed in section 1.5 of this thesis, there is no agreement in the literature 
about the direction of the effects of regulation on company's systematic risk and on 
whether the cost of capital is endogenous to the regulatory process itself. The 
regulatory model of Peltzman (1976)53 shows that regulators, who are assumed to 
maximises political support, tend to 'buffer' shocks to the cash flow of the firm and 
suggests that this could impact on the regulated company's systematic risk, as measured 
by the beta coefficient of the firm's assets. In particular, regulation is expected to 
decrease the asset beta, since shocks tend to be smoothed by regulatory action. Other 
authors emphasise institutional arrangements as important in lowering regulated firms' 
risk by shifting some of the risk of exogenous shocks from producers to consumers 
(Joskow, 1974; and Clarke, 1980). There are, however, a number of studies that argue 
that regulation tends to increase systematic risk, especially during periods when factor 
prices are rising, because of the stickiness of regulated prices (Keran, 1976). In this 
case, profit streams become more volatile and thus systematic risk increases. There are 
also other factors than simply cash flows that affect the company's beta and regulation 
may impact on these factors. For example, there is some empirical evidence that 
regulation tend to increase capital intensity by distorting the factor mix (Joskow and 
Noll, 1981) and that in turn higher capital intensity leads to higher systematic and 
5 3 Peltzman's model has been analysed in chapter 1, section 1.2. 
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unsystematic risk (Lev, 1974). On the basis of the extant literature, therefore, it can be 
concluded that the total effect of regulation on risk is uncertain. 
Focusing more closely on measures of systematic risk and in particular on the Sharpe-
Lintner CAPM formulation, the beta of firm /'s assets can be defined as follows: 
VAR(R„) 
where /?, is the return of firm /'s assets and Rm is the return on the market portfolio. In 
turn, the return is a function of the price of the asset at the beginning of the period, P„ 
and the uncertain end-of-period payoff, V,. Thus, the return can be expressed as: 
V - P 
Substituting equation (3.2) into equation (3.1), beta can be defined as: 
comM ( 3 3 ) 
P,VAR(R„) 
Since P, is in the denominator of the above formulation of beta, any regulatory action 
that has an impact on the firm's cash flow will also affect beta inversely, ceteris paribus, 
through its effect on the firm's value. This provides a link between the literature that 
finds that entry and price regulation tend to increase profits (Stigler, 1971; and Jarrell, 
1978) and the literature that finds that regulation is often accompanied by a decrease in 
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beta (Peltzman, 1973; Ray, 1974; Clarke, 1980; Hogan, Sharpe and Volker, 1980; Chen 
and Sanger, 1983; Norton, 1985; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1988; Wallace, Watson and 
Yandle, 1988; Spudeck and Moyer, 1989; and Fraser and Kannan, 1990)54. In 
particular, Binder and Norton (1999) show that beta is inversely related to profits; that 
is, the more profitable a firm is, the lower its beta55. 
In addition to the effect explained above, regulation can alter beta through other factors. 
Specifically, a regulated firm's beta is affected by factors present in the firm's cost, 
revenue and demand functions. To see these effects, let us assume a single period 
framework, where all firms in a regulated industry charge the same price for their 
output, set at the beginning of the period. Total costs, TC, paid at the end of the period, 
comprise of a fixed component, FC, and a variable component, A VC, multiplied by the 
quantity of output, Q. Thus, firm i will have total costs equal to: 
The market clearing output sold at the end of the period is assumed to be stochastic with 
multiplicative uncertainty and can be expressed as follows: 
5 4 It must however be said that not all the empirical literature in this area agrees that 
regulation has a negative effect on beta. For example, Lenway, Rehbein and Starks (1990) 
find that beta increases with regulation, while Davidson, Chandy and Walker (1984 and 
1985), Chen and Merville (1986), Allen and Wilhelm (1988) and Fraser and Kolari (1990) 
find no significant change in beta. 
5 5 For a survey of the empirical evidence between asset beta and profitability, see Binder 
(1992). 
TC, = FC, + AVC, Q, (3.4) 
(3.5) 
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where E(.) is the expectations operator and is the random shock to output with an 
expected value of zero. 
In a regulatory environment where the regulator controls both entry and price, Peltzman 
(1976) shows that the regulator buffers the random shock, Sj, to the firm's cash flows by 
means of either tax or subsidy to the firm, depending on the sign of s,56. The size of the 
tax/subsidy is equal to 0, for 0<@<1, times the difference between the cash flow 
expected at the beginning of the period and the actual cash flow at the end of the period. 
In this way, any shock will only have an impact of (1-0) on the firm's cash flow and 
will be shared with the public as a whole. 
Following Binder (1992) and Binder and Norton (1999), on the basis of equations (3.4) 
and (3.5), the value of the regulated firm, expressed as the value of its cash flows, can 
be defined as follows: 
V, = EiQXPr - AVC,) - FC, - (1 - <D) £ ( f i ) (pr -AVC,) e, (3.6) 
Substituting (3.6) into equation (3.3) and simplifying yields the following definition of 
beta: 
5 6 The role of taxes/subsidies in this single-period model is the same as the role of changes 
in regulated prices from period to period, due to shifts in demand and thus profits. In both 
cases, the change in the value of the firm due to output shocks wil l be less than in an 
unregulated situation. 
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_ (1 - <P) - AVC.) E(Q,) COV(e„Rm) 
P, VAR{Rm) 
(3.7) 
It is clear from the above equation (3.7) that the value of the beta of the firm's assets 
depends on three main types of factors: i) the covariance of the output shock with the 
returns on the market portfolio and the variance of the market; ii) firm's, or industry's, 
specific factors, such as prices and costs; and iii) the extent of the regulatory buffering. 
When moving from the above theoretical framework to the empirical testing, a number 
of issues need to be considered. In particular, the beta coefficient derived above is a 
measure of the systematic risk of the firm's assets. However, in practice, only the 
equity beta can be directly estimated, thus ignoring the effects on asset beta of the 
firm's capital structure. This may appear to be particularly problematic since there is 
ample evidence that regulation increases the firm's gearing ratio (Ulmer, 1955; and 
Chaplinsky, 1982). In particular, it has been argued that regulated firms rely more 
heavily on debt for the following reasons: i) the regulatory agency may control the issue 
of equity by the firm; ii) i f regulated firms decide on capital structure by balancing the 
tax advantage of debt against expected bankruptcy costs, the marginal cost of using debt 
wil l be relatively low, because the buffering effect of regulation lowers expected 
bankruptcy costs; and iii) the agency costs of debt may be reduced by regulation. The 
implicit assumption in empirical tests of the effects of regulation on equity beta is that 
the regulated firm's debt and preferred stock is riskless. In the case of regulated 
utilities, this assumption is not too unreasonable and, thus, the asset beta can be 
measured simply as a proportion, equal to the percentage of equity capital in the firm's 
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capital structure, of the equity beta . Therefore, changes in asset beta are only caused 
by changes in equity beta and equity beta becomes a good proxy for asset beta. 
In summary, there is extensive evidence, at both the theoretical and empirical levels, 
that regulation affects the regulated company's beta. The precise direction of these 
effects is however ambiguous, with ample theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
for believing that regulation may either increase and/or decrease beta. In addition, 
regulation-induced changes in beta could be a by-product or a prerequisite of the 
regulatory process. The direction of the aggregate effect of regulation on beta remains 
an empirical question. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
The primary objective of this chapter is to extend the investigation on the effects of 
regulation carried out in the previous chapter. However, unlike the previous chapter, 
the focus here is on the telecommunications industry and, specifically, on the impact of 
announcements that affect competition, pricing and the supply of services in the 
telecommunications industry on BT's systematic risk as measured by the beta 
coefficient. Usually, the standard methodology adopted in the existing literature is the 
extended market model with dummy variables [Karafiath (1988) and Binder (1985a and 
1985b)]. This methodology assumes that the company's systematic risk is constant for 
the whole period under investigation. However, this seems unlikely in this case, 
because of changes in BT's political and competitive environment during the estimation 
5 7 Of the empirical studies cited here, only Norton (1985) controls for the firm's gearing. 
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period, from December 1984 to December 1993. After testing for the stability of BT's 
beta coefficient and finding it unstable over the estimation period, the methodology 
adopted allows beta to vary over time, unlike previous studies and the previous chapter 
of this dissertation. Specifically, a two-step procedure is followed. In the first stage, we 
estimate a simple market model recursively to allow both the alpha and beta coefficients 
to vary with time: 
R,=a, + P,Rml+e, s, ~ N (0,a £ 2) (3.8) 
More precisely, the model in equation (3.8), which shows how the returns on BT's shares 
at time t, Rt, are determined by the information updating process influencing market 
returns at time t, Rm t , is estimated. Equation (3.8) can be viewed as a time-varying 
parameters model and the coefficient on the market returns, p t, can be estimated using the 
Kalman Filter (Harvey, 1982). The Kalman Filter enables (3.8) to be written as a 
measurement equation, and the time-varying parameter, p t, is allowed to be generated 
stochastically by the transition equation shown below: 
/ ? , = # _ , + « , «,~N(0,O (3.9) 
Equation (3.9) shows that (3t evolves as a random walk process. The intuition behind this 
specification is that beta changes in response to new information. Following the argument 
in Ross (1989), information arrives stochastically and thus beta evolves in the same way. 
Equations (3.8) and (3.9) are estimated to obtain time-varying estimates of p t. 
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In the second stage, the impact of regulatory announcements on the time-varying estimates 
of BT's systematic risk is tested. As discussed in the previous chapter, the actual timing of 
the impact of an announcement cannot always be accurately determined and thus a three-
day window is used to capture movements in the systematic risk that may occur around, 
but not necessarily on, the day chosen as the event date. A three-day window allows any 
effect occurring because of market anticipation or delayed reaction to be detected. 
However, the window cannot be too large because of possible contamination from other 
unknown events that may occur during the period covered by a larger window. 
3.3.1 Hypothesis formulation for groups of announcements 
As in the previous chapter, announcements are initially grouped by their expected impact 
on the level of competition, prices and the supply of services in the telecommunications 
industry. Equation (3.10) below is estimated over the whole nine year sample period using 
OLS to analyse the impact of the announcements groups on the estimated time-varying 
beta coefficient: 
P,=ro + Y\ COMP - NEG, + y2 COMP - POS, 
+ y, PRICE - NEG, + y, PRICE - POS, 
3 4 (3.10) 
+ y5 SERV - NEG, + y6 SERV - POS, 
+ S} DELS! + S2 DEL92 + e, 
where p\ is the time-varying coefficient estimated from equations (3.8) and (3.9) and 
represents BT's systematic risk; COMP-NEGt is a dummy variable that equals one on the 
three days around each regulatory announcement which is expected to decrease 
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competition, and zero otherwise; COMP-POSt is a dummy variable that equals one on the 
three days around each regulatory announcement which is expected to increase 
competition, and zero otherwise; PRICE-NEG,, PRICE-POS,, SERV-NEG, and SERV-
POS, are dummy variables constructed like COMP-NEG and COMP-POS for the groups 
of announcements affecting pricing and service supply; DEL87 and DEL92 are dummy 
variables that capture the effects of the 1987 and 1992 UK General Elections and equal 
one over the period from when the elections were announced until the day after the 
election results are known, and zero otherwise; yo,...,6 and 01,2 are parameters; and et is a 
random component or error term. More specifically, the parameters yi,...^ detect changes in 
BT's systematic risk due to particular types of regulatory announcements within a three-
day window; that is, they measure any effect on the beta coefficient due to any of the six 
types of announcements defined. 
Estimating equation (3.10) allows for the testing of the following hypotheses about the 
effect of each group of announcements on BT's systematic risk, on the assumption that the 
main concern of BT's regulators is to protect the consumer and there is no regulatory 
capture: 
(i) Announcements which are expected to decrease competition (COMP-NEG) are also 
expected to decrease beta and thus decrease the cost of equity capital: 
Ho : y, = 0 ;H, : 7, < 0 
(ii) Announcements which are expected to increase competition (COMP-POS) are also 
expected to increase beta and thus increase the cost of equity capital: 
Ho : y 2 = 0 ;H, : y 2 > 0 
(iii) Announcements which are expected to decrease the price of BT's services (PRICE-
NEG) are also expected to increase beta and thus increase the cost of equity capital: 
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Ho : y 3 = 0 ;Hi : y 3 > 0 
(iv) Announcements which are expected to increase the price of BT's services (PRICE-
POS) are also expected to decrease beta and thus decrease the cost of equity capital: 
H 0 : Y 4 = 0 ; H , : y 4 < 0 
(v) Announcements which are expected to decrease the range of services which BT is 
allowed to supply (SERV-NEG) are also expected to increase beta and thus increase 
the cost of equity capital: 
H o : y 5 = 0 ;H, : y 5 > 0 
(vi) Announcements which are expected to allow BT to offer a wider range of services to 
customers (SERV-POS) are also expected to decrease beta and thus increase the cost 
of equity capital: 
H 0 : y 6 = 0 ;H, : y 6 > 0 
3.3.2 Hypothesis formulation for individual announcements 
The information derived from estimating equation (3.10) is essential for drawing policy 
conclusion on the effect of different types of regulatory announcements on the cost of 
equity capital. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, when analysing the 
announcements grouped by type, the contribution of each announcement to the overall 
group effect is lost. For example, i f an announcement group is found not to have a 
significant impact on systematic risk, this may be because of investors believing that type 
of announcements not to have an affect on the regulated company's risk. On the other 
hand, it could also be the consequence of an averaging out effect within the group, with 
individual announcements causing a significant market reaction, but in different directions. 
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In this latter case, the direction of the effect of a specific type of announcement cannot be 
predicted, but it would be incorrect to believe that investors are indifferent to those 
announcements being made. Thus, the impact of individual regulatory announcements is 
further analysed in an attempt to gain more detailed insights on the nature of the market 
reaction. Once again, as for equation (3.10), BT's time-varying beta coefficient is 
regressed against dummy variables, but in equation (3.11) below each dummy variable 
captures the effect of individual announcements within a specific group: 
P, =<f>0 + t<Pi D„ + 0, DELS! + 02 DEL92 + u, (3.11) 
i=\ 
where fit is the time-varying coefficient estimated from equations (3.8) and (3.9) and 
represents BT's beta coefficient; D„ are individual announcement dummy variables that 
equal one on the three days around each /''' regulatory announcement, and zero otherwise; 
<f>o ,„ and 0/ 2 are parameters; and u, is a random component or error term. Thus, the 
parameters tf>i:detect changes in BT's systematic risk due to individual regulatory 
announcement within a group. Equation (3.11) is estimated for each of the six groups of 
announcements separately over the whole nine year sample period. 
3.4 ANNOUNCEMENT S E L E C T I O N AND DATA 
The announcement selection in this chapter follows the same approach to that adopted in 
the previous chapter. Specifically, the regulatory announcements considered include 
reports by regulatory bodies, such as OFTEL, and news announcements made by the 
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Government and representatives of the regulatory bodies. Such news items provide 
information to market participants that enable them to anticipate forthcoming official 
regulatory announcements. Thus, i f only official OFTEL announcements had been 
considered, the time when investors' expectations change as a consequence of expected 
changes in regulation would have been often missed. The announcements considered here 
are believed to have an informational content and thus a potential to impact on the 
regulatory structure of BT. Given the absence of any previous research in this area relating 
to the UK telecommunications industry and the difficulty of identifying important 
unanticipated regulatory announcements, the history of the chosen announcements has also 
been investigated. The periods preceding and following each announcement have been 
checked for the presence of other events, such as quarterly earnings announcements and 
general elections, and announcements believed to be contaminated by other events have 
been excluded from the sample. The dates of the announcements relate to the day when 
the announcement was released to the public. 
After considering all these issues, the effects of 123 regulatory announcements, listed in 
Appendix 3.1, are tested over the period from BT's privatisation, in December 1984, 
through to the end of 1993. In all the equations estimated, the return on BT's shares is 
defined as the difference of the log of share prices, thus assuming that dividends are 
continuously reinvested. As a proxy for the market return, the difference of the log of 
the FT Al l Share Index is calculated. Al l price series have been obtained from 
Datastream. 
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3.5 E M P I R I C A L RESULTS 
Firstly, the stability of BT's beta coefficient was tested over the whole sample period. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix 3.1 plot the results of the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) 
and the Cumulative Sum of Squares (CUSUMSQ) tests (Brown, Durbin and Evans, 
1975) from estimating the simple market model in equation (3.8) recursively. Both the 
CUSUM and the CUSUMSQ tests suggest that the parameters of the market model are 
unstable and this can be readily verified by looking at the recursive Least Squares 
estimates. In particular, the instability of the beta coefficient is even more obvious from 
the plot of the Kalman Filter estimates of beta shown in Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.1 5 8 . 
3.5.1 Results of Group Announcements 
The results of the announcement group analysis show that regulatory announcements 
that allow prices to increase and announcement relating to the supply of services are the 
only type of announcements to have an unambiguous impact on BT's systematic risk. 
For all the other groups of announcements, the null hypothesis is accepted; that is, their 
y coefficients are not statistically different from zero. Table 3.1 presents the results from 
estimating equation (3.10) over the nine year period, from December 1984 to December 
1993. 
5 8 The time-varying estimates of the beta coefficient appear to be relatively high in the 
first two years of estimation. This may be a reflection of partial payment and the 
characteristics implicit in delayed interim and final instalments for the shares. 
182 
Table 3.1 
The effect of competition, pricing and service announcements on BT's systematic 
risk as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
P,=r0+ Yx COMP - NEG, + y2 COMP - POS, 
+ y3 PRICE - NEG, + y4 PRICE - POS, 
+ ys SERV - NEG, + y6 SERV - POS, 
+ 5, DEIXI + S2 DEL92 + e, 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT Yo 1.1160 14.39* 
COMP-NEG Yi 0.0384 1.24 
COMP-POS Y2 -0.0278 -0.34 
PRICE-NEG Y3 -0.0020 -0.05 
PRICE-POS Y4 0.1289 1.83* 
SERV-NEG Y5 -0.0918 -2.12* 
SERV-POS Y6 -0.0690 -1.70* 
DEL87 5, 0.2122 2.73* 
DEL92 5 2 -0.1712 -2.29* 
Notes: 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation based on Newey-West adjusted S.E., Parzen weights, 
truncation lag=767 
* Denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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These results indicate that the group of price announcements which is expected to decrease 
BT's systematic risk, PRICE-POS, has a statistically significant coefficient, 74, but its 
positive sign goes contrary to our hypothesis. In fact, the estimates suggest that when the 
regulator allows the prices of telecommunication services to increase, investors perceive 
that BT becomes a riskier company. An explanation for this result could be found under 
the regulatory capture hypothesis discussed earlier in the thesis: by keeping prices low, the 
regulator actually imposes a barrier to entry to potential competitors who are likely to face 
higher costs than the incumbent firm. A regulated price increase thus may actually 
eliminate this barrier to entry. In addition, a significant proportion of the PRICE-POS 
announcements in our sample relates to services for which BT is facing international 
competition and whose prices had during the sample period a world-wide tendency to fall. 
Therefore, i f BT does increase its prices for those services, its international 
competitiveness may well deteriorate. For these reasons, investors may actually perceive 
BT to be a 'safer' company when regulation keeps the prices of regulated services low. To 
strengthen this point, it needs to be considered that many services offered by BT are not 
subject to price-cap regulation. 
It is interesting to note that competition announcements and announcements expected to 
decrease prices are not found to significantly affect BT's systematic risk. According to 
the previously formulated hypotheses on the effects of regulation, BT's shares might not 
react in the expected way to regulatory announcements because of BT's well-established 
competitive advantage on potential and actual competitors. Thus, a further decrease in 
competition may not be seen by investors as a great improvement in a market that is 
already highly concentrated, while more competition is not a threat to a company with 
established cost advantages. Potential price reductions may also have no effect on BT's 
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share price, i f investors believe that BT is in a stronger position than its competitors to face 
those reductions in prices. In this case, in fact, the loss of revenue per unit sold could well 
be compensated by a strengthening of BT's competitive position vis a vis incumbent and 
potential entrants in the industry at national level, but possibly more importantly at 
international level. 
Another prima face surprising result is that, following announcements that affect the 
supply of services, either positively or negatively, BT's systematic risk has a statistically 
significant tendency to fall. In connection with regulation intended to allow BT to offer a 
wider choice of services, this result is in line with our hypothesis; but, when regulation is 
intended to tighten the rules on the supply of services, we would expect BT's beta 
coefficient to increase. The opposite result of our analysis can however be justified i f we 
consider the specific nature of the SERV-NEG announcements in our sample. Most of 
these announcements, in fact, relate to controversial services, such as the provision of chat-
lines, which suffered from bad publicity in the media. It is not therefore surprising that, 
when the regulator intervenes to tighten the control on those type of services, and thus the 
public image of BT improves, investors react positively to the news. 
Finally, it is interesting to comment on the impact on BT's systematic risk of the two 
General Election periods in our sample, since both election coefficients, 5] and 62, are 
statistically significant. The 1987 and the 1992 election dummy variables are constructed 
to capture the effect of the whole period from when a General Election is called to the day 
after the election results are known, and not just the impact of the election results alone. 
Our estimates suggests that, during the period coming up to the 1987 General Election, 
BT's systematic risk increased, while it decreased during the 1992 election period, in spite 
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of a Conservative Party's win in both cases and a stronger threat from the Labour Party in 
1992. These results may be explained by the different policies of the Labour Party towards 
privatised utilities in the two election campaigns. In 1987, in fact, the Labour manifesto 
still included the re-nationalisation of the telecommunications industry, while in 1992 this 
policy objective had been abolished. Thus, had the Labour Party won the 1992 General 
Election, BT was envisaged to remain a private company. 
3.5.2 Results of Individual Announcements 
Beside the analysis of the impact of different groups of announcements, the effects of 
individual announcements within the groups are also tested. Although this analysis does 
not have clear policy implications in relation to the impact of specific types of regulatory 
announcements, it can be invaluable in interpreting the results. Tables 3.2-3.7 summarise 
the results of the analysis of the individual announcements from estimating equation 
(3.11). As expected, a large proportion of announcements within insignificant groups have 
a significant impact on BT's systematic risk. However, the impact of different 
announcements within the same group is often of opposite sign and thus overall the group 
appears to have no impact. 
The insignificant group with the largest proportion of significant announcements is 
COMP-NEG (Table 3.2). Out of thirteen announcements, nine are significant; of these 
announcements, seven increase systematic risk, while only two decrease it. In an attempt 
to understand why so many of the announcements that are expected to decrease 
competition increase systematic risk, the nature of those specific announcements 
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Table 3.2 
The effect of COMP-NEG announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
P, =</>o + t f i A , + DELS! + 02 DEL92 + u, 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT <t>0 1.1691 9.95* 
CN1 
• i 
0.2773 2.36* 
CN2 (j>2 0.2722 2.32* 
CN3 h 0.1235 1.05 
CN4 <t>4 0.1808 2.28* 
CN5 <t>5 -0.3452 -2.94* 
CN6 <|)6 -0.3521 -2.99* 
CN7 §1 -0.1047 -0.89 
CN8 <t>8 0.1750 4.88* 
CN9 fa 0.0813 2.27* 
CN10 <t>10 0.0786 2.19* 
CN11 *t> 11 0.1497 4.18* 
CN12 <f>12 0.0391 1.09 
CN13 <J>13 -0.0296 -0.82 
DEL87 e , 4 0.1546 2.33* 
DEL93 9,5 -0.1217 -3.24* 
See notes to table 3.1. 
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needs to be analysed more closely. It can be argued that most of them increase uncertainty 
about either the competitive strategy of BT or the next regulatory move of OFTEL or the 
government. For example, CN2 announces the intention of a joint venture without 
specifying the terms of it; in CN3 OFTEL defers a decision; with CN9 OFTEL criticises 
the Government for wanting to introduce too much competition in telecommunications. 
On the contrary, the two COMP-NEG announcements for which the hypothesis of a lower 
beta is accepted refer to the decision not to refer BT to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission and the granting of a licence to BT, both of which are announcements that 
decrease uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty appears to have a greater impact on BT's 
systematic risk than the likely effects of announcements. In other words, even i f the news 
carries favourable information about BT's future competitive position, it is likely to have a 
negative effect on BT's perceived risk i f it also increases uncertainty. Once again, this may 
be due to the strength of BT vis a vis potential competitors, and thus the fact that investors 
do not perceive that BT will necessarily benefit from less competition. 
A similar argument can also explain the finding that announcements expected to increase 
competition can decrease beta. In fact, of the fifty-four announcements in the COMP-POS 
group (Table 3.3), twenty-three announcements are significant: eleven increase systematic 
risk and twelve decrease it. Once again, these results could be interpreted as a 
consequence of investors believing that it does not really matter i f BT faces greater 
competition. If, following a change in regulation, the 'rules' of the competitive game 
become clearer and thus there is less uncertainty, investors will perceive that BT's 
systematic risk has decreased. Examples of this argument are given by announcement CP6 
that discloses the details of a BT's licence; CP31 and CP37 that disclose government plans; 
CP46 and CP48 that announce the granting of new licences by the government. The 
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Table 3.3 
The effect of COMP-POS announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
fl,=A + t f r A , + e\ D E L ^ + 02 DEL92 + u, 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT <|>o 1.4257 5.50* 
CP1 h 0.3672 3.40* 
CP2 <h 0.3095 3.37* 
CP3 0.1615 1.76* 
CP4 <j>4 -0.0295 -0.32 
CP5 <b -0.0677 -0.74 
CP6 <t»6 -0.2026 -2.20* 
CP7 <|>7 0.0956 1.04 
CP8 <|>8 0.1381 1.50 
CP9 <t>9 0.1160 1.26 
CP10 4> io 0.1719 1.87* 
CPU 0.0838 0.91 
CP12 <t>12 -0. 1002 -1.09 
CP13 <t>13 -0.1117 -1.21 
CP14 <(>I4 -0.0805 -0.99 
CP15 <t>15 -0.1596 -1.95* 
CP16 <f> 1 <5 -0.1302 -1.59 
CP17 <t>17 -0.0990 -1.21 
CP18 <t> 18 -0.1022 -1.25 
CP19 <(>19 -0.0985 -1.20 
CP20 <|>20 -0.0815 -0.99 
CP21 <t>21 -0.1024 -1.25 
CP22 <t>22 -0.1038 -1.27 
Cont.A 
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CP23 <t»23 -0.1167 -1.42 
CP24 <|»24 -0.1201 -1.46 
CP25 «P25 -0.1702 -2.08* 
CP26 <{>26 -0.0900 -0.10 
CP27 4>27 -0.0521 4.67* 
CP28 <|>28 -0.0346 -1.13 
CP29 <t>29 -0.0661 -2.16* 
CP30 <t>30 -0.0521 -1.70* 
CP31 <j>31 -0.0852 -2.78* 
CP32 <j>32 -0.0493 -1.61 
CP33 <t>33 0.0148 0.48 
CP34 <|>34 0.0032 0.10 
CP35 <t>35 -0.0202 -0.66 
CP36 <|>36 -0.0409 -1.77* 
CP37 <t>37 -0.0428 -1.87* 
CP38 <t>38 0.0007 0.02 
CP39 <|>39 0.0715 2.33* 
CP40 <t>40 0.1122 2.68* 
CP41 4»41 0.1096 2.61* 
CP42 <t»42 0.0965 2.30* 
CP43 <t>43 0.1329 3.17* 
CP44 <t>44 0.0933 3.80* 
CP45 <t»45 0.0877 3.40* 
CP46 <(>46 -0.0882 -2.11* 
CP47 <t>47 -0.0760 -1.81* 
CP48 <t>48 -0.1113 -2.65* 
CP49 <t>49 -0.0164 -0.39 
CP50 <t>50 -0.0368 -0.88 
CP51 <t»51 0.0574 1.37 
CP52 <t>52 0.0106 0.25 
CP53 <t>53 -0.0110 -0.26 
CP54 <t>54 0.0200 0.48 
DEL87 e , 0.3717 4.67* 
DEL92 e 2 -0.0899 -2.06* 
See notes to Table 1 
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Table 3.4 
The effect of PRICE-NEG announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
0,=4o + t<Pi A + 6 \ D E L ^ + e i DEL92 + u, 
i=l 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT <|>o 1.1126 4.41* 
PN1 <t>. 0.2019 2.61* 
PN2 <j>2 0.1077 1.39 
PN3 4>3 0.1864 2.41* 
PN4 <|>4 0.2055 2.66* 
PN5 h 0.4697 6.08* 
PN6 0.1381 1.79* 
PN7 *7 0.0601 0.78 
PN8 -0.3061 -3.96* 
PN9 <t>9 -0.1347 -1.74* 
PN10 0.0231 0.30 
PN11 •I ' l l 0.0979 1.27 
PN12 <t)|2 -0.0471 -0.61 
PN13 •frn -0.0664 -0.85 
PN14 4> 14 -0.0459 -0.59 
PN15 <t>15 -0.0243 -0.31 
PN16 «t>16 -0.0404 -0.52 
PN17 *t>l"7 0.0091 0.12 
PN18 <t)|8 0.0141 0.30 
PN19 <t>19 0.0597 1.27 
PN20 <|>20 -0.1504 -1.92* 
PN21 •t»21 -0.1224 -1.56 
PN22 <|»22 -0.1224 -1.56 
PN23 <l>23 -0.1535 -1.96* 
PN24 <|)24 -0.1084 -1.39 
PN25 §25 -0.2599 -3.32* 
DEL87 e . 0.2142 2.71* 
DEL92 e 2 -0.1882 -2.40* 
See note to Table 1 
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Table 3.5 
The effect of PRICE-POS announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
P, = <f>0 + t<t>, A, + 3 DELS! + 02 DEL92 + U, /-i 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 1.1132 4.47* 
PP1 <tu 0.0935 1.22 
PP2 0.2086 2.71* 
PP3 <|>3 0.2718 3.53* 
PP4 §4 -0.0511 -0.66 
DEL87 e. 0.2163 2.78* 
DEL92 e 2 -0.1861 -2.41* 
See note to Table 1 
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Table 3.6 
The effect of SERV-NEG announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
P , = k + tti A , + #i DEL87 + 92 DEL92 + u, 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT <|>o 1.1579 2.64* 
SN1 4»i 0.3682 3.70* 
SN2 <t>2 0.2182 2.19* 
SN3 * 3 -0.3541 -3.56* 
SN4 ( j ) 4 -0.3291 -3.31* 
SN5 •s -0.2897 -2.91* 
SN6 (j>6 -0.3085 -3.10* 
SN7 <t>7 -0.3007 -3.02* 
SN8 <t>8 -0.2847 -2.86* 
SN9 (j)9 0.0846 2.04* 
SN10 <))10 -0.1226 -2.96* 
SN11 <t> 11 -0.0315 -6.38* 
SN12 <t»12 0.0105 2.27* 
SN13 <|> 13 -0.0605 -1.46 
SN14 <t> 14 0.0797 1.92* 
SN15 4* 15 0.0205 0.49 
DEL87 e, 0.1717 1.71* 
DEL92 e 2 -0.1010 -2.31* 
See note to Table 1 
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Table 3.7 
The effect of SERV-POS announcements on BT's systematic risk as measured by 
the time-varying beta coefficient 
P,=A+ i</>, A , + °x DEW- + G2 DEL92 + U, 
Rcgressor Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT <t>0 1.1151 4.41* 
SPI; •J 0:2614 3.38* 
SP2 <t>2 0.2740 3.54* 
SP3 h 0.2908 3.76* 
SP4 (|)4 -0.3283 -4.24* 
SP5 -0.3126 -4.04* 
SP6 §6 -0.2500 -3.23* 
SP7 <t>7 -0.2652 -3.43* 
SP8 <t>8 -0.2553 -3.30* 
SP9 §9 -0.1004 -128 
SP10 <t>10 -0.1327 4:72* 
S P U <|>1I -0.0440 -0.57 
SPI 2 <t> 12 -0.0192 -0.25 
DEL87 e, 0.2144 2.74* 
DEL92 e 2 -0.1880 -2.42* 
See note to Table 1 
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informational content on these announcements ends uncertainty and the positive effect of 
decreasing uncertainty prevails over the potential negative effect from increased 
competition. 
In relation to PRICE-NEG announcements (Table 3.4), only ten out of twenty-six 
announcements are found to be significant: five increase systematic risk, as it was 
expected, while five decrease risk. As it has been noticed earlier, it is hard to believe that 
BT would be threatened by regulation designed to keep prices low. In this case, in fact, the 
barrier to entry created by the regulator may well stabilise BT's revenue, decrease 
uncertainty and stand BT in good stead to face its international competitors. To 
summarise, the unexpected sign of a number of coefficients can be explained by one of 
three factors. Firstly, the day of the public release of an announcement may not capture its 
effect, because the informational content of the announcement might have been anticipated 
by the market. In this case, the market might have anticipated the regulatory change to be 
more damaging/beneficial to BT than when the announcement is finally made and thus 
days or weeks before the event there might have been a market overreaction to the 
expected change. Therefore, at the time of the announcement, we would observe a change 
of opposite direction than expected, since the market is simply eliminating the excess 
decrease\increase in share prices. For example, both announcements CP 15 and CP 19 
relate to the loss by BT of its monopoly in payphones; however, both announcements 
caused a decrease in BT's systematic risk. These results must be interpreted against the 
sharp increase in BT's systematic risk four months before, when OFTEL indicated that 
more competition in the payphone market was desirable. When the following 
announcement was made and then the monopoly was finally abolished, investors 
readjusted their perception of BT's risk in the opposite direction. 
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Secondly, according to the previous hypotheses on the effects of regulation, investors 
might expect BT to acquire more, rather than less, market power following some 
regulatory changes designed to increase competition. For instance, deregulation for the 
whole industry may not be damaging for BT, which is in a strong position to compete. In 
fact, deregulation and the subsequent increase in competition may be seen favourably by 
investors who perceive that they understand the 'laws' of market competition better than 
the behaviour of an heavily regulated industry. In this case, investors would associate less 
uncertainty with less regulation. 
The third consideration, which may conflict with the previous explanation, is that investors 
may actually react positively to strict regulation because they perceive that this would 
reduce uncertainty about the overall regulatory framework in which BT operates. In other 
words, announcements that appear to weaken BT's position may in fact decrease 
uncertainty about the future standing of the company. In this case investors may react 
positively to such announcements. Finally, the announcements which were found to have 
no statistically significant impact on BT's systematic risk within the three-day window may 
not necessarily have zero informational content. In fact, some of these announcements 
could have caused a market reaction either well ahead, or possibly after, the official 
announcement. In this case, the analysis would have not registered any effect. 
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this chapter is to contribute to the literature on the effects of regulation on 
the regulated firm's systematic risk by analysing the impact of regulatory announcements 
on BT's shares in the period December 1984 - December 1993. The impact of regulatory 
announcements on BT's systematic risk has been investigated, by applying for the first 
time to this problem a methodology that allows the beta coefficient to vary over time. 
When announcements are grouped by their expected impact on BT's competitive position, 
pricing policy and supply of services, only price announcements which are expected to 
allow prices to increase and service announcements appear to have a significant impact 
upon BT's shares. However, the direction of these effects is not always in line with the 
stated hypotheses and these results can be interpreted as a consequence of regulatory 
capture in the presence of one dominating company in the industry, such as BT. In fact, in 
this case, measures to increase consumer protection may not necessarily lead to lower 
returns for the company since they may hit the actual and potential competition harder than 
the dominating incumbent company. 
This interpretation is supported by further evidence when the impact of individual 
announcements is analysed. Within the insignificant groups, many individual 
announcements are found to significantly affect BT's systematic risk. However, the 
direction of their effect varies within the same group. Closer analysis of these individual 
announcements shows more evidence that regulatory capture is likely to be present and 
that the uncertainty created by ambiguous signals from the regulator, the government and 
even BT itself increases systematic risk even when the announcement is expected to have 
the opposite effect. Investors obviously believe that regulation cannot endanger BT's 
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market dominance and thus will revise their expectations only following announcements 
that change the level of uncertainty. 
In conclusion, regulators need to be aware that their actions may indeed affect a regulated1 
company's systematic risk, and thus its cost of capital, but the direction of these effects is 
not always easy to predict. Clearly, further investigation is needed to determine whether 
the results presented in this chapter are industry specific. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
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Figure 3.3 - Time-Varying Estimates of BT's beta Coefficient (1984 - 1993) 
1 -9741 [ -
1.5699 
1.1658 
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an 653 1226 1799 2371 
Beta 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
Regulatory Announcements Relating to the Telecommunications Industry: 
December 1984 - December 1993 
Announcement Type, 
Number and Date Description of Announcement 
1985 
CP1 May 19 OFTEL studies options over BT plan to buy Mitel. 
CP2 Jun 6 Government to change rules for company services on value added 
network services. 
CP3 Jun 25 BT-Mitel deal referred to MMC. 
SN1 Jul 3 Director General of OFTEL says complaints against BT are hard to 
probe. 
CN1 Jul 23 BT launches a direct-dialled Freephone service; and BT is planning a 
joint venture with KDD to set up a high speed digital link between 
Japan and Britain. 
SP1 Aug 22 OFTEL asks for change in BT billing: separate billing for radio paging 
customers required. 
CP4 Sep 4 OFTEL may seek change in BT licence to ensure fair competition. 
CP5 Oct 1 OFTEL to rule on how BT should 'interconnect' network with 
Mercury. 
PN1 Oct 15 Row between BT and OFTEL over price increases for residential 
customers. 
PN2 Nov 29 Pricing policy to be reviewed by OFTEL. 
CP6 Dec 4 OFTEL changes BT's licence for radiopaging. 
PP1 Dec 16 OFTEL accepts latest BT price increases. 
1986 
PN3 May 20 OFTEL investigates BT repair charges. 
PP2 Jun 4 OFTEL set to clear BT of over special line charges. 
PN4 Jun 17 Bryan Carsberg warns of high costs of some telecommunication 
services recently introduced by BT. 
PP3 Jul 9 OFTEL softens BT charges plan. 
CP7 Aug 21 BT clashes with OFTEL over radio phone policy. 
CP8 Oct 26 Ministry to order end of BT ban on Mercury links. 
PN5 Nov 12 OFTEL to monitor BT's price of'party' service. 
CP9 Nov 25 OFTEL names products for BT to put out to tender. 
CP10 Dec 15 OFTEL agrees to mediate formally between BT & Mercury 
1987 
C P I I Jan 27 BT's monopoly on installation approval to be suspended. 
CN2 Feb 9 OFTEL defers decision on liberalisation proposals. 
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CP 12 Feb 25 Government announces moves to extend the liberalisation of UK 
telecoms. 
CP 13 Mar 4 OFTEL to persuade overseas operators to accept Mercury as BT 
competitor. 
CN3 Mar 16 Telecommunications industry criticises OFTEL's report into the 
effectiveness of competition in the telephone supply industry. 
PN6 Mar 30 OFTEL to monitor BT's repair fees. 
CN4 Jun 1 OFTEL to speed up procedures for approval of new equipment; 
OFTEL's proposals are weaker than those in the Birtwistle report in 
February. 
SP2 Jul 1 OFTEL may introduce penalty on BT due to poor record of repairs and 
installation for private customers. 
SP3 Jul 6 Bryan Carsberg calls for more payphones. 
SN2 Jul 14 BT may have to compensate customers over service delays; since the 
quality of services has improved, there is no need of further regulatory 
action in this respect. 
PN7 Sep 8 OFTEL to monitor cases where BT has overcharged customers. 
CP 14 Oct 27 EDS wins special licence to manage voice traffic. 
CP 15 Nov 25 BT may lose monopoly on call-boxes as Government wants more user 
choice. 
PN8 Nov 30 OFTEL warns BT to curb price increases next year due to excessive 
profits. 
SP4 Dec 7 Safeguards for BT clients demanded by the National Consumer 
Council 
1988 
SN3 Jan 8 Minister wants report on Talkabout after children run up large bills. 
SP5 Jan 11 OFTEL reply to minister expresses reluctance to ban Talkabout 
service. 
CN5 Jan 27 OFTEL announces review of BT pricing system and Bryan Carsberg 
believes that it will not be necessary to refer BT to the MMC. 
SN4 Feb 8 OFTEL to recommend tougher control on Talkabout service. 
CP 16 Feb 17 The Government to introduce further competition in satellite 
communications, although BT/Mercury duopoly over basic telephone 
network remains unchanged. 
CP 17 Mar 22 OFTEL ruling prevents BT blocking first private transatlantic satellite. 
CP 18 Apr 1 OFTEL may stop BTs monopoly of the approval of 
telecommunications equipment installed by private contractor on 
business premises. 
SP6 Apr 13 OFTEL gives go-ahead for trials of Cordless Creditphone handsets. 
CP 19 May 3 OFTEL abolishes BTs monopoly on payphones. 
SN5 May 12 OFTEL proposes curbs on all chatline services. 
SN6 Jun 29 OFTEL scheme for independent monitoring of metering systems of 
BT. 
SN7 Jul 19 MMC to investigate BT's chat-lines. 
CP20 Jul 27 OFTEL chief plans to allow competitive services to run on private 
premise. 
SP7 Oct 9 OFTEL will tell BT to compensate customers if later in repairing lines. 
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SP8 Oct 19 
CP21 Oct 31 
CP22 Nov 29 
CP23 Dec 5 
CP24 Dec 13 
1989 
CN6 Jail 3 
CP25 Jan 26 
CP26 Jan 30 
SN8 Feb 3 
CP27 Apr 4 
CP28 Jun 15 
CP29 Jun 23 
CN7 Jul 10 
SP9 Jul 26 
CP30 Aug 30 
PN8 Nov 2 
CP31 Nov 8 
SP10 Dec 7 
CP32 Dec 11 
1990 
CP33 Mar 21 
PN9 Apr 9 
CN8 Jun 27 
PNIO Jul 23 
CP34 Sep 2 
PN11 Sep 17 
PN12 Oct 1 
CP35 Oct 18 
CP36 Nov 9 
CP37 Nov 13 
OFTEL may require Cellnet to produce regular quality of service 
reviews. 
Minister asks OFTEL to introduce more competition into payphone 
market. 
OFTEL announces liberalisation moves to begin next year. 
OFTEL may resolve dispute on terms of Mercury's access to BT 
network. 
OFTEL intervenes over Mercury/BT networks use for expensive calls. 
OFTEL advises Government to grant BT one of 4 Cellular licences. 
The government proposes expansion of the mobile communications 
services and the introduction of more competition. 
OFTEL plans liberalisation of private networks market. 
OFT will publish MMC report on Chatlines at the end of the month. 
OFTEL will not allow BT to make equipment approvals from next 
year. 
The Government announces measures to liberalise private networks. 
DTI to licence two or three new mobile phone companies including 
Mercury. 
OFTEL to issue new regulations for private leased telephone lines. 
OFTEL to announce that chatlines will be allowed to resume. 
OFTEL advises DTI that BT should lose sole right to inspect private 
exchanges. 
OFTEL to examine whether BT increases are abuse of dominant 
position. 
Government announces regulations liberalising private networks come 
into effect. 
OFTEL allows resumption of chat-lines provided that a code of 
practice is followed. 
Government awards PCN licences to international consortium to 
compete with cellular networks. 
DTI starts review of telecoms industry. 
OFTEL to probe international pricing. 
OFTEL warns Government against introducing too much competition 
into market. 
OFTEL to investigate BT's price structure. 
Report to DTI advocates sell off of BT's international division. 
OFTEL challenges BT's attempt to increase telephone rental charges. 
OFTEL plans to reduce BT's charges for international calls. 
Adam Smith Institute urges the Government to open the 
telecommunications market to all-comers. 
Government plans to increase competition and abolish BT/Mercury 
duopoly. 
Government unveils far-reaching proposals to increase competition. 
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SP11 Nov 26 The interest of customers is condition to enter UK market according to 
OFTEL. 
PN13 Dec 23 OFTEL plans to make proposals to BT about pricing of international 
calls. 
1991 
PN14 
SN9 
PN15 
PP4 
CP38 
CP39 
CN9 
CP40 
CP41 
CP42 
CN10 
PN17 
CP43 
PN18 
PN19 
CN11 
CP44 
Jan 10 
Jan 28 
Feb 17 
Mar 3 
Mar 5 
Apr 19 
May 9 
Jul 3 
Jul 10 
Jul 17 
Jul 23 
Jul 28 
Sep 23 
Nov 1 
Nov 4 
Nov 12 
Dec 5 
CP45 Dec 6 
1992 
OFTEL urges BT/Mercury to cut prices to USA. 
OFTEL to press BT to disclose more information about costs of its 
services. 
National Consumer Council urges lower telephone charges for 
domestic users. 
Government may allow rise in BT's line rental charges as part of deal 
to open up market. 
Government unveils plans for far-reaching reforms on telecoms 
industry. 
OFTEL may publish documents on telecoms due to confusion with 
Government white paper. 
OFTEL to introduce access charges for competitors using BT lines. 
OFTEL may waive access charges for use of BT network by 
competitors. 
OFTEL warns BT could be forced to split its long distance and local 
operations. 
Report on price of OFTEL's U-turn on BT charges for access to its 
network. 
BT escapes MMC referral after deal with OFTEL; as a result 
Government proceeds with privatisation. 
OFTEL to press BT to disclose more information about costs of 
services. 
Government to introduce legalisation for tougher regulation in next 
session of Parliament. 
OFTEL announces that BT's pricing policy will probably be referred to 
MMC when the price cap system will be renewed. 
OFTEL to publish consultative document on BT's prices. 
OFTEL approves regulatory section of BT's share sale prospectus. 
OFTEL expected to announce tighter regulation of BTs equipment 
supply business. 
OFTEL announces regulations to prevent cross-subsidies in BT 
equipment supply business. 
PN20 Jan 12 OFTEL to publish consultative document to start examination of BT 
prices. 
CP46 Jan 26 Government plans to licence operators who can lease BT/Mercury 
lines in bulk. 
CP47 Jan 30 OFTEL launches its most comprehensive review of BT since 
privatisation. 
CP48 Feb 20 UK Government licences two new companies to provide satellite 
services. 
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SN10 Mar 2 
SN11 Apr 6 
SN12 Apr 10 
PN21 Apr 29 
PN22 Jun 9 
SN13 Jun 25 
PN23 Jul 1 
CP49 Aug 11 
PN24 Sep 4 
PN25 Nov 12 
1993 
CP50 Mar 15 
CN12 Jun 23 
SN14 Jun 29 
SP12 Jul 27 
CP51 Jul 29 
SN15 Aug 2 
CP52 Aug 18 
CN13 Aug 19 
CP53 Sep 5 
CP54 Oct 17 
OFTEL plans to stop BT/Mercury from providing chat-line services. 
Chat-lines discontinued after operators fail to meet OFTEL deadline 
for compensation. 
High Court ruling enables people to sue most of former operators of 
chat-line. 
Consumers organisation says BT should make one-off cuts in prices 
due to excess profits. 
OFTEL urges BT to accept tougher new pricing regime or face MMC 
investigation. 
OFTEL investigates alleged unfair practices in mobile phone market. 
Accounting rate system reform may lead to companies cutting 
international charges. 
Government confirms plans to award licences in order to increase 
competition. 
OFTEL to investigate large increase in BT telex charges. 
BT amends tariff to business customers following OFTEL pressure. 
DTI grants telecoms licence to company selling transatlantic calls at 
discount to BT. 
OFTEL annual report signals shift to higher regulatory regime for BT 
competitors. 
OFTEL may ask BT to modify or withdraw future special offers to 
customers. 
Government decides not to give OFTEL power in disputes over bills 
with BT and customers. 
OFTEL proposes subjecting BT satellite business to more regulation. 
OFTEL rules that BT special offers to customers was discriminatory. 
Government grants licences to 3 foreign companies to offer UK 
telecom services. 
OFTEL reject complaints that Mercury cheap mobile service is unfair 
to competitors. 
OFTEL gives signal that AT&T may compete with BT in UK 
telecoms. 
OFTEL unveils range of initiatives to speed up competition in 
Telecoms market. 
Notes: 
CN Announcements not likely to lead to more competition 
CP Announcements likely to lead to more competition 
PN Announcements likely to lead to lower prices 
PP Announcements not likely to lead to lower prices 
SN Announcements not likely to lead to service improvements 
SP Announcements likely to lead to service improvements 
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Chapter 4 
The Effects of Regulatory .Announcements on the Systematic 
Risk of the Water Industry of England and Wales : Aw 
Alternative Time-Varying Approach 
206 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the impact o f regulatory policy on the systematic risk o f the water 
and sewerage companies o f England and Wales (WaSCs). Like the previous chapter, 
this chapter too analyses the impact o f regulatory announcements relating to 
competition, price and service quality on the time-varying systematic risk o f equity 
capital for the WaSCs. However, in this chapter a multivariate GARCH methodology is 
used to allow for time variation, not only in the systematic risk, but also in the 
covariance between the market and individual stock, and in the variance o f the market. 
In addition, this chapter provides a first attempt to estimate the overall regulatory risk 
over the period o f estimation. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 reviews some o f the aspects o f 
privatisation and regulation in the water industry. The data and the testing methodology 
are presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents and analyses the results, whilst the 
concluding remarks are presented in section 4.4. 
4.1 ISSUES IN T H E PRIVATISATION AND R E G U L A T I O N OF 
T H E WATER INDUSTRY 
The state o f the water industry in England and Wales at privatisation was undoubtedly 
one o f neglect. A serious lack of investments had left a leaking infrastructure, which 
delivered water o f questionable quality and contributed to the pollution o f rivers and 
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beaches. Substantial capital expenditures were needed, also in the light o f new EC 
directives on water quality and sewerage services (Shaoul, 1997). 
The industry was privatised in November 1989 with the creation o f 10 water and 
sewerage companies, based on the designated geographical areas o f the old water 
authorities. As the previous authorities, the new private water companies worked on the 
principle o f 'integrated river basin management' and thus performed all the water-
related activities o f abstraction, treatment, distribution, sewerage, sewerage treatment 
and disposal, within the catchment area o f major rivers. However, the activities o f 
pollution monitoring and control, water resources management, fisheries and land 
drainage were taken over by the National Rivers Authority (now incorporated into the 
Environment Agency). Although Hunt and Lynk (1995) argue that this division o f 
responsibilities resulted in a considerable loss o f economies o f scope, the privatised 
water companies remained vertically integrated in production, distribution and supply. 
In addition, the industry also comprised o f 29 water only companies, which were 
already in private ownership, but statutorily controlled, and supplied about a quarter o f 
the total population o f England and Wales. These water only companies were allowed 
to acquire Pic status under the 1989 Water Act. Licences to companies covering 
mutually exclusive geographical areas were granted for an initial period o f 25 years, 
with a 10 year notice period. This implies that notice cannot be given until 2004 for 
termination o f service in 2014. Regulatory responsibility was assigned to a number o f 
organisations: the Office of Water Services (OFWAT) took charge o f the economic 
regulation 5 9, while H M Inspectorate o f Pollution, the Drinking Water Inspectorate and 
the National Rivers Authority shared the responsibility for environmental regulation. 
5 9 For a summary of the activities o f OFWAT, see Rees and Vickers (1995). 
208 
A l l these bodies however shared some responsibility for issues of water quality and 
consumer protection. 
4.1.1 Economic Features of Water Supply 
The special features that differentiate the water industry f rom other utilities jus t i fy this 
relatively complex regulatory framework. In the supply of water, almost all o f the 
traditional instances o f markets failure are to be found, namely, natural monopoly 
conditions, capital intensity, very low price elasticity o f demand, seasonal 
characteristics, negative externalities and the public good nature o f domestic water 
consumption. 
In the case o f other network utilities, such as electricity and gas, the standard argument 
is that, while the network is naturally monopolistic, supply o f the services over the 
network can have competitive features. In relation to water, however, at the time o f 
privatisation, the assumption was that all aspects o f the industry were naturally 
monopolistic and thus there was little scope for competition. There is indeed some 
empirical evidence to just i fy the assumption o f natural monopoly. Firstly, the industry 
is likely to exhibit increasing economies o f scale in a number o f its operations. In 
particular, there are likely to be increasing returns to density o f supply wherever there 
are capacities o f storage and delivery, which depend upon the square o f the linear 
dimension, as recognised by the regulator itself (OFWAT, 1994). In addition, the 
results o f empirical analysis also suggest that operating costs rise less than 
proportionally wi th output in both water and sewerage services, and thus marginal costs 
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are below average variable costs ( M M C , 1996). This finding has been supported by 
evidence f rom OFWAT (1996a), which reports that, fol lowing the increase in the 
demand for water and sewerage due to the 1995 dry weather conditions, unit costs, 
including capital costs, decreased. However, the evidence o f the existence o f natural 
monopoly conditions is weaker when the total long-run costs o f the vertically integrated 
business is considered. For example, OFWAT (1994) estimates that long-run marginal 
costs, including resource, bulk transfer and treatment costs, tend to increase with the 
total quantity supplied. This suggests that some competitive forces may be able to 
operate in the industry, as analysed in the following section. 
That the water industry is capital intensive in relation to other utilities is clearly 
suggested by the examination o f the capital expenditure to sales ratio for the different 
U K uti l i ty industries in 1995: water industry 36%, telecommunications 17%, gas 15%, 
electricity distribution 8% 6 0. This feature means that costs may rise sharply wi th 
demand for improved quality and environmental considerations. In addition, negative 
externalities are encountered in several stages o f the water cycle; for example, rivers 
and lakes can be polluted by industrial waste or acid rain; underground sources can be 
polluted by fertilisers and agricultural chemicals. On the one hand, domestic water 
consumers pay for the removal o f the effects o f pesticides and fertilisers used by the 
agricultural sector and o f waste caused by industrial and other activities. On the other 
hand, water and sewerage services impose costs on local economies when frequent 
maintenance work causes traffic congestion. Coastal population pays for the additional 
sewerage capacity necessary to cater for holiday-makers in the Summer, without 
necessarily sharing the benefits o f the tourist industry. About half o f the sewerage costs 
6 0 Source: SG Warburg, "Utilities Group Modeller", 1996. 
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relate to highway surface water drainage. There is indeed scope for debating who 
should bear some o f the costs that at present water and sewerage companies simply pass 
on to domestic households (Smith, 1995). 
Finally, most o f the water is still supplied 'unpriced' at the point o f consumption, since 
its consumption is not measured. With a sharp decline in industrial demand during the 
1970s and early 1980s, the proportion o f unmeasured domestic consumption has grown 
sharply and it is set to remain high for a long time. The declared aspiration o f the 
regulator is that 33% of households w i l l be metered by 2014, as compared wi th the 
present 6% (Glaister, 1996). Thus, a large proportion o f consumers has no choice on 
either the quantity, or the quality, o f the water consumed. These features o f water 
supply make water an excellent example o f a public good. 
4.1.2 Types of Feasible Competition in Water Supply 
The above evidence on market failure in the supply of water and sewerage services does 
not completely rule out the possibility o f some form of competition. I t is however 
revealing to notice that the 1989 Water Act, subsequently consolidated into the 1991 
Water Industry Act, places emphasis on the regulator's duty to facilitate competition in 
the industry, in contrast to regulators in other utilities who have a stronger statutory duty 
to promote competition. The theoretical literature recognises five types o f competition 
that can be applied to the water industry (Cowan, 1997), namely, yardstick competition, 
competition for the market, contracting out of services, capital market competition, and 
product market competition. 
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Yardstick competition can be applied to regulated industries where firms are 
geographically separated. In its simplest form, the regulator decides the price allowed 
to one firm on the costs o f another firm, thus creating an incentive for firms to lower 
their own costs. Such regulation works better the greater the correlation between the 
various exogenous factors that affect costs o f different firms in the industry. Shleifer 
(1985) suggests that yardstick competition can be applied simply by regressing unit 
costs on the exogenous factors driving costs. In practice, however, yardstick 
competition cannot really be applied in any mechanical way, especially considering the 
diversity of external conditions that affect the supply o f water in different geographical 
areas. In addition to this diversity, the other main issue relating to yardstick competition 
in the supply o f water and sewerage in England and Wales has been the alleged 
efficiency gains o f proposed mergers within the industry. Water and sewerage 
companies have argued that their geographical boundaries are somewhat arbitrary and 
that there would be efficiency gains i f mergers were allowed. However, mergers would 
also reduce the number o f companies in the industry and thus the ability o f the regulator 
to apply yardstick competition. On this latter ground, the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission has stopped mergers bids that would reduce the number o f water and 
sewerage companies ( M M C 1996a and 1996b), judging that "no remedy, even in the 
shape of very significant price reductions, would be sufficient to compensate for the loss 
of [South West Water Services] as a comparator" 6 1. 
Competition for the market can be achieved by franchising services. However, 
franchising is more successful the lower sunk costs are, since the franchisee has to 
6 1 M M C (1996a), p. 4. 
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recover sunk investments before the contract expires. It is thus often desirable to keep 
the main sunk assets in public ownership. In the U K , franchising has been used in the 
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case o f train services , while for the water supply it has been used in France and a 
number o f developing countries (World Bank, 1994). Given the structure o f the 
privatised industry and the high sunk investments faced by individual companies, 
franchising is not really suitable in the supply o f water and sewerage services in 
England and Wales. 
On the contrary, some contracting out o f services has taken place in the industry. 
Activities relating to information technology, bil l ing and revenue collection, and 
maintenance have been contracted out. The obvious advantage o f this practice is that 
the competition in the supply o f a specific service can bring about efficiency gains. 
However, in the U K privatised utilities some services have been contracted out to in-
house teams or associated companies. In these cases, further market testing and 
competitive tendering may be desirable to insure competitive gains. 
Competition in capital markets is often referred to as a market mechanism for 
managerial control and the water industry is no exception (Littlechild, 1986). In an 
efficient capital market, inefficient companies can be penalised by investors who 
continuously compare performance between companies in the same industry, as well as 
across industries. The main market threat to inefficient companies, however, is the 
threat o f take-overs. In a regulated industry such as the water industry, this threat w i l l 
6 2 When the privatisation of Scottish water services was being considered in the early 
90s, franchising was one o f the options discussed (McMaster and Sawkins, 1993). 
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not work i f mergers are not allowed to go ahead because of the desire to maintain a 
large enough number o f independent companies. 
Finally, with respect to direct product-market competition in the supply o f water, it is 
inconceivable that a proliferation o f competing networks o f water mains and sewers w i l l 
ever prove to be efficient, given the current technology and market conditions. 
Although there can be some cross-border competition and a scope for diversifying the 
ownership o f the network when additional pipes are linked to the existing network, it 
must be argued that the main boost to competition would come f rom allowing a number 
of competing suppliers to share a common network, like in the case o f other network 
utilities. However, the present vertical integration o f the water industry acts as 
constraint to the development o f this type o f competition and the wisdom of separating 
the industry vertically, as it has been done for electricity and gas, has been questioned. 
There is some agreement in the literature that there is limited scope in the water industry 
for product market competition (Armstrong, Cowan and Viskers, 1994; and Cowan, 
1997) and thus more regulation than in other utility industries has to be accepted. 
One o f the main attempts to facilitate competition has been the introduction o f inset 
appointments by OFWAT. With an inset appointment a company can be entrusted wi th 
the responsibility to supply water services to a defined geographical area, wi th an 
existing licence holder. The area must include a customer consuming at least 250 
megalitres of water per year, who has to agree to the proposed inset appointment, or 
have no existing customers, a so-called green-field development 6 3. Although there has 
6 3 For more details on inset appointments in the water industry see OFWAT (1995) and 
Pethick(1996). 
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been more than twenty applications for insets, only very few have been granted and the 
new companies have acted only as brokers, or retailers, leaving the existing licence 
holder to continue the provision o f the service. In other words, the existing licence 
holder carries out the treatment, transportation and supply o f water and charges the inset 
appointee a wholesale price covering the relevant costs. I f the inset holder and the 
original licence holder cannot agree the wholesale price, then the regulator intervenes 
and determines the terms of trade. 
Traditionally, larger industrial customers have cross-subsidised smaller domestic users. 
In recent years, though, the existence o f inset appointments has induced more 
competition in the supply to large customers and thus many water companies have 
introduced different tariffs for large users. Since 1995, most large customers have a 
choice of contracts, such as standard two-part tariffs, or a higher fixed charge and lower 
charge per unit o f consumption, or non-linear tariffs with declining prices for successive 
blocks o f consumption. Some customers do not have to choose the preferred contract 
ex-ante, but can choose the cheapest contract ex-post. The regulator, needing to ensure 
that this re-balancing does not result in a cross-subsidisation f rom domestic to industrial 
users, has removed large users f rom the regulated tar i f f basket f rom Apr i l 2000, opening 
up the competition in the supply o f water to large users (OF W A T , 1999). 
In conclusion, it is clear that, because o f the unique characteristics o f the water industry, 
the creation o f a competitive framework is a diff icul t and controversial task, and the 
result is likely to be different f rom the existing solutions for other network utilities. 
Vertical integration o f water companies and their geographical strongholds means that 
any increase in competition is likely to require a restructuring o f the industry. 
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Common-carriage agreements have been discussed for a long time (OFWAT, 1996b). 
However, without a national water grid, this type o f competition can only take place 
within regions. Considering that the cost o f implementing common-carriage 
competition is rather high, i t is unclear whether any benefit f rom it w i l l exceed the costs 
(Cowan, 1997). 
4.1.3 Price Regulation 
Negative externalities and capital intensity were the main 'o f f i c i a l ' reasons behind the 
government's cash injections at privatisation 6 4 and the lenient RPI+K pricing formula 
applied to the water utilities. The 'K' factor in the formula is equal to (-X+Q), where X 
is the usual productivity factor, while Q is the cost o f quality and reflects the massive 
investment programme that water companies had to face to improve the quality o f water 
and other services. Furthermore, the K factor is company specific to acknowledge the 
diversity across companies in the costs o f meeting environmental and quality 
obligations and in the scope for efficiency savings between different WaSCs 6 5. It is also 
an instrument for inducing 'yardstick' competition (Shleifer, 1985), penalising under-
performing and rewarding over-performing companies in relation to the industry's 
average. 
6 4 The Government wrote o f f the industry's debts o f £4.95 bil l ion before privatization 
and injected an additional £1.5 bil l ion cash towards the costs o f the investment 
programme. 
5 A t the time of privatization, K factors ranged between 5.5 for Anglian Water to 0 for 
Southern Water, wi th an average of 3.8. 
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The RPI+K formula is a ' t a r i f f basket', which takes into account the multi-product 
nature of the water industry by dividing output into five categories: metered and 
unmetered water, metered and unmetered sewerage, and trade effluent. The weighted-
average increase in the prices o f these f ive items must not grow by more than RPI+K. 
The weights o f each item are given by the share o f that item in total revenue in the 
previous accounting year 6 6. In the initial five years o f regulation, the K factor for the 
water and sewerage companies was at its highest, the average formula being RPI+5%. 
This fel l to an average o f RPI+1.4% in the subsequent five-year period. The price o f 
water in real terms increased by 30.2% in the first regulatory period and by only 4.5% in 
the second period. The setting of the K factor was mainly linked to the need for 
investment, paramount in the water industry where the most important issues at 
privatisation were the need to improve water quality, safeguard the environment, 
replace depleted capital stock and provide for future growth in demand. Any 
consideration about possible productivity gains was low on the list o f priorities, unlike 
in other utilities. Thus, in setting the initial K factor the regulator was mainly concerned 
with the need to finance the much needed investment, rather than provide any incentives 
for increased productivity 6 7 . The Department o f the Environment estimated by means 
of the capital asset pricing model that the cost o f capital for new investment would be 
about 7% for the water and sewerage companies and about 8-8.5% for the water only 
companies. The problem in setting a 'fair' value o f K was that the WaSCs at the time o f 
privatisation were earning only about 2% on the replacement value o f assets. Thus, 
valuing the existing assets at replacement cost for setting K would have meant an 
6 6 A t the end o f the 1990s, about 90% o f domestic households had still no meter and 
were charged according to the rateable values o f their properties. 
6 7 For a description o f the process of setting the K factor for the water industry, see 
M M C (1990) and OFWAT (1991). 
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increase in prices too large to be politically acceptable. In the end, it was decided that 
existing assets should continue to earn a rate o f return o f 2% on their replacement costs, 
but new assets should earn the market rate o f return o f 7%, or 8% in the case of water-
only companies. In addition, there is a provision for 'cost pass through', which allows 
water companies to pass on any increase in capital investment costs resulting f rom new 
environmental legislation to consumers through higher prices. 
The specific features of the water industry outlined in the previous sections aggravate 
the problem discussed in the previous chapter o f estimating the systematic risk o f water 
companies and thus their associated desirable rate o f return. In addition, as pointed out 
earlier, when considering the role o f risk in designing regulation, it is important to 
realise the circular nature o f the relationship between regulation and risk. Although 
regulators rely on estimates o f risk to decide on an appropriate rate o f return, it is also 
generally accepted that the actions o f regulators in turn affect risk. The ability o f the 
regulator to allocate stochastic future costs and benefits between consumers and 
investors means that the investment risk of the regulated firm is endogenous, being a 
function not only o f technical and market uncertainties, but also o f regulatory pol icy 6 8 . 
4.1.4 Environmental and Quality Regulation 
As mentioned earlier, in the supply of water, issues of quality control and environmental 
concerns are o f paramount importance. Thus, water companies also faced right from 
the beginning though environmental and quality regulation, in addition to OFWAT's 
6 8 See Brennan and Schwartz (1982) for a theoretical treatment o f this problem. 
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price regulation. Most o f these regulations were imposed by the European Community, 
such as the Drinking Water Directive, the Bathing Beaches Directive, and the Urban 
Waste Water Treatment Directive. They were administered in the U K by the H M 
Inspectorate o f Pollution, the Drinking Water Inspectorate and the National Rivers 
Authority. 
The potential inefficiency f rom having separate agencies to regulate price and quality 
have been discussed for a long time in the theoretical literature (Baron, 1985). It is a 
special case o f the problem o f common agency, where one agent, the firm, has several 
principals, the regulators, wi th diverse objectives 6 9. The solution o f the theoretical 
model is that the firm makes higher excess profits when the regulators do not co-operate 
than when they do co-operate. In the case o f the water industry in England and Wales, 
Byatt (1991) has argued that the environmental and quality obligations should be 
carefully costed and implemented in consultation with the industry. The cost and 
benefit o f new quality standards should be fu l ly assessed and those standards that are 
likely to be adopted should be taken into account when setting the K factor. The 
implementation by firms should also be monitored closely to avoid any possible 
Averch-Johnson over-investment effect, over-statement o f future investment costs and 
an inefficient abatement o f pollution (Helm, 1991 and 1993). Depending on the costs 
and benefits o f pollution abatement, the desirability o f quantitative controls, pollution 
tax and trading permits, or various combinations o f these, have also been considered in 
the literature (Hahn, 1989; and Helm, 1993). 
6 9 For a general analysis o f the common agency problem wi th moral hazard, see 
Bernheim and Whinston (1986), and for an analysis wi th adverse selection, see Stole 
(1991). 
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4.2 METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION 
4.2.1 Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital Using a Time-Varying 
Methodology 
The standard methodology usually adopted in the literature for the investigation o f this 
type o f issue is the extended market model with dummy variables (Karafiath, 1988; 
Binder, 1985a and 1985b). This methodology, however, assumes that the systematic 
risk o f the portfolio is constant for the whole period under investigation. This seems 
unlikely, especially in this case, because o f the changes in the political and economic 
environment in the U K and more particularly the development o f quality, health and 
environmental issues relating to the supply o f water and sewerage services during the 
period under study . 
Furthermore, i t has long been recognized that the uncertainty of speculative prices, as 
measured by the variances and covariances, are also changing through time 
(Mandelbrot, 1963; and Fama, 1965). Thus, this study adopts a method o f estimation o f 
the systematic risk that incorporates these two features, i.e. time variation in beta and 
changes in variances and covariances over time. More specifically, following Merton 
(1980) the expected return on the market portfolio can be written as: 
E(Rml) = XlE{a2ml) (4.1) 
7 0 In order to examine whether the systematic risk o f the ten water utilities and the 
industry portfolio is stable over time, their betas were estimated recursively. Results 
confirmed that the systematic risk was not constant for the period under investigation. 
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Assuming expectations are correct on average, then equation (4.1) can be re-written in 
terms o f ex-post returns as follows: 
Kr=^M<J + £m, (4.2) 
where emt is a white noise error term implying that the conditional variance o f the 
market portfolio is: 
E{CTI,) = E{CI,) (4.3) 
The excess return o f a stock i is given by the fol lowing equation, assuming again that 
expectations are correct on average: 
R I L = / J L E ( R M L ) + 6-il (4.4) 
where eu is a white noise error term. The substitution o f equation (4.3) into equation 
(4.2) yields the fol lowing: 
Rml=^E(^,) + eml (4.5) 
Furthermore, substituting equation (4.1) into equation (4.4) gives 7 1: 
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Rit =XlE{sml,eil) + Eil (4.6) 
Equations (4.5) and (4.6) are estimated using a multivariate GARCH model that allows 
for changes in correlation in estimating the covariance between the market and 
individual stocks and the variance of the market. In particular, the fol lowing 
multivariate G A R C H system was estimated: 
K„ =a0m +XlE{£2ml) + Eml 
^ = « o i + « w * * 2 - i + * . X - i (4-7) 
iml ) + A , )(*/,,,,-,) 
where aoi and aom are constants; Xt is the market price for risk; f „ and £mt are error 
terms; hit, hmt and himt are the conditional variances and conditional covariance 
respectively; a and 5 are the coefficients o f the conditional variances and covariance to 
be estimated. The estimate o f beta is simply the conditional covariance divided by the 
conditional variance f rom the above GARCH system. This measure o f time-varying 
betas is then used to carry out the rest o f the investigation. 
71 Note that p, = 
Cov{RitRml) 
and E( Cov(R i t R m t ) )=E(e i tsmt)-
222 
4.2.2 Hypothesis Testing for Groups of Announcements 
Initially, announcements were grouped by their expected impact on the level of 
competition, prices, and the supply of services in the water industry. Equation (4.8) 
below was then estimated over the entire sample period using OLS to analyze the 
impact of the announcement groups on the systematic risk, i.e. the estimated time-
varying beta coefficient, of the water industry portfolio: 
P W P L =r* + V^COMP - POS, + YIPRICE - NEG, + 
y3PRICE - POS, + y.QUAL - NEG, +y5QUAL- POS, +e, 
where p w p t is the time-varying coefficient that represents the systematic risk of the water 
industry, COMP-POSt, PRICE-NEG,, QUAL-NEG t, QUAL-POS t, PRICE-POS,, and 
COMP-POSt are dummy variables that equal one on the three days72 around each 
regulatory announcement and zero otherwise; et is a random error term. The parameters 
Yo,....,5 detect changes in the industry's systematic risk due to particular types of 
regulatory announcements within a three-day window; that is, they measure possible 
effects on the beta coefficient due to any of the five types of announcements defined. 
Using equation (4.8), the following hypotheses about the effects of each group of 
announcements on the water industry's systematic risk were tested73: 
It is desirable that the window should be small to avoid contamination from other 
events. This is particularly accOeptable in a developed and active stock market such as 
the London market. 
7 3 These hypotheses were formulated on the assumption that the main concern of 
OFWAT is to protect consumers and that there is no regulatory capture. 
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(i) Announcements that are expected to increase competition are also expected to 
increase beta and thus increase the cost of equity capital (yi>0); 
(ii) Announcements that are expected to decrease the price of services are also 
expected to increase beta and thus increase the cost of equity capital (y2>0); 
(iii) Announcements that are expected to increase price of services are expected to 
decrease beta and thus decrease the cost of equity capital (y3<0); 
(iv) Announcements that lower the quality threshold, and thus reduce the need for 
future investment expenditure, are expected to reduce beta and thus decrease the 
cost of equity capital (Y4<0); 
(v) Announcements that are expected to improve quality, and thus increase the need 
for future investment expenditure, are also expected to increase beta and thus 
increase the cost of equity capital (YS>0). 
4.2.3 Testing the Impact of Individual Announcements 
I f investors believe that a certain type of announcement does not have an effect on the 
systematic risk of a company, then this group of announcements should be found 
insignificant in testing equation (4.8). However, groups of announcements may result 
as having no significant impact as a consequence of an averaging out effect within the 
group, with individual announcements causing a significant market reaction, but in 
different directions. Although in this case the direction of the overall effect of the 
specific type of announcements is unpredictable, it would nevertheless be incorrect to 
believe that investors are indifferent to these types of announcements. Thus, in order to 
gain more detailed insights in the nature of market reaction, the impact of individual 
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regulatory announcements was further analysed by regressing the water industry's time-
varying beta coefficient against dummy variables that capture the effects of individual 
announcements within a specific group. The following equation was thus estimated: 
where p w p t is the time varying systematic risk of the industry as described above; Dj t are 
individual announcement dummy variables that equal one on the three days around each 
i t h regulatory announcement, and zero otherwise; and u t is a random error term. The 
parameters <t>o,...,n detect changes in the water industry's systematic risk due to individual 
regulatory announcements within a group. Equation (4.9) is estimated for each of the 
five groups of announcements separately over the whole sample period. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis Testing for the Impact of Group Announcements on 
Individual Company's Systematic Risk 
Given the heterogeneity of water companies and the fact that they face different 'K' 
factors, as explained in the introduction, it is important to examine whether the group 
announcements have the same impact across the industry. Therefore, this chapter first 
examines whether each group of announcements has an impact on the systematic risk of 
each utility, rather than on the industry as a whole. Secondly, it also examines whether 
the significant groups of announcements have the same impact across all companies. 
To this end, the following regression is estimated: 
(4.9) 
;=1 
225 
P H = Vo+ ItCOMP - POS, + TJ2PRJCE - NEG + TJ.PRJCE - POS, + 
TJ4QUAL - NEG, + rjSQUAL - POS, + u„ 
where, pit is the systematic risk of company /; the parameters r|o,....,5 detect the changes 
in each company's systematic risk due to particular types of regulatory announcements. 
The regulatory announcement variables are defined as in equation (4.8) and u t is a 
random error term. In addition, a Wald test was used to examine whether any 
statistically significant impact of a group of announcements was the same across all 
companies. This was done by computing pair-wise Wald tests under the null hypothesis 
that the effect (i.e. the coefficient) of a group of announcements, such as PRICE-POS, 
on the systematic risk of, for example, company 1 was the same as the effect of PRICE-
POS on the systematic risk of company 2. 
4.2.5 The Overall Effect of Regulation on the Industry's Systematic 
Risk 
Another important issue relates to the overall effect of regulation on the industry's 
systematic risk. The relevant question here is whether the effect of regulation can be 
isolated by calculating a measure of systematic risk, free of regulatory risk. A proxy of 
the industry's systematic risk without the effect of regulation can be obtained by 
replacing the value of the time-varying betas in the 3-day announcement windows with 
the constant from equation (4.8), i.e. the beta coefficient's mean value uncontaminated 
from regulatory effects. In other words, during announcement windows, the effect of 
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regulation on beta is eliminated by replacing its values estimated in a time-varying 
framework, with its mean value estimated as the constant term in equation (4.8). The 
mean of the compensated beta can then be compared with the mean of the estimated 
time-varying beta. The statistical equality of these two means is then tested using a z-
statistic. This is an important part of the analysis, since it can provide useful insights on 
the overall effects of regulation on the industry's systematic risk and thus on the cost of 
equity capital for the water utilities. 
4.3 ANNOUNCEMENT S E L E C T I O N AND DATA 
As in previous chapters, the regulatory announcements considered in this paper include 
any news published in the Financial Times that either relate directly, or are expected to 
lead, to regulatory changes. These include announcements by regulatory bodies, such 
as OFWAT, general announcements by the government, and news expected to influence 
regulation. The periods preceding and following each announcement have been 
checked for the presence of other events, such as quarterly earnings announcements and 
general elections, and announcements that are contaminated by other events have been 
excluded from the sample. The dates of the announcements relate to the day when the 
announcement was released to the public. In all, the effects of the 116 regulatory 
announcements listed in the Appendix were tested over the period December 1989 to 
August 199574. Announcements were grouped by their expected impact on the level of 
competition, prices, and the supply of services in the water industry. Of these 
announcements, 5 were expected to increase competition (COMP-POS), 57 were 
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expected to decrease prices (PRICE-NEG), 22 were expected to increase prices 
(PRICE-POS), 12 were expected to decrease the quality of services (QUAL-NEG), and 
20 were expected to increase the quality of services (QUAL-POS). No announcement 
was expected to decrease competition. 
The utilities included in the sample were Anglian Water, North West Water, 
Northumbrian Water, Severn-Trent, South West Water Services, Southern Water 
Services, Thames Water, Welsh Water, Wessex Water and Yorkshire Water. Share 
returns were defined as the difference of the log of daily share prices, thus assuming that 
dividends are continuously reinvested. As a proxy for the market return, the difference 
of the log of the FT Al l Share Index was used. An equally weighted portfolio of returns 
for the water industry was also calculated. AH price series were obtained from 
Datastream. 
4.4 E M P I R I C A L RESULTS 
4.4.1 Portfolio Results for Group Announcements 
The results from estimating equation (4.8) over the sample period are presented in Table 
4.1 and suggest that only regulatory announcements which affect competition and the 
quality of services have an impact on the water industry's systematic risk. In particular, 
the COMP-POS group has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, which 
7 4 The sample used ends in August 1995 because after this period mergers between 
water companies started to take place. 
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confirms the hypothesis that, when the regulator takes steps to increase competition, 
investors perceive that the water industry becomes more risky. This is to be expected, 
as increasing competition wil l reduce firms' market power and probably require lower 
price levels and profit margins. 
The statistical significance of the QUAL-POS and QUAL-NEG coefficients suggests 
that these announcements also have an impact on the industry's systematic risk. The 
positive sign of the QUAL-POS coefficient confirms the stated hypothesis that 
announcements that have an improving effect on the quality of service increase the 
systematic risk. A possible explanation for this result can be found in the high capital 
intensity of the water industry: regulatory announcements that require water utilities to 
increase the quality of their services are perceived by investors to be associated with 
high costs of replacing capital equipment and/or new investments. This increases costs 
and reduces profit margins, and thus makes the companies more risky. However, the 
positive sign of the QUAL-NEG coefficient contradicts the stated hypothesis that these 
announcements would reduce systematic risk. Once again this result may be linked to 
the high capital intensity of the industry. The fact that a regulator may allow UK water 
companies to maintain a low level of quality could lead to a deterioration of the capital 
equipment and make these companies more vulnerable to future tighter environmental 
and public health regulation and consumer dissatisfaction. The question of quality 
control is indeed a complex one for the water industry, with several bodies dealing with 
it, from the National River Authorities, to the Environment Agency and the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, among others, and the possibility of legislation being imposed from 
outside the UK. This coupled with a decaying and aging network, and a serious 
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Table 4.1 
The effect of competition, pricing, and quality of service announcements on the 
water industry's systematic risk as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
P N =y0+yiCOMP-POSl + 
y2PRICE - NEG, + y3PRICE - POS, + 
y AQUAL - NEG, + y 5QUAL - POS, + e, 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT Yo 0.68152 23.59' 
COMP-POS Yi 0.06127 1.884** 
PRICE-NEG Y2 -0.0036 -0.21 
PRICE-POS Y3 0.01489 0.402 
QUAL-NEG Y4 0.11271 3.384* 
QUAL-POS Y5 0.08271 2.456* 
Notes: 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation based on Newey-West adjusted S.E. 
* denotes statistically significant at the 5% level 
** denotes statistically significant at the 10% level 
COMP-POS : announcements likely to increase competition 
PRICE-NEG : announcements likely decrease the price of services 
PRICE-POS : announcements likely to increase price of services 
QUAL-NEG : announcements likely to decrease quality/efficiency 
QUAL-NEG : announcements likely to increase quality/efficiency 
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problem of under-investment (see Shaoul, 1997) can rationalise the positive effect of the 
QUAL-NEG group of announcements. 
It is interesting to note that announcements that are expected to affect prices have no 
statistically significant impact on the industry's systematic risk. While at first sight this 
result appears surprising, it could be explained by the fact that investors anticipate price 
regulation and thus discount it in their pricing mechanism. Indeed, i f the regulator 
correctly sets the price-cap, it is only the abnormal profits that wil l be eliminated. Thus, 
as the evidence suggests, price regulation has no overall impact on the industry's 
systematic risk. 
4.4.2 Portfolio Results for Individual Announcements 
The results from estimating equation (4.9) are presented in Tables 4.2-4.6. As expected, 
a large proportion of announcements within the insignificant price groups has a 
significant impact on the industry's systematic risk. However, the effect of different 
announcements within the same group is often of opposite sign and thus overall the 
group appears to have no impact. For example, the PRICE-NEG group has forty-five 
significant announcements out of fifty-seven. Of these announcements twenty-four 
decrease systematic risk and twenty-one increase it. In order to understand why so 
many announcements that are expected to decrease prices also decrease the systematic 
risk, we need to look at the specific announcements more closely. The first thing to 
note is that fifteen of the twenty-four announcements that resulted in a reduction in beta 
occurred during the first two years of privatisation (PN2-PN20), a period where the 
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Table 4.2 
The effect of COMP-POS announcements on the water industry's systematic risk 
as measured by the time-Varying beta coefficient 
$••» =<t>o 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT 0.6906 25.8' 
CP1 h -0.0113 -0.42 
CP2 0.1343 5.03* 
CP3 h -0.0719 -2.69* 
CP4 <t>4, 0.0214 0.80 
CP5 h 0.1880 7.04* 
Notes: see notes to Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.3 
The effect of P R I C E - N E G announcements on the water industry's systematic 
risk as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
n 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT <|>o 0.6921 25.2' 
PN1 h -0.0433 -1.57 
PN2 fa -0.1764 -6.43* 
PN3 h -0.1382 -5.04* 
PN4 <j>4 -0.2200 -7.97* 
PN5 <b -0.0060 -0.22 
PN6 <|>6 0.1271 4.62* 
PN7 <|>7 -0.0967 -3.53* 
PN8 <f>8 -0.1953 -7.13* 
PN9 §9 0.0641 2.34* 
PN10 d> io 0.0982 3.57* 
PN11 <t>n -0.0960 -3.49* 
PN12 d> 12 -0.0526 -1.91* 
PN13 <t>13 0.2336 8.51* 
PN14 <P> 14 -0.0276 -1.00 
PN15 <t>15 -0.1487 -5.41* 
PN16 <t>16 -0.1328 -4.79* 
PN17 <(>! 7 -0.0940 -3.39* 
PN18 <|>18 -0.5365 -19.6* 
PN19 <t>19 -0.2384 -8.74* 
PN20 <t>20 -0.1853 -6.75* 
PN21 §2\ 0.0770 2.84* 
PN22 <j>22 -0.1761 -6.52* 
PN23 d>23 0.0946 3.47* 
PN24 <t»24 -0.0323 -1.19 
PN25 <t>25 0.0025 0.093 
Cont.A 
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PN26 <|>26 0.0395 1.45 
PN27 4>27 0.0511 1.92* 
PN28 <t>28 0.0191 7.09* 
PN29 <|>29 0.0223 0.82 
PN30 <t>30 0.0411 1.52 
PN31 <t>31 0.2214 8.18* 
PN32 <b2 0.2835 10.4* 
PN33 <t>33 0.0570 2.10* 
PN34 <t>34 0.2936 10.8* 
PN35 <t>35 0.0733 2.70* 
PN36 <t>36 0.1318 4.87* 
PN37 <j>37 0.1547 5.71* 
PN38 4*38 0.0150 0.56 
PN39 <(>39 -0.1379 -5.11* 
PN40 <)>40 -0.1033 -3.83* 
PN41 <t>41 0.1395 5.09* 
PN42 <|>42 -0.2764 -10.1* 
PN43 <t>43 0.0380 1.38 
PN44 <|>44 -0.1194 -4.37* 
PN45 <|>45 -0.1684 -6.15* 
PN46 <t>46 0.0407 1.49 
PN47 <t>47 0.0801 2.92* 
PN48 <|>48 0.0748 2.73* 
PN49 <t>49 -0.1778 -6.50* 
PN50 <t>50 -0.0709 -2.58* 
PN51 4>51 -0.1737 -6.36* 
PN52 <|>52 0.0722 2.64* 
PN53 <P53 0.0314 1.14 
PN54 <t>54 0.1696 6.20* 
PN55 4>55 0.2485 9.08* 
PN56 <|»56 -0.1049 -3.83* 
PN57 <|>57 0.1321 4.82* 
Notes: see notes to Table 4.1 
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Table 4.4 
The effect of PRICE-POS announcements on the water industry's systematic 
risk as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
n 
Pn = 00 + 2 > ' Z ) « 
/=l 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT <t>0 0.6909 26.8' 
PP1 • i -0.1909 -7.46* 
PP2 <t>2 -0.3803 -14.8* 
PP3 <j>3 -0.0681 -2.64* 
PP4 -0.0995 -3.85* 
PP5 fa -0.2255 -8.78* 
PP6 <|>6 0.0407 1.58 
PP7 <|>7 0.2019 7.84* 
PP8 <t>8 0.1143 4.44* 
PP9 fa -0.1354 -5.27* 
PP10 <P> 10 -0.1479 -5.74* 
PP11 <|> 11 0.1624 6.31* 
PP12 <|>I2 -0.1920 -3.57* 
PP13 4* 13 -0.1403 -5.46* 
PP14 <J> 14 0.1619 6.29* 
PP15 <f> 15 0.2584 10.0* 
PP16 <))16 0.0893 3.46* 
PP17 <(> 17 0.2952 11.4* 
PP18 <t> 18 0.1200 4.67* 
PP19 4» 1 S> 0.1224 4.75* 
PP20 <ko -0.0188 -0.73 
PP21 <j>21 0.0721 2.81* 
PP22 <t>22 -0.0213 -0.82 
Notes: see notes to Table 4.1 
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Table 4.5 
The effect of QUAL-NEG announcements on the water industry's systematic 
risk as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
P« =<t>o +«, 
1=1 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT <t»o 0.6882 25.4' 
QN1 h -0.1282 -4.73* 
QN2 fa 0.1433 5.30* 
QN3 fa 0.1171 4.32* 
QN4 fa 0.2649 9.78* 
QN5 fa 0.1960 7.24* 
QN6 fa -0.0471 -1.73 
QN7 fa 0.0518 1.92* 
QN8 fa 0.1409 5.19* 
QN9 <t>9 0.1125 4.15* 
QN10 <|>I0 0.1147 4.24* 
QN11 <1>11 0.1766 6.52* 
QN12 <b> 1 2 0.1231 4.53* 
Notes: see notes to Table 4.1 
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Table 4.6 
The effect of QUAL-POS announcements on the water industry's systematic risk 
as measured by the time-varying beta coefficient 
;=1 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
CONSTANT <|>o 0.6882 24.8' 
QP1 h -0.1494 -5.39* 
QP2 <|>2 0.2101 7.58* 
QP3 <(>3 0.2078 7.50* 
QP4 <t>4 0.1243 4.48* 
QP5 4»s 0.0772 2.78* 
QP6 <|>6 0.2023 7.30* 
QP7 h -0.0681 -2.45* 
QP8 <t>8 0.0950 3.43* 
QP9 <|>9 0.1189 4.29* 
QP10 <ho 0.0206 0.74 
QP11 <j)ll -0.0441 -1.60 
QP12 <|>12 0.1756 6.31* 
QP13 <j>l3 0.0516 1.86* 
QP14 d> 14 0.0013 0.04 
QP15 <j>15 0.0812 2.93* 
QP16 <)>16 0.0265 0.95 
QP17 4> 17 -0.0788 -2.84* 
QP18 4» 18 0.1401 5.04* 
QP19 <f> 19 0.1587 5.72* 
QN20 <t>20 0.1206 4.35* 
Notes: see notes to Table 4.1 
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market was very sensitive to price regulation and as a result, most of the announcements 
were deemed to be important in influencing beta. 
More specifically, the perceived reduction in risk linked to price announcements in this 
period could be due to a number of factors. Investors could have initially been more 
pessimistic than necessary and the announcements relating to price regulation in this 
period may thus have been less restrictive than anticipated. I f this were to be the case, 
we would observe reductions in perceived risk whenever a milder than anticipated 
regulatory announcement is made. In addition, a number of announcements were 
related to Ofwat's intention to question customers on preferred charging methods and 
on the debate on the metering of water consumption. This suggests that the market 
believes that a charging system linked to consumption may well reduce future 
uncertainty and allow a more efficient use of resources. Finally, two announcements 
that stress the opportunity for the water utilities to increase productivity and thus reduce 
prices result in a reduction of beta, suggesting that the market believes that these types 
of measures may well result in a more efficient water industry. The situation is similar 
with the PRICE-POS group where there are nineteen significant announcements out of 
twenty-two; nine decrease systematic risk and ten increase it. A more detailed 
examination of the ten announcements which increase systematic risk reveals that most 
of them refer to price increases following the tightening of environmental and quality 
controls. In these cases, perceived systematic risk may increase due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the cost repercussions of new quality regulation. In other words, it is not at 
all clear that the price increases will cover for the imposed additional cost of production. 
In relation to COMP-POS announcements, out of five relevant announcements three are 
significant and only one has a negative sign contrary to the initial hypothesis that 
238 
announcements that increase competition should increase systematic risk. However, 
this latter announcement refers to OFWAT's opinions and not to specific measures. 
In the Q U A L - N E G group, eleven out o f twelve announcements are found to be 
significant. In line with the findings about the overall effect o f this group of 
announcements previously presented and discussed, ten announcements increase 
systematic risk, while only one announcement decreases it. In the QUAL-POS group 
sixteen out o f twenty announcements have a significant impact on systematic risk; only 
four announcements decrease systematic risk and twelve increase it. As argued above, a 
possible explanation for the results relating to quality announcements can be found in 
the high capital intensity o f the water industry and the considerable costs and 
uncertainty associated with increasing quality standards. Indeed, one announcement 
refers to 'capital programmes on track'; another announces that the investment boom 
takes off; one calls for extension o f integrated pollution and quality control; and another 
one announces that the Government wants the water utilities to spend £500 mi l l ion on 
clean-up. Thus, these announcements are, on the one hand, expected to increase quality 
o f services and thus decrease the systematic risk, but on the other hand they are also 
expected to raise the industry's costs considerably, thus reducing profit margins and 
increasing uncertainty. 
In summary, when announcements are tested individually, rather than in groups, the 
large majority o f them appears to affect the water industry's systematic risk. Even 
individual price announcements, which as a group were found to have no effect on risk, 
are significant; however, they have opposite effects which cancel out when considered 
as a group. Most competition and quality announcements tend to increase the industry's 
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systematic risk and thus the groups relating to those types o f announcements are found 
to have the same combined effect. 
4.4.3 Company Results for Group Announcements 
The results f rom testing the effect o f competition, pricing and quality o f service 
announcements on the systematic risk o f each water utility are presented in Table 4.7 
and suggest that only the regulatory announcements that affect negatively the price are 
significant for all companies. Also, the announcements that affect competition 
positively are significant for only three companies, namely Anglian Water, North West 
Water and Thames Water, all o f which had relatively high ' K ' factors o f 5.5, 5 and 4.5 
respectively. This meant that they were allowed to keep prices relatively high and thus 
they were particularly vulnerable from 'comparative competition'. 
Testing whether the significant effect o f the PRICE-NEG announcements is the same 
across all companies, using pair-wise Wald tests for equality o f coefficients, reveals that 
for the majority o f pair-wise comparisons the null hypothesis o f equal impact o f this 
group o f announcements across companies is rejected at the 10% significance level. 
However, for the effect o f the COMP-POS announcements, the null hypothesis o f equal 
impact on the systematic risk o f the three above-mentioned companies is accepted. 
These results suggest that regulatory announcements that affect price in a negative way 
have a different impact on each company's systematic risk, while the announcements 
that affect competition, where significant, have the same effect across companies. 
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Table 4.7 
The effect of competition, pricing, and quality of service announcements on the 
systematic risk of each water company 
Pi = 7„ + IxCOMP - POS, + rj2PRICE - NEG, + 
^PRICE - POS, + TJ4QUAL - NEG, + TJ5QUAL - POS, + u, 
Regressor Pi P2 Pa P< Ps 
Constant 110 0.54187* 0.69809* 0.53982* 0.71225* 0.55069* 
(32.93) (27.67) (18.54) (37.17) (21.56) 
COMP-POS 
T\\ 
0.03806* 0.04150** 0.05101 0.02206 0.08831 
(2.32) (1.80) (1.30) (1.00) (1.34) 
PRICE-NEG 112 -0.02129* -0.03498** -0.04084* -0.02862* -0.03059* 
(-2.58) (-1.80) (-2.23) (-2.30) (-2.49) 
PRICE-POS Tl3 -0.1419E-3 -0.01554 0.00456 -0.00253 0.02235 
(-0.0120) (-0.8462) (0.2785) (-0.1599) (1.52) 
QUAL-NEG 1^4 0.00379 -0.01826 -0.01192 -0.00425 -0.00281 
(0.3899) (-0.9519) (-0.7720) (-0.3239) (-0.3297) 
QUAL-POS 115 0.01378 -0.00636 0.3971E-3 0.00779 0.00335 
(1.2220) (-0.2652) (0.01361) (0.4763) (0.1262) 
P 7 Ps P 9 Pio 
Constant 110 0.59144* 0.67473* 0.58600* 0.62884* 0.57055* 
(11.55) (24.03) (27.67) (12.72) (15.48) 
COMP-POS 111 0.10172 0.05393** 0.05362 0.04745 0.06202 
(1.45) (1.77) (1.52) (0.9648) (1.3316) 
PRICE-NEG 112 -0.06976** -0.03931* -0.02863* -0.06018** -0.04360* 
(-1.687) (-2.08) (-2.95) (-1.91) (-2.42) 
PRICE-POS 113 -0.00567 -0.00976 0.01125 -0.00687 0.00352 
(-0.2031) (-0.5388) (0.8415) (-0.2381) (0.1858) 
QUAL-NEG 114 -0.03320 -0.01878 -0.7500E-3 -0.03615 -0.02512 
(-0.9995) (1.007) (-0.0909) (-1.1592) (-1.3808) 
QUAL-POS 115 -0.03502 -0.00115 0.8449E-3 -0.01879 -0.00669 
(-0.6655) (-0.0448) (0.04328) (-0.4208) (-0.2118) 
Notes: 
See notes Table 4.1. 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation based on Newey-West adjusted S.E., Parzen 
Weights, t-statistics appear in parenthesis. 
Systematic risk: Pi is for Anglian Water, p 2 North West Water, p 3 Northumbrian Water, 
P 4 Severn-Trent, p 5 South West Water Services, p 6 Southern Water Services, p 7 Thames 
Water, p 8 Welsh Water, p 9 Wessex Water and p 1 0 Yorkshire Water. 
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These results confirm that water companies are vulnerable to price regulation by 
different degrees. This is well justified by the disparity in size and profitability o f the 
water companies 7 5. 
4.4.4. The Overall Effect of Regulation 
The comparison o f the estimated systematic risk o f the water industry wi th the 
constructed systematic risk that excludes the effects o f regulation in Table 4.8 suggests 
that overall the regulatory announcements have a small effect on the systematic risk o f 
the industry. Furthermore, the null hypothesis that the means o f the two measures o f 
systematic risk are equal cannot be rejected according to a t-test. The implication o f 
these findings is that the overall impact o f regulation on the industry's cost o f equity 
capital is very small i f any at all. Given the findings in the previous sections, this is 
hardly surprising. With the impact o f regulation being so diversified by both type o f 
announcement and company, there is obviously an averaging out effect when a more 
aggregated investigation is conducted. The fact that the 'cost' o f regulation appears to 
be insignificant leads to the conclusion that, in the case o f water, regulation is not 
overall distorting the market evaluation of risk. 
During the period examined, the difference in turnover between the smallest and the 
largest WaSC was f ivefold; similarly, the largest WaSC had three times as much 
operating profits as the smallest company. 
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Table 4.8 
A comparison of the systematic risk of the water industry with and without the 
effects of regulation 
Descriptive statistics Systematic risk Systematic risk with the 
effects of regulation removed 
Maximum 1.8648 1.8648 
Min imum 0.0000 0.0000 
Mean 0.69217 0.68199 
Standard Deviation 0.18326 0.17027 
Estimated Correlation Matrix of Variables 
Systematic risk Systematic risk wi th the effects 
of regulation removed 
Systematic risk 1.0000 .92900 
Systematic risk wi th the .92900 1.0000 
effects o f regulation 
removed 
Testing HQ: mean of systematic risk = 0.68199 z-statistic:-0.00144 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Unlike previous studies, which assume that systematic risk is constant through time, this 
chapter employs a dynamic GARCH methodology in order to estimate a time-varying 
systematic risk for the water industry. Announcements are grouped by their expected 
impact on the water industry's competitive posture, pricing policy, and quality o f 
services. Only announcements that are expected to increase competition and 
announcements that relate to the quality o f services appear to have a significant impact 
upon the water industry's systematic risk. However, further evidence when the impact 
of individual announcements is analyzed suggests that, within the insignificant price 
groups, many individual announcements are found to significantly affect the industry's 
systematic risk. When the systematic risk o f individual companies is considered, a 
slightly different picture emerges: the group o f announcements that affect price 
negatively seems to have a significant - but not uniform - impact on all utilities. Finally, 
the overall impact o f regulation on the industry's cost o f equity capital seems to be 
insignificant over the sample period. 
Overall the results reveal some important issues. Firstly, individual regulatory 
announcements do affect systematic risk and this confirms the existence o f a circular 
problem in regulation, namely that while risk affects regulation, in turn regulation 
affects risk. Secondly, when announcements are grouped by type and tested on the 
water industry as a whole, announcements relating to quality o f services and 
competition appear to alter investors' perception o f risk. This confirms that the issue o f 
quality is critically important in the water industry, it has an uncertain future and that 
quality regulation is expected to play a fundamental role in determining both 
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profitability and pricing policies. The water industry also appears to be sensitive to the 
regulator's attempt at introducing 'comparative' competition. This suggests that the 
industry views this type o f regulation as being effective. Thirdly, when the WaSCs are 
analysed individually, the heterogeneous nature of these companies becomes clear. The 
systematic risk o f all companies decrease in response to PRICE-NEG announcements; 
however, the size o f the reaction is different for different companies. Finally, this 
chapter attempts to measure the overall effect o f regulation on the systematic risk o f the 
industry and finds that, in the case investigated, the long-term effect o f regulation is 
insignificant. 
In conclusion, although the industry's systematic risk does not appear to have been 
altered overall by regulatory action over the sample period, regulators need to be 
aware that their actions may indeed affect the systematic risk o f individual regulated 
companies, and thus their cost o f equity capital. However, the direction o f these 
effects is not always easy to predict. This result, coupled with the finding o f a 
heterogeneous impact o f price announcements across the industry, indicates that 
regulation alters risk perceptions at the level o f individual companies and thus 
regulators need to be sensitive to the effects o f their actions on individual firms. 
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A P P E N D I X 4 
Regulatory Announcements for the Water Industry of England and Wales: 
April 1990 - September 1995 
1. Announcements that are expected to have a positive effect on Competition 
( C O M P - P O S ) . 
CP1 Apr 27 1990 DG welcomes decision on Three Valleys merger inquiry. 
CP2 Jul 04 1990 DG welcomes water mergers decision but emphasises need for 
"comparative competition". 
CP3 Oct 311991 "Competition in water industry is feasible and should be 
welcomed" says OFWAT. 
CP4 Jul 04 1995 More competition is needed in the industry - OFWAT introduces 
new measures to this end. 
CP5 Jul 26 1995 OFWAT welcomes outcome of M M C report into the merger 
between Lyonnaise Des Eaux and Northumbrian Water. 
2. Announcements that are expected to have a negative effect on prices 
( P R I C E - N E G ) . 
PN1 Jun 19 1990 DG reports on the first 7 months o f regulatory regime. 
PN2 Oct 30 1990 OFWAT proposes changes to infrastructure charging systems. 
PN3 Nov05 1990 "Have your say on how you pay" urges DG. 
PN4 Nov26 1990 OFWAT asks WaSCs to canvas customers on charging methods. 
PN5 Dec05 1990 OFWAT calls for co-operation to stop rising prices. 
PN6 Dec20 1990 OFWAT consults on proposed changes to infrastructure charging 
schemes. 
PN7 Jan 28 1991 OFWAT proposes maximum price for resale o f water services. 
PN8 Feb08 1991 DG suggests no 100% pass-through o f increased environmental 
expenditure. 
Debate on water metering intensifies. 
Water industry must consider customers, says OFWAT. 
Data o f financial performance o f industry in 1990-1991 published 
by OFWAT. 
Land disposal rules for WaSCs changed. 
D G says customer involvement is essential in price reviews. 
OFWAT warns WaSCa on meter installation and charges. 
Suggestion that reports o f public support for metering are 
misleading rejected by OFWAT. 
PN16 Jul 20 1992 Competition may lead to varying water prices. 
PN17 Aug 241992 OFWAT consults on license changes to protect customers. 
PN18 Sep 22 1992 Better deal for water customers put forward. 
PN 19 Oct 19 1992 OFWAT seeks reductions in charges for 1993. 
PN20 Oct 20 1992 Most WaSCos settle for lower charges for 1993. 
PN21 Nov 10 1992 OFWAT consults on framework for return on capital to be used at 
periodic review. 
PN22 Dec23 1992 DG resets North West Water price limits. 
PN23 Jan 12 1993 D G scrutinises use o f water profits. 
PN9 A p r i l 1991 
PN10 May091991 
PN11 Jul 011991 
PN12 Jan 171992 
PN13 Mar04 1992 
PN14 Mayl21992 
PN15 Jul 071992 
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PN24 
PN25 
PN26 
PN27 
PN28 
PN29 
PN30 
PN31 
FeblO 1993 
Mar04 1993 
M a r l 5 1993 
Mar24 1993 
Mar29 1993 
Apr 29 1993 
May 12 1993 
Jun22 1993 
PN32 Jul 14 1993 
PN33 Aug 12 1993 
PN34 Sep 13 1993 
PN35 Sep 17 1993 
PN36 
PN37 
PN38 
PN39 
PN40 
PN41 
PN42 
PN43 
Oct 07 1993 
Oct 19 1993 
Jan 071994 
Mar 14 1994 
Mar24 1994 
Apr 05 1994 
May301994 
Jun 16 1994 
PN44 Jun 21 1994 
PN45 Jul 15 1994 
PN46 Jul 25 1994 
PN47 Jul 28 1994 
PN48 Sep05 1994 
PN49 Sep21 1994 
PN50 Sep29 1994 
PN51 Oct l7 1994 
PN52 Feb 14 1995 
PN53 M a r l 4 1995 
PN54 May 16 1995 
PN55 Jun 21 1995 
PN56 Jun 27 1995 
PN57 Aug24 1995 
OFWAT consults on paying for growth. 
DG secures further protection for customers. 
DG spells out that unending price escalation must stop. 
Responses to "Cost of Quality" consultation to be announced. 
DG launches "National Customer Council". 
DG welcomes progress towards fairer meter charges. 
OFWAT takes further steps to prevent cross-subsidisation. 
OFWAT warns that consumers w i l l not accept continuing 
increases in charges. 
OFWAT publishes costing o f new E U regulations on water 
standards. 
Report published on the effects o f different charging methods. 
DG welcomes National Meter Trials Report. 
OFWAT clarifies programme and process for 1994 review of 
price limits. 
Customers to benefit f rom proposed license amendments. 
OFWAT welcomes response o f Government to costs o f water 
quality improvements. 
More customers to benefit f rom proposed license changes. 
WaCSs have opportunities to reduce costs says DG. 
OFWAT wins better deal for metered customers. 
Major review o f all price limits gets underway. 
Row ensues over new price controls. 
1993 Annual Report published. OFWAT strives to l imi t price 
rises. 
OFWAT warns WaSCs that customers w i l l not accept ever higher 
bills. 
OFWAT plans tough price limits, forcing WaSCs to work harder 
for profits. 
OFWAT expects to l imit price rises over next 5 years. 
A new financial climate for the industry - caps on rising water 
bills and orders to become more efficient. 
P M calls meeting to discuss policy towards utilities. 
Non-domestic bills rose by twice inflation. 
Appeals against price limits referred to M M C . 
Local watchdogs to challenge ministers over SW bills. 
OFWAT strengthens ring-fencing protection for customers when 
WaSCs plan to diversify. 
Rate o f increase in bills slows. Average bills falling. 
OFWAT publishes new report on water companies' tariffs. 
1994 Annual Report published. 
Article looking at increasing risk o f investing utilities. 
OFWAT in talks with WaSCs over possibility on compensating 
customers for recent hose-pipe bans. 
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3. Announcements that are expected to have a positive effect on prices 
( P R I C E - P O S ) . 
PP1 May301990 
PP2 
PP3 
PP5 
PP6 
PP7 
PP8 
PP9 
PP12 
PP13 
PP14 
PP15 
PP16 
PP18 
PP19 
PP20 
PP21 
PP22 
Aug 071990 
Sep 12 1990 
PP4 Feb 28 1991 
Mar 111991 
May25 1991 
Jul 31 1991 
Sep 09 1991 
Decl3 1991 
PP10 Dec23 1991 
PP11 Feb 17 1992 
Aug06 1992 
Aug 13 1992 
Jun 17 1993 
Jul 12 1993 
Aug30 1993 
PP17 Sep24 1993 
Nov27 1993 
Dec15 1993 
Mar29 1994 
Nov21 1994 
Apr 041994 
Environment minister says water charges w i l l have to rise to meet 
E U standards. 
Charges for business users rising fastest in Western world. 
"Step by step" approach to costing o f large projects encouraged 
by OFWAT. 
New rules on infrastructure charges to come into effect on 1st 
Apr i l . 
Survey findings show "considerable support" for metering. 
Lords EU committee warns bills to rise to meet E U standards. 
D G calls for tougher regulatory regime. 
Regional watchdogs have their say on how customers pay. 
DG says he w i l l allow higher prices due to greater risk f rom 
metering. 
South West Water charges to increase to finance environmental 
improvements. 
WaSCs say curbs on licenses to take supply f rom rivers w i l l result 
in increased prices. 
OFWAT to publish assessment on prospects for future bills. 
OFWAT sets out prospects for future bills. 
Standards could result in 16% rise in real charges. 
D G warns that water bills could treble due to E U impositions. 
Financial institutions call for tighter controls on OFWAT's 
decision-making powers. 
E U concedes standards are unrealistic and agrees to modify rules 
that are financially affecting WaSCs. 
Debate rages over future charging methods. 
DG urged to soften its treatment o f WaSCs in price review. 
OFWAT interferes less in changing WaSCs' price limits. 
Trial installation leads to 16% rise in bills. 
OFWAT welcomes Government decisions on charging methods. 
Announcements that are expected to have a negative effect on quality 
( Q U A L - N E G ) . 
QN1 Aug 151990 1989/1990 water supply disconnection figures published. 
QN2 Jun 18 1991 OFWAT consults on proposed changes to protect water companies' 
core business. 
QN3 Jan 22 1992 EU court finds U K has exceeded maximum allowable nitrate 
levels in water. 
QN4 Jun 01 1992 Customers have their say about water services (MORI) . 
QN5 Jun 05 1992 Disconnections increase: OFWAT expresses concern. 
QN6 Nov 16 1992 OFWAT publishes interim water disconnection figures. 
QN7 DecOl 1992 OFWAT publishes report on water costs and water losses. 
QN8 Oct 28 1993 OFWAT publishes costs o f water delivered and sewage collected. 
QN9 May 16 1994 Water and electricity firms write o f f 1 bi l l ion pounds on failed 
diversification programme. 
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QN10 AugOl 1994 Report claims OFWAT has ended industry profit spree but not 
row over high bills. 
QN11 Aug 12 1994 WaSCs in forefront o f criticism over executive payoffs. 
QN12 Mar30 1995 DG sounds note o f caution to industry on large dividend payouts. 
5. Announcements that are expected to have a positive effect on quality 
( Q U A L - P O S ) . 
QP1 Oct 24 1990 
QP2 Jun 05 1991 
QP3 Sep 19 1991 
QP4 OctOl 1991 
QP5 Oct08 1991 
QP6 Oct 18 1991 
QP7 Nov28 1991 
QP8 Dec05 1991 
QP9 Feb 26 1992 
QP10 May 01 1992 
QP11 Nov04 1992 
QP12 Dec 17 1992 
QP13 May 11 1994 
QP14 Jul 07 1994 
QP15 Nov 10 1994 
QP16 Nov 15 1994 
QP17 Dec 13 1994 
QP18 MarOl 1995 
QP19 May 11 1995 
QP20 Aug08 1995 
OFWAT publishes report on levels o f service in industry. 
OFWAT to take action on WaSCs diversification. 
DG to ask customers what they want. 
WaSCs cut price increases. Capital programmes on track. 
Water industry investment boom takes off . 
Business customers urged to cut their water costs. 
WaSCs chiefs claim Government is undermining its own plans to 
improve water quality by using political pressure to interfere wi th 
water regulation. 
OFWAT publishes report on water industry standards o f service 
for 1990/1991. 
Calls for extension o f integrated pollution and quality control. 
OFWAT acts to implement measures in Citizen's Charters Act. 
OFWAT responds to consultation paper "Using Water Wisely". 
OFWAT reports on standards o f service - overall improvement. 
Water disconnections down by a third. 
Government wants WaSCs to spend 500 million pounds on clean-
up. 
OFWAT publishes paper on future water demand and supply. 
OFWAT reports on continuing fa l l in water disconnections. 
Water industry service standards continue to improve. 
OFWAT calls on government to promote efficient use o f sewage 
services. 
Disconnections continue to fal l fol lowing OFWAT guidelines. 
OFWAT release letter on incentives for efficiency and cost 
cutting. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Following the privatisation programme of public utilities implemented by the U K 
government in the 1980s and early 1990s, an interesting debate on the impact o f 
regulation on the cost o f equity capital has emerged. While the effects o f regulatory 
announcements have been studied extensively in the USA, there is very little systematic 
evidence in the U K . The objective o f this thesis is partly to redress this imbalance by 
analysing the impact o f regulatory announcements on the returns o f equity capital and 
systematic risk o f three utility industries in the U K . 
The review o f the main issues in the economics o f regulation conducted in chapter 1 
highlights the lack of precise theoretical predictions and empirical evidence in relation to 
the impact o f regulation on regulated firms. This uncertainty about the outcomes o f 
regulation extends to the effects on the regulated firm's cash flows and the investor's 
required rate o f return. In particular, a two-way feedback effect between the regulator's 
decisions and the cost o f capital has been identified by the literature, without however any 
agreement as to the direction o f the overall effect. Thus, the issue o f the impact o f 
regulation on the cost o f capital remains largely an empirical question, which the thesis has 
tried to partly address. In addition, the cost of equity capital is a very important variable 
for regulators because it determines the appropriate level o f the rate o f return. While in the 
U K regulators do not directly control the rate of return, a 'fair ' rate o f return is considered 
when price controls are set and revised. 
Since a regulatory process can be described as a chain o f events, an event study 
methodology has been chosen to investigate the effects o f regulation. The thesis 
proposes and tests various extensions o f the traditional model used in regulatory event 
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studies (Binder, 1985b; and Karafiath, 1988). As indicated in the introduction, the aim 
of the empirical analysis conducted in the thesis is twofold. Firstly, the impact o f 
regulatory announcements has been analysed on three industries that, especially during 
the estimation period, differed quite remarkably by both market structure and 
technological innovation. A t one extreme, the regulated telecommunications services 
were mostly supplied by a monopolist; whereas, at the other extreme, the distribution o f 
electricity was regulated with a clear agenda for developing competition. In the water 
industry, on the other hand, although the development o f some form o f competition was 
not ruled out, it was recognised f rom the outset that only limited forms o f competition 
could be developed, as discussed in section 4.1.2. Similarly, while telecommunications 
services were the subject o f significant technological innovations, technology had less 
o f an impact in the reshaping o f the electricity distribution and water markets after 
privatisation. 
Secondly, the empirical analysis presented in the thesis tests different ways o f extending 
the event study methodology to overcome some o f the well-documented statistical 
problems. In chapter 2, the multivariate regression model o f Binder (1985b) is 
estimated as a GARCH(1,1) process to capture the commonly accepted existence o f 
serial correlation in the volatility of asset returns. The announcement dummy variables 
are firstly introduced in the return equation to test for the potential effects o f regulatory 
announcements on the stock returns o f the RECs. Subsequently, the announcement 
dummy variables are introduced in the conditional variance equation to test for the 
possible impact o f different individual announcements on the volatility o f stock returns 
of individual firms, since unanticipated announcements with informational content are 
expected to have an impact on return volatility. 
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The methodology adopted in chapter 2 assumes that the systematic risk o f firms, as 
measured by /?, is constant for the whole estimation period. However, there is evidence 
that this is unlikely to be the case for most firms, but especially for British Telecom, 
given the changes in its political and competitive environment during the estimation 
period. Therefore, the methodology adopted in chapter 3 allows ft to vary over time. 
More specifically, a two-step procedure is followed. In the first stage, a simple market 
model is estimated using the Kalman Filter. In the second stage, the impact o f 
regulatory announcements is tested on the estimated time-varying beta coefficient. The 
methodology in chapter 4 goes one step further by adopting a method of estimation o f 
the systematic risk that incorporates both time variation in beta and changes in variances 
and covariances o f returns. In this last empirical chapter, conditional covariances and 
conditional variances are estimated using a multivariate GARCH system. The time-
varying beta is simply calculated as this estimated conditional covariance divided by the 
conditional variance. Once again, the impact o f regulatory announcements was then 
tested against this time-varying beta coefficient. 
More specifically, chapter 2 analyses the impact o f unanticipated regulatory 
announcements on the return o f the equity capital o f the Regional Electricity Companies 
(RECs) and the power generating companies in England and Wales by using an 
extended market model to include dummy variables and with the residuals modelled as 
a G A R C H (1,1) process. When estimating the impact o f the group announcements, 
announcements relating to the retail price o f electricity supply are found to be the only 
type o f announcements to have a significant impact on the equally weighted portfolio o f 
RECs. Since most o f the announcements relating to competition could have been to 
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some extent anticipated at the time o f privatisation, this is not a surprising result. I t 
simply shows that capital markets discount expected changes in advance of the actual 
implementation and clear regulatory objectives reduce the uncertainty perceived by 
investors. When the effects o f the same announcement groups are tested on the return 
o f the equity capital o f the equally weighted portfolio o f generators, the results are 
different. Generators' returns seem to be affected, in addition to retail price 
announcements, by announcements relating to the tightening o f wholesale price control 
and the increase in competition in electricity generation. This confirms that the 
important issues in electricity generation are quite different to the main issues in 
distribution. While distribution was privatised with a clear agenda for developing 
competition, generation was privatised as a duopoly, without a clear mandate given to 
the regulator. Thus, it could be argued that there is much more uncertainty about the 
future structure o f electricity generation than distribution. 
When the impact o f individual announcements is tested, a good proportion o f 
announcements within insignificant groups have a significant impact on the returns o f 
individual RECs, although their effect does not always have the expected sign. These 
anomalies illustrate how diff icul t it is to classify announcements by type o f expected 
effect and formulate hypothesis about group effects. There is no doubt that greater 
competition in any industry should mean lower profits and thus lower investor's returns. 
However, this generalisation does not take into account cases when a move towards 
industry's liberalisation has implications beyond the simple competitive posture o f 
incumbent firms. Specifically, in the case of the electricity industry, an early 
liberalisation o f the RECs was taken as good news by investors, since finally the RECs 
were able to compete on equal footing with gas suppliers. This type o f effects can only 
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be analysed when individual announcements are considered and highlights the 
importance o f testing for the effects o f both group and individual announcements. 
Finally, chapter 2 also provides evidence that announcements that have a systematic 
effect on returns across the industry also appear to affect return volatility. This 
confirms that some regulatory announcements have an informational content, which 
affects investor's risk perceptions, as argued by Peltzman (1976). 
In the light o f the findings in chapter 2 and some of the limitations o f the methodology 
adopted, chapter 3 focuses on the impact o f regulatory announcements on the systematic 
risk o f British Telecom. As outlined in chapter 3, there is extensive theoretical and 
empirical evidence that regulation can impact upon a regulated firm's systematic risk. In 
particular, Binder and Norton (1999) identify a number of factors through which regulation 
may affect systematic risk. I f systematic risk is affected, this has obvious implications on 
the cost o f equity capital. The chapter develops and utilises a methodology that allows the 
beta coefficient to vary over time. The results are once again consistent with the 
characteristics o f the industry under consideration. O f the group announcements, only 
price announcements which are expected to allow prices to increase and service 
announcements appear to have a significant impact upon BT's shares. The direction o f the 
effect o f the price announcement group, however, contradicts the stated hypothesis and 
shows that more lenient price regulation is associated with 'bad' news. This finding can be 
interpreted as an indication of the existence o f regulatory capture in the presence of one 
dominating company in the industry, such as BT. Given the structure o f the 
telecommunications industry in the U K during the sample period, measures to increase 
consumer protection did not necessarily lead to lower returns for B T since they were 
perceived by investors as likely to hit the potential competition harder than the dominating 
incumbent company. This interpretation is supported by further evidence when the impact 
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of individual announcements is analysed. Closer analysis of individual announcements 
shows additional evidence that regulatory capture is likely to be present and that the 
uncertainty created by ambiguous signals from the regulator, the government and even BT 
itself increases systematic risk, even when the announcement is expected to have the 
opposite effect. Overall, there is evidence that investors believe that regulation cannot 
endanger BT's market dominance and thus revise their expectations only following 
announcements that change the level of uncertainty. 
Finally, chapter 4 examines the impact of regulatory announcements on the systematic 
risk of the water industry of England and Wales. The specific characteristics and 
regulatory features of the water industry aggravate the problems of estimating 
systematic risk and the associated desirable rate of return. A dynamic GARCH 
methodology is thus used to estimate the time-varying systematic risk for both an 
equally weighted portfolio of water and sewerage companies and the individual 
companies. Only group announcements that are expected to increase competition and 
announcements that relate to the quality of services appear to have a significant impact 
upon the water industry's systematic risk. With respect to quality related 
announcements, whether they are expected to increase or not the quality of water 
supply, they appear to increase systematic risk. This is interpreted as evidence of the 
great uncertainty and complexity of quality controls in water, which are determined by 
several national and EU agencies. In addition, the high capital intensity of the water 
industry means that high costs of new and replacement investments are associated with 
any change in quality. Overall these results confirm that investors expect quality 
regulation to play a fundamental role in determining both profitability and pricing 
policies. The significance of the announcements relating to increased competition, 
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however, may seem at first sight surprising, especially considering that there is less 
scope for developing competition in water than in other utilities investigated. 
Nevertheless, they indicate that investors are sensitive to the regulator's attempt at 
introducing 'comparative' competition and view this type of regulation as being 
effective. It must also be pointed out in relation to this result that, when the impact of 
this group announcement is tested for individual water and sewerage companies, only 
three companies' systematic risk appear to be affected by it. 
Although it is surprising that groups of price announcements are found to have no 
significant effect on the water industry as a whole, when the impact of individual 
announcements is analysed within the insignificant price groups, many individual 
announcements are found to significantly affect the industry's systematic risk. 
However, within the same group, announcements have opposing effects and thus 
neutralise each other on aggregate. As discussed in chapter 4, this is an industry where 
there is great uncertainty relating to environmental regulation and associated future 
costs. During the sample period, it was also subject to several regulatory agencies, with 
different and sometimes conflicting objectives. It is thus not surprising that the 
investors' reaction to price announcements is not always as predicted. In addition, the 
diversity of the water and sewerage companies investigated must have an influence on 
the aggregate results and this is confirmed by the results from testing the effects of 
group announcements on the systematic risk of individual companies. When individual 
companies are considered rather than their portfolio, a different picture emerges: the 
group of announcements that affect price negatively seems to have a significant - but 
not uniform - impact on all companies across the industry. Finally, chapter 4 also 
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attempts to measure the overall effect of regulation on the systematic risk of the water 
industry and finds that the long-term effect of regulation is in this case insignificant. 
Overall the results in the empirical chapters reveal some important issues. Firstly, 
individual regulatory announcements can affect both ex-post returns and systematic 
risk. This finding lends support to the theoretical view that there is a circular problem 
in regulation, namely that while risk affects the regulatory parameters through the 
determination of a 'fair' rate of return, in turn regulation affects both ex-post returns and 
risk. Secondly, while grouping announcements and testing the effects of these groups 
on the industry as a whole leads to more general policy conclusions, it can also be 
misleading about investors' reactions to announcements. The results from testing for 
the effects of individual announcements show that some types of announcements have a 
great informational content, but they also have a heterogeneous impact. Thus, when 
grouped, their effects average out on aggregate. Thirdly, when companies within an 
industry are analysed individually, the heterogeneous nature of these companies 
becomes clear. In most cases, although the sign of the impact of an announcement is 
the same across companies, the size of the reaction is different for different companies 
and some companies are not affected at all. Finally, the way in which regulation 
impacts on an industry's cost of equity capital crucially depends on the structure and 
competitive posture of that industry, as well as technological and market conditions and 
the parameters of the regulatory system. 
In conclusion, whichever regulatory system is implemented, it is clear from the debate 
in the literature that the cost of equity capital plays an important role in price regulation, 
at least as long as the price of regulated services is related in some way to the cost of 
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providing them. In the case of the price cap system, this relationship between cost of 
capital and prices of regulated services is not direct, but it is embedded in the setting of 
the parameters on which the scheme is based. However, there is also a reverse 
relationship, since regulation in turn affects the cost of capital. This thesis has provided 
supporting evidence for this latter causal relationship. Regulators need to be aware that 
their actions may indeed alter risk perceptions at the level of both individual regulated 
companies and industries; they affect companies' ex-post returns and systematic risk, 
and thus their cost of equity capital. However, the direction and size of these effects are 
not always easy to predict, although they crucially depend on the parameters of the 
regulatory system. 
Having provided evidence to suggest that regulation may alter ex-post returns and 
systematic risk, two key questions remain: (i) Does regulation increase the inherent 
variability of earnings?; and (ii) Can regulation be made endogenous to the process of 
estimating the cost of capital? The first question is important because, i f regulation is 
found to increase earnings variability, then the specific way in which price regulation 
operates becomes an important consideration in estimating the cost of capital. One of 
the main effects of price cap regulation is to shift most of the risks of cost variability 
from consumers to shareholders. This may provide a disincentive for managers to take 
risk and thus earning variability may decline. The effects of this decline in earning 
variability on the cost of capital are uncertain and crucially depend on the specific 
parameters of the regulatory control. In particular, they depend on the upper and lower 
limits of the rate of return, which are used by the regulator to decide whether there is 
scope for a review of the price cap. I f the upper limit is more tightly controlled than the 
lower limit, then regulation will tend to neutralise the gains to the firm from increased 
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earnings, but not the losses from lower earning. Thus, a greater regulation-induced 
variability of earnings will increase perceived risk and thus the cost of capital will also 
increase. On the contrary, i f the lower limit is more tightly controlled than the upper 
limit, then the firm wil l be protected against a decline in earnings, while it will be 
allowed to earn the benefit of higher earnings. In this case, a greater regulation-induced 
variability of earnings will reduce perceived risk and thus the cost of capital. 
With respect to including regulation explicitly into the model for estimating the cost of 
capital, this thesis provides empirical evidence that it is important to consider regulation 
as endogenous to the estimation of the cost of capital. This is an issue that requires 
further investigation. Multi-factor models used to estimate systematic risk allow for 
several sources of risk, so it would be possible for one of the factors to represent 
regulation. However, this has never been attempted and several authors have expressed 
doubts that one factor could fully represent the dynamic regulatory process. A 
theoretical solution to this problem can be found in the theory of contingent claims. 
Brennan and Schwartz (1982) first developed a contingent claim model for analysing 
the dynamic effects of regulation on firm's value and risk. This model treats regulation 
as an on-going process, in which cash flows to investors are randomly dependent on 
future regulatory decisions and are subject to dynamic shifts. In other words, cash flows 
are contingent on stochastic events and price regulation. Contingent claims models 
suggest that beta is a poor indicator of a fair rate of return for a regulated company and 
that there are important regulatory variables that can affect the cost of capital, such as 
the upper and lower limits for regulatory intervention. Although at present contingent 
claims models remain theoretical, they represent the only methodology that explicit 
accepts the potential changes in risk arising from regulatory decisions. 
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